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ELECTIONS AND ALIGNMENT
Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos*
Election law doctrine has long been dominated by rights-andinterests balancing: the weighing of the rights burdens imposed by electoral regulations against the state interests that the regulations serve. For
the last generation, the election law literature has emphasized structural
values that relate to the functional realities of the electoral system, competition chief among them. This Article introduces a new structural
theory—the alignment approach—that has the potential to reframe and
unify many election law debates. The crux of the approach is that voters’
preferences ought to be congruent with those of their elected representatives. Preferences as to both party and policy should correspond, and they
should do so at the levels of both the individual district and the jurisdiction as a whole.
The alignment approach is attractive because it stems from the core
meaning of democracy itself. If it is the people who are sovereign, then it
is their preferences that should be reflected in the positions of their representatives. The approach also is appealing because of the support it
finds in the Supreme Court’s case law. While the Court has never embraced the approach explicitly, it has often recognized the significance of
preference congruence. However, it is important not to overstate the
approach’s utility. Other election law values matter too and cannot be
disregarded. Moreover, many of the factors that produce misalignment
are nonlegal and thus cannot be addressed by law reform alone.
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INTRODUCTION
Something important is missing from the prevailing judicial and academic accounts of many election law issues. Consider the spate of franchise restrictions that states around the country recently have enacted:
photo identification requirements for voting, proof-of-citizenship requirements for registering to vote, cutbacks to early voting, and the like.1
According to the Supreme Court, the only cognizable harm that these
policies may inflict is a burden on the individual right to vote. The policies should be upheld if they are tied closely enough to the state’s alleged
interests in preventing fraud and improving election administration.
According to most of the legal literature, franchise restrictions should be
assessed based on their implications for structural values such as competition and participation. The validity of the policies should hinge on
whether they entrench incumbents in office or deter many people from
engaging in the political process.
But the uproar over photo identification requirements and their ilk
has not arisen primarily—or even mostly—because of concerns about
liberty, competition, or participation. The main objection to the
measures, rather, is that they disproportionately prevent certain kinds of
people from voting: minorities, the poor, the young, in a word,
1. See Wendy Weiser & Diana Kasdan, Brennan Ctr. for Justice, Voting Law Changes:
Election Update 1–6, 17–21 (2012), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/
default/files/legacy/publications/Voting_Law_Changes_Election_Update.pdf (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (describing franchise restrictions adopted by nineteen states
in 2011–2012 period); Wendy R. Weiser & Lawrence Norden, Brennan Ctr. for Justice,
Voting Law Changes in 2012, at 1–3 (2011), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/
page/-/Democracy/VRE/Brennan_Voting_Law_V10.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (summarizing various restrictions adopted in 2011). Other new restrictions
included limiting voter registration drives, eliminating election day registration, and
making it more difficult to restore voting rights to ex-felons. See id. at 2–3.
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Democrats. As Judge Evans of the Seventh Circuit has written, in a rare
judicial acknowledgement of this point, “Let’s not beat around the bush:
The Indiana voter photo ID law is a not-too-thinly-veiled attempt to discourage election-day turnout by certain folks believed to skew
Democratic.”2 Uneven declines in turnout, of course, may produce different election outcomes from those that would have arisen in the absence
of the franchise restrictions. More Republican candidates may prevail
due to the change in the composition of the electorate. Above all, it is
this potential partisan distortion, not the worries identified by courts and
scholars, that fuels the controversy over the “new vote denial.”3
Next, consider the record spending that took place during the 2012
campaign: about $6.3 billion in federal races alone, a sum 20% higher
than in 2008 and 100% higher than in 2000.4 According to the Court, the
only problem with this spending is quid pro quo corruption, the explicit
exchange of money for political favors.5 The legal literature highlights a
broader range of concerns, including unequal influence over the electoral process and reduced competition due to the financial advantage of
incumbency.6 But to many observers, an even more urgent issue is the
imbalance in the resources available to the two major parties.7 If one party
enjoys a substantial financial edge (as the Republicans did in 20128), and
2. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 954 (7th Cir. 2007) (Evans,
J., dissenting), aff’d, 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (plurality opinion).
3. Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the Voting
Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. Rev. 689, 691–92 (2006) (coining phrase for recent wave of measures
aimed at making voting more difficult).
4. The Money Behind the Elections, OpenSecrets.org, http://www.opensecrets.org/
bigpicture/index.php (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Dec. 28, 2013)
[hereinafter Election Money].
5. See, e.g., FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496–97
(1985) (“The hallmark of corruption is the financial quid pro quo: dollars for political
favors.”).
6. See infra notes 232–235 and accompanying text (reviewing this literature).
7. One of these observers is former President Bill Clinton. See Noam Levey, Clinton:
GOP Money Advantage Could Still Swing the Election, L.A. Times (Sept. 23, 2012),
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/sep/23/news/la-pn-clinton-gop-money-20120923
(on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (“‘Citizens United gave [an enormous financial
advantage] to these Republican super PACs . . . .’” (quoting interview with former
President Bill Clinton)).
8. See
2012
Outside
Spending,
by
Race,
OpenSecrets.org,
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2012&disp=R&pty=A&ty
pe=A (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Dec. 28, 2013) (noting proRepublican outside groups outspent pro-Democratic outside groups $834 million to $501
million); 2012 Presidential Race, OpenSecrets.org, http://www.opensecrets.org/
pres12/index.php (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Dec. 28, 2013)
(noting Republican spending on presidential race totaled $1.24 billion compared to $1.11
billion
for
Democrats);
Price
of
Admission,
OpenSecrets.org,
http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/stats.php (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(last visited Dec. 28, 2013) (showing Republicans outspent Democrats $580 million to
$476 million in House races and $377 million to $309 million in Senate races).
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if dollars spent have an impact on votes received, then election outcomes
may deviate from what they would have been in an environment with
more even outlays. The fear that voters may be swayed by asymmetric
spending animates much of the popular conversation about campaign
finance—but is largely absent from the judicial and academic debate.
Last (for now), consider redistricting, the decennial redrawing of
district lines, whose most recent iteration generated 206 lawsuits in 42
states,9 as well as howls of outrage when Republicans retained their
House majority in 2012 despite receiving 1.4 million fewer votes nationwide than their opponents.10 The Court has floundered for decades in its
efforts to determine why (and whether) gerrymandering might be unconstitutional. The most prominent recent scholarship argues that the
practice’s core harm is the decline in competition that ensues when bipartisan plans shield incumbents from electoral challenge.11 But the
most glaring problem with gerrymandering—the problem that spawned
the term two centuries ago—is the partisan havoc that it may wreak.
Clever district configurations may give rise to legislatures whose composition diverges sharply from the will of a majority of voters. This sort of
mismatch arose in several states in 2012,12 and it is the quintessential injury inflicted by gerrymandering.
A common thread runs through all of these examples. In each case,
an electoral practice may produce a misalignment13 between the preferences of voters and the preferences of their elected representatives. In
each case, this misalignment is precisely what is objectionable about the
practice (even if it is not all that is objectionable). And in each case, both
the doctrine and the legal literature seem oddly uninterested in the misalignment. They plainly are missing something important.

9. Litigation in the 2010 Cycle, All About Redistricting, http://redistricting.lls.edu/
cases.php (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Dec. 28, 2013).
10. E.g., Greg Giroux, Republicans Win Congress as Democrats Get Most Votes,
Bloomberg (Mar. 18, 2013, 8:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-0319/republicans-win-congress-as-democrats-get-most-votes.html (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
11. See infra note 268 and accompanying text (discussing this scholarship).
12. At the congressional level, for example, Democrats received a majority of the
statewide vote in Michigan, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, but won only
36%, 31%, 28%, and 38% of the available seats, respectively. 2012 election results are on
file with the Columbia Law Review.
13. Misalignment also could be conceived in agency cost terms as the divergence
between the interests of the principal (the electorate) and of agents (elected
representatives). See, e.g., D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 Harv. L. Rev.
671, 706 (2013) (using this framework). I prefer the terminology of alignment because it
lends itself more easily to the various classifications that I employ in this Article (partisan
versus policy alignment and district-specific versus legislative alignment).
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The purpose of this Article, then, is to introduce the alignment
approach to election law.14 By alignment I mean that the preferences of
voters are congruent with the preferences of their elected representatives. Preferences with respect to two concepts are relevant here: first,
partisan affiliation, so that, if a majority of voters wish to be represented
by a candidate from a certain party, this in fact is who represents them;
and second, public policy, so that if most voters hold a certain ideology
or issue position, their representative tends to do so as well (or at least to
vote accordingly). Alignment also operates at two distinct levels: first,
within a particular district, so that the preferences of the district’s median voter are aligned with those of the district’s representative; and
second, within a jurisdiction as a whole, so that the preferences of the
jurisdiction’s median voter are aligned with those of the legislature’s
median member. The median voter and legislator bear special significance under the alignment approach because it is only they, thanks to
their positions at the midpoints of their respective distributions, who
speak by definition for popular or legislative majorities.
While there is no particular locus classicus for the alignment
approach in the democratic theory literature, an impressive range of
thinkers have made the normative argument that the preferences of
voters ought to be aligned with those of their representatives—and that
elections are the key instrument for producing this alignment. For example, Hanna Pitkin, the famed scholar of representation, once wrote
that “[o]ur concern with elections and electoral machinery . . . results
from our conviction that such machinery is necessary to . . . secure a government responsive to public interest and opinion.”15 Similarly, Joseph
Bessette, one of the pioneers of the deliberative democracy movement,
has commented that “[t]he chief mechanism for ensuring a reliable link
between the deliberations of representatives and the interests and desires
of the represented is the electoral connection.”16 The alignment approach may be new to election law, but it is hardly unfamiliar to democratic theory.
And in fact the alignment approach is not entirely new to election
law. Hints of it are evident in the Court’s great one-person, one-vote decisions, in which the Justices made clear that legislatures must accurately
reflect the will of the electorate. Intimations of it also can be found in the
Court’s campaign finance case law, in which the argument appears on
occasion that contributions may be regulated in order to prevent politicians from embracing the views of their donors rather than of their vot14. Cf. Edward B. Foley, Election Law and the Roberts Court: An Introduction, 68
Ohio St. L.J. 733, 734 (2007) (imploring scholars to “offer the Supreme Court ideas and
principles concerning their field as a whole” to “make[] the cumulative body of the
Court’s precedent cohere as a sensibly unified law”).
15. Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of Representation 234 (1967).
16. Joseph M. Bessette, The Mild Voice of Reason: Deliberative Democracy and
American National Government 36 (1994).
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ers.17 In the legal literature as well, the responsiveness that many scholars
value is not so different a concept from alignment.18 Responsiveness refers to the rate at which legislative preferences change given some shift in
voters’ preferences, while alignment denotes the congruence of these preferences. Both terms share the premise that, in a democracy, public policy
ultimately must be tied to public opinion.
Still, there is no question that the alignment approach is not the
Court’s usual approach in election law cases. To the extent the Court has
an overarching theory in this domain, it is that valuable individual
rights—speech, association, and the franchise—sometimes are burdened
by regulations of the political process, and that in such circumstances it is
the Court’s duty to weigh the burdens against the countervailing interests
served by the regulations. This methodology has little in common with
the alignment approach’s emphasis on the correspondence between voters’ and representatives’ preferences. Analogously, the dominant theory
in the legal literature, that electoral practices should be assessed based
on their implications for competition, is largely orthogonal to the alignment approach in terms of values and prescriptions. Competition and
alignment may both be important democratic principles, but there is no
reason to expect them to be especially highly correlated. Electoral
systems easily may be competitive but misaligned, or uncompetitive but
properly aligned.
The payoff of the alignment approach is that it reframes—and provides a common vocabulary for analyzing—an array of election law issues.
For instance, partisan misalignment, the divergence between voters and
representatives in terms of partisan preference, is a serious concern in
the franchise restriction, campaign finance, and party regulation contexts. In the franchise restriction context, the misalignment occurs when
the median actual voter (who is pivotal to the representative’s election)
differs from the median eligible voter who would have gone to the polls
in the absence of the measure at issue. In the campaign finance setting,
the misalignment arises when asymmetric spending creates a gap between the median actual voter and the median hypothetical voter exposed to more even outlays. And in the party regulation arena, an even
starker sort of misalignment ensues when the presence of a third party
on the ballot, enabled by lax regulation, results in the victory of a candidate not even preferred by the median actual voter.
In all of these cases, partisan misalignment produces policy misalignment too: the divergence between voters and representatives in terms of
policy preferences. But other common electoral scenarios may generate
policy misalignment even if there is no partisan misalignment. For example, the contributions that fuel modern campaigns may cause repre17. See infra notes 143–145 and accompanying text (describing case law).
18. See infra note 67 and accompanying text (providing sample of responsiveness
literature).
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sentatives’ issue preferences to reflect the views of their donors rather
than those of their constituents. Likewise, closed primaries, which are
used by about half the states, may encourage candidates to embrace the
opinions of party activists instead of general election participants. And
districts that are highly heterogeneous may make politicians more susceptible to partisan pressures since the signals they receive from their
constituents are more difficult to interpret.
The above examples all involve district-level harms that may then
aggregate into partisan or policy misalignment at the legislative level. But
legislative misalignment also may be brought about directly by redistricting. Shrewd district lines may cause the party preferred by the median
voter in a jurisdiction not to win a majority of the jurisdiction’s seats. The
partisan divergence is obvious in this case, and so too, given the parties’
very different issue stances, is the resulting gap in policy preferences between the median voter and the median representative. Ironically, efforts
to augment minority representation may give rise to the same kind of
legislative misalignment. Minority-heavy districts often are very safe for
the Democrats, so if too many of them are drawn, Republicans may end
up winning a majority of a jurisdiction’s seats even if they do not enjoy
the support of a majority of the jurisdiction’s voters.
In addition to reframing these issues, the Article draws on work by
political scientists to estimate the extent of the misalignment in each context. For instance, photo identification requirements reduce turnout by
2% to 3%, on average, and result in a net pro-Republican swing of 0% to
1%.19 The latter figure represents the partisan misalignment between the
median actual voter and the median eligible voter who would have gone
to the polls in the absence of the restriction. Similarly, the voting records
of representatives are about six times more reflective of the views of affluent contributors than they are of the opinions of the median-income
constituent.20 This differential constitutes the policy misalignment between the representative and the median voter. And in the most recent
election, congressional district plans featured an average partisan bias of
about 10%.21 If the disadvantaged party had won 50% of the vote (and
the support of the median voter), it would have won only 40% of the
seats (and not the allegiance of the median legislator).
To be clear, the Article does not claim that alignment is the only
value that is relevant to the resolution of election law disputes. Individual
rights (the Court’s mainstay) and electoral competition (the darling of
the legal literature) plainly are implicated in many cases, as are participation, political equality, minority representation, and a host of other con-

19. Infra notes 186–188 and accompanying text.
20. Infra notes 252–258 and accompanying text.
21. Infra notes 292–293 and accompanying text.
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siderations.22 The Article’s aim is to draw attention to a vital democratic
principle that has been underappreciated to date—not to displace all
other election law theories. Misalignment also is not a problem that is
caused or can be solved by the law alone. The factors that produce misalignment (particularly of the policy variety) include internal legislative
structures, powerful political parties, politicians’ perceptions of their
constituents’ preferences, politicians’ own ideologies, the geographic
distribution of the parties’ supporters, and single-member districting itself. Many of these factors are political; some are historical or psychological; but none clearly lies within law’s empire.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I surveys the existing accounts
of election law disputes and identifies a crucial value—the alignment of
voters’ and representatives’ preferences—that courts and scholars largely
have neglected. Part II explicates the alignment approach. It outlines the
approach’s intellectual and doctrinal origins, explains what it is that
ought to be aligned, and argues for the importance of preference congruence in a democracy. Part III, the pragmatic core of the Article, uses
the alignment approach to reconceptualize a series of election law debates. It covers topics including franchise restriction, party regulation,
campaign finance, redistricting, and minority representation. Lastly, Part
IV sets forth some of the limits of alignment. It stresses the plurality of
election law values as well as the constraints on what the law alone can
achieve.
One final introductory point: The Article’s rationale for introducing
the alignment approach is not just that it redirects attention to a key issue in many election law cases. It is also that the problem of misalignment has never been greater in modern American history. Franchise restrictions that distort the composition of the electorate have
surged in popularity in recent years.23 The Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Citizens United v. FEC has opened the floodgates to much higher
and more uneven campaign spending.24 The partisan bias of congressional district plans reached a forty-year high in the 2012 election.25 Conversely, the congruence between House members’ voting patterns and
constituents’ opinions is now at a forty-year low.26 Under these circumlaw).

22. See infra Part I.A–B (reviewing Court’s and scholars’ perspectives on election

23. See Weiser & Kasdan, supra note 1, at 1–6, 17–21 (surveying recent restrictive
state voting laws).
24. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); see infra note 225 (discussing effects of Citizens United).
25. See infra notes 292–293 and accompanying text (noting that both absolute and
pro-Republican redistricting biases are at highest levels since 1966).
26. See Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Candidate Positioning in U.S. House Elections,
45 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 136, 151 (2001) [hereinafter Ansolabehere et al., Candidate
Positioning] (presenting chart of U.S. House candidate responsiveness over time); John D.
Griffin, Party Polarization and Representation 12 fig.2 (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://www.dartmouth.edu/~govt/docs/John%20Griffin%20paper.pdf (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (demonstrating increase in “average citizen distance
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stances, it is not only scholars who may benefit from a renewed focus on
preference alignment. It is also American democracy itself.
I. WHY ELECTIONS?
In a well-known 2002 essay, Samuel Issacharoff posed the provocative question: Why elections?27 Why, that is, do we use the ballot box to
decide who will have the privilege of governing us? Issacharoff asked this
question not as a democratic theorist but rather as an election law
scholar. His aim was to formulate a theory that could both explain what is
at stake in electoral disputes and guide courts in their resolution of these
disputes. As he put it, a central task “in developing an organic view of the
law of the political process is to provide a more robust understanding of
what justifies . . . judicial intervention into the political domain.”28
I begin this Part by distilling from its case law the theory, such as it is,
on which the Supreme Court relies to explain its activity in the election
law arena. In brief, the Court’s view is that regulations of the political
process, though they may serve many worthwhile state interests, also may
burden valuable individual rights.29 The Court’s duty is to ensure that the
interests served by the regulations are worth the burdens imposed on the
rights. I next describe the most prominent academic accounts of the
harms that may arise in the electoral context and the ways that courts
should strive to ameliorate them. Some scholars are sympathetic to the
Court’s framework of rights balanced against interests. But the dominant
perspective in the legal literature—the one that Issacharoff adopted to
answer his “why elections” question—is that structural values, competition chief among them, provide the appropriate prism for making sense
of the law of democracy.30 Finally, I argue that both the doctrine and the
literature largely have overlooked the vital value of aligning the preferences of voters with those of their elected representatives. Like competition, alignment is a structural value that does not fit easily into the
Court’s rights-and-interests framework. But unlike competition, alignment has not yet been advanced as a unifying election law principle.

from members of Congress”); cf. The Polarization of the Congressional Parties,
Voteview.com, http://voteview.org/political_polarization.asp (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (last updated Jan. 18, 2013) (illustrating dramatic increases in congressional
polarization through 2012).
27. Samuel Issacharoff, Surreply, Why Elections?, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 684 (2002).
28. Id. at 684; see also Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Constitutional Pluralism and Democratic
Politics: Reflections on the Interpretive Approach of Baker v. Carr, 80 N.C. L. Rev. 1103,
1138 (2002) [hereinafter Charles, Constitutional Pluralism] (arguing ideal theory of
judicial intervention in election law domain “would combine the constitutional text, with
its silences, and its vagueness[,] . . . in addition to substantive principles of democratic
theory”).
29. See infra Part I.A (reviewing Court’s election law jurisprudence).
30. See infra Part I.B (reviewing scholarly perspectives).
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A. The Court’s Answer
The closest the Supreme Court has come to articulating a general
theory of judicial activity in the election law domain is its discussion of
rights and interests in the 1992 case of Burdick v. Takushi.31 The Court
stated that “the rigorousness of our inquiry into the propriety of a state
election law depends upon the extent to which a challenged regulation
burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.”32 If the burden on
these rights—speech, association, and the franchise—is “‘severe,’” then
the regulation must be “‘narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of
compelling importance.’”33 On the other hand, if the burden is more
moderate, then “‘important regulatory interests are generally sufficient
to justify’” the regulation.34 Courts almost always employ this approach in
franchise restriction and party regulation cases.35 They also use a variant
of it in the campaign finance context, subjecting expenditure limits
(which are thought to impose a heavy burden on the freedom of speech)
to stricter scrutiny than contribution caps (whose burden is seen as
lighter).36 Related rights-and-interests tests are applied as well in certain
kinds of redistricting37 and minority representation38 disputes.
31. 504 U.S. 428 (1992). Burdick drew in turn on a number of earlier Court
precedents, most notably Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 786–90 (1983) (setting
forth similar framework of individual rights balanced against countervailing state
interests); see also Christopher S. Elmendorf, Structuring Judicial Review of Electoral
Mechanics: Explanations and Opportunities, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 313, 317 (2007)
[hereinafter Elmendorf, Judicial Review] (noting Burdick Court “undertook to restate the
doctrines governing constitutional challenges to electoral mechanics”).
32. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434.
33. Id. (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992)).
34. Id. (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788).
35. Some notable examples include Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 553
U.S. 181, 189–91 (2008) (plurality opinion) (noting, in photo identification case, “a court
must identify and evaluate the interests put forward by the State as justifications for the
burden imposed by its rule, and then make the ‘hard judgment’ that our adversary system
demands”), Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 357–59 (1997)
(observing, in fusion candidacy case, “we weigh the character and magnitude of the
burden the State’s rule imposes on [individual] rights against the interests the State
contends justify that burden” (quoting Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434) (internal quotation marks
omitted)), and Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208, 213–14 (1986)
(balancing rights and interests in party regulation case). See also Richard L. Hasen, The
“Political Market” Metaphor and Election Law: A Comment on Issacharoff and Pildes, 50
Stan. L. Rev. 719, 721 (1998) (describing “current Supreme Court approach to election
law cases in which the government provides a reason or reasons justifying the law, and the
Court balances those reasons against any infringement on individual rights”); Samuel
Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic
Process, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 643, 645 (1998) [hereinafter Issacharoff & Pildes, Politics as
Markets] (“In case after case, courts . . . apply sterile balancing tests weighing individual
rights of political participation against countervailing state interests in orderly and stable
processes.”).
36. See, e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 241–42, 246–47 (2006) (plurality
opinion) (contrasting expenditure limits’ heavier burden on free speech with lighter

2014]

ELECTIONS AND ALIGNMENT

293

What seems to underpin this framework is a commitment to
optimizing the simultaneous protection of individual rights and realization
of state interests. The rights that may be encumbered by regulations of
the political process are very important. The franchise, in particular, is a
“fundamental matter in a free and democratic society” because “the right
to exercise [it] in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other
basic civil and political rights.”39 But the interests served by electoral
regulations are highly significant as well. Goals such as avoiding voter
confusion, ensuring that elections run smoothly, and preventing political
corruption are essential both on their face and in the eyes of the Court.40
Confronted with pressing concerns on both sides of the ledger, the Court
consistently casts itself in the role of balancer-in-chief. It assesses, on an
ad hoc basis, the magnitude of the burdens that are imposed and the
interests that are advanced, and it validates only those regulations that, in
its view, confer policy benefits that outweigh their rights costs. Its apparent philosophy is that judicial intervention is justified in the election law
arena in order to provide the optimal mix of rights protection and interest promotion.
Two related points about this philosophy are worth stressing. The
first is that it is indistinguishable from the Court’s approach to constitutional disputes outside the electoral context. The Court carries out the
same sort of rights-and-interests balancing in free speech, equal protection, and due process cases that do not involve any electoral issues. As
Richard Pildes has put it, the Court’s framework “is conventional because
it imports into the law of democracy the same doctrinal tools, legal tests,
and ways of framing the issues from more fully developed areas of constitutional law.”41 The second point is that the Court does not base its
burden of contribution limits); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19–23 (1976) (per curiam)
(same); see also Elmendorf, Judicial Review, supra note 31, at 357–61 (“[I]t is . . .
appropriate to view the Court’s recent contribution limit jurisprudence as substantially
informed by . . . the electoral mechanics case law.”).
37. See, e.g., Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740–41 (1983) (noting that inquiry in
malapportionment context weighs dilution of right to vote against state interests such as
compactness and respect for political subdivisions).
38. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920–27 (1995) (observing that inquiry
in racial gerrymandering context weighs representational harm against state interests such
as remedying effects of past discrimination and complying with Voting Rights Act).
39. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–62 (1964); see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25
(asserting freedoms of speech and association “‘lie[] at the foundation of a free society’”
(quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486 (1960))).
40. See, e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 796 (1983) (“There can be no
question about the legitimacy of the State’s interest in fostering informed and educated
expressions of the popular will in a general election.”); FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm.,
459 U.S. 197, 208 (1982) (describing “importance of preventing both the actual
corruption threatened by large financial contributions and the eroding of public
confidence in the electoral process through the appearance of corruption”).
41. Richard H. Pildes, Competitive, Deliberative, and Rights-Oriented Democracy, 3
Election L.J. 685, 687 (2004) [hereinafter Pildes, Democracy] (reviewing Richard A.
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theory of election law on any substantive value that the democratic process is meant to realize, such as competition, participation, or alignment.
The state may invoke a democratic value as a justification for burdening
an individual right, but there is otherwise no place for democracy in the
Court’s theory. In the (rather harsh) words of Richard Posner, the Court
has “failed to articulate a coherent conception of democracy even
though the relation between law and democracy is fundamental to the
proper role of judges in a democratic society.”42
To be fair, the Court does sometimes use techniques other than
rights-and-interests balancing to decide election law cases. Particularly in
the redistricting and minority representation contexts, the Court often
conceives of the harms it is seeking to cure in terms that do not involve
infringements of individual rights. The “consistent[] degrad[ation]” of a
party’s “influence on the political process,”43 a racial group’s diminished
“opportunity . . . to elect legislators of [its] choice,”44 and a district plan’s
conveyance of the “message that political identity is . . . predominantly
racial”45 all are not rights-related injuries—but all have motivated the
Court’s interventions in these areas. It also is not the case that the Court
has failed entirely to ground its election law decisions in democratic
values. Issacharoff has identified an array of cases in which the Court
hinted at the importance of holding representatives accountable to their
constituents.46 Later in the Article, similarly, I highlight several doctrinal
passages that reveal the Court’s occasional appreciation of the alignment
principle.47
Posner, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy (2003)); see also James A. Gardner, The Dignity
of Voters—A Dissent, 64 U. Miami L. Rev. 435, 438 (2010) (“Democratic politics is not . . .
treated differently from any other arena of governmental and citizen activity.”).
42. Richard A. Posner, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy 131 (2003); see also
Heather K. Gerken, The Costs and Causes of Minimalism in Voting Cases: Baker v. Carr
and Its Progeny, 80 N.C. L. Rev. 1411, 1427 (2002) [hereinafter Gerken, Minimalism]
(“Despite demands from its own members to offer a sufficiently robust theory for deciding
what equality should mean in the reapportionment context, the Court never did so.”
(footnote omitted)); Issacharoff & Pildes, Politics as Markets, supra note 35, at 646
(“[T]he Court’s electoral jurisprudence lacks any underlying vision of democratic politics
that is normatively robust or realistically sophisticated . . . .”).
43. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132 (1986) (plurality opinion) (stating standard
for partisan gerrymandering challenges).
44. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 766 (1973) (stating standard for racial vote
dilution challenges under Fourteenth Amendment).
45. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 980 (1996) (plurality opinion) (stating standard for
racial gerrymandering challenges).
46. Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 593,
605–06 (2002) [hereinafter Issacharoff, Gerrymandering]; see also Richard H. Pildes, The
Supreme Court, 2003 Term—Foreword: The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics,
118 Harv. L. Rev. 28, 46 (2004) [hereinafter Pildes, Constitutionalization] (“[T]he actions
of courts in this domain reveal that they are enforcing structural values concerning the
democratic order as a whole, albeit erratically and not always self-consciously . . . .”).
47. See infra Part II.C (showing that alignment principle has made repeated
appearances in certain Justices’ opinions).
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Notwithstanding these caveats, it is clear that the Court’s dominant
election law theory is the concurrent optimization of individual rights
and state interests. It also is clear that this theory does not include a
major role for any substantive democratic value. Next, I consider the
accounts that scholars have put forward of the harms in election law
cases and the ways in which courts should address them. Some academics
support the Court’s rights-and-interests balancing; others are passionate
advocates of a structural theory of election law; and still others aim to
reconcile the two sides of the heated balance-versus-structure debate.
B. Balance Versus Structure
To begin with, a number of prominent scholars agree with the Court
that its task should be to balance the rights burdens imposed by electoral
regulations against the interests that the regulations serve. These scholars
do not necessarily concur with the Court’s conclusions in each case, but
they are receptive to the notion of the Court as ultimate assessor of burdens and interests. Richard Hasen, for example, writes that he “agree[s]
with the Court’s jurisprudence that a balancing of interests is required
when a plaintiff’s assertion of a . . . right is defended by the state’s assertion of a government interest.”48 Likewise, Bruce Cain comments that it is
“important that the courts balance [election] laws against the rights of
voters, candidates, parties, and groups to determine whether they are
constitutionally permissible.”49 And Nathaniel Persily argues that it is unsurprising—indeed commendable—that “[t]he Court’s jurisprudence in
‘democracy’ cases . . . flows logically from or fits comfortably within
larger constitutional doctrines.”50
The prevailing position in the legal literature, however, is that the
Court’s discourse of rights and interests fails to capture what is truly at
stake in election law cases.51 What is at stake, on this view, is irreducibly
structural: the relationships between candidates, groups, and parties; the
allocation of power between different political actors; and the operation
of the electoral system as a whole. It is these structural factors—summa48. Richard L. Hasen, The Supreme Court and Election Law: Judging Equality from
Baker v. Carr to Bush v. Gore 97 (2003) [hereinafter Hasen, Election Law].
49. Bruce E. Cain, Commentary, Garrett’s Temptation, 85 Va. L. Rev. 1589, 1603
(1999).
50. Nathaniel Persily, Commentary, The Search for Comprehensive Descriptions and
Prescriptions in Election Law, 35 Conn. L. Rev. 1509, 1515 (2003); see also Daniel H.
Lowenstein, The Supreme Court Has No Theory of Politics—and Be Thankful for Small
Favors, in The U.S. Supreme Court and the Electoral Process 283, 297–302 (David K.
Ryden ed., 2d rev. ed. 2002) (arguing Supreme Court should not try to develop theory of
democracy to apply in election law cases).
51. See, e.g., Hasen, Election Law, supra note 48, at 139 (referring to structuralism as
“new election law orthodoxy”); Joseph Fishkin, Equal Citizenship and the Individual Right
to Vote, 86 Ind. L.J. 1289, 1290 (2011) [hereinafter Fishkin, Individual Right] (describing
“emerging consensus hold[ing] that courts ought to focus on ‘structural’ benefits and
harms”).

296

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 114:283

rized by Pildes as the “interlocking relationships of the institutions . . .
that organize the democratic system”52—that explain why much election
law litigation is launched in the first place. It is also these factors that are
most affected, for good or for ill, by the outcomes of the litigation.
Accordingly, they should be the focus of the Court’s jurisprudence, not
rights and interests that are linked only tenuously to the underlying functional realities.
The ranks of the structuralists include Issacharoff, Pildes, and Posner, as well as Justice Stephen Breyer,53 Christopher Elmendorf,54
Heather Gerken,55 Michael Kang,56 Pamela Karlan,57 Michael Klarman,58
Daniel Ortiz,59 Spencer Overton,60 and David Schleicher.61 But while
these scholars agree on the unsuitability of the Court’s framework, they
are divided as to what the most important structural consideration might
be. Electoral competition is the value that most of them favor; as
Issacharoff and Pildes put it in their seminal 1998 article, “Our aim is to
read into the Constitution an indispensable commitment to the preserva52. Pildes, Constitutionalization, supra note 46, at 41.
53. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic
Constitution 28 (2005) (“[W]e can find in the Constitution’s structural complexity an
effort to produce a form of democracy . . . that could produce legislation that would
match the needs of the nation.”).
54. See, e.g., Christopher S. Elmendorf, Undue Burdens on Voter Participation: New
Pressures for a Structural Theory of the Right to Vote?, 35 Hastings Const. L.Q. 643, 644
(2008) [hereinafter Elmendorf, Undue Burdens] (“[C]ourts would have an easier time
developing judicially manageable rules for decision if they adopted an expressly structural
understanding of the right to vote . . . .”).
55. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Lost in the Political Thicket: The Court, Election
Law, and the Doctrinal Interregnum, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 503, 519 (2004) (“Should the
Court . . . choose to remain in the political thicket, it could try to get a better map by
adopting an explicitly structural approach.”).
56. See, e.g., Michael S. Kang, Race and Democratic Contestation, 117 Yale L.J. 734,
738 (2008) [hereinafter Kang, Contestation] (“[A] structural commitment to competition
in politics ought to transcend the simple maintenance of competitive elections between
the major parties.”).
57. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Nothing Personal: The Evolution of the Newest Equal
Protection from Shaw v. Reno to Bush v. Gore, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 1345, 1346 (2001) (noting
Court’s use of “structural” equal protection in regulating political institutions).
58. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment
Problem, 85 Geo. L.J. 491, 528–39 (1997) (critiquing Court’s election law doctrine from
“anti-entrenchment,” majoritarian perspective).
59. See, e.g., Daniel R. Ortiz, From Rights to Arrangements, 32 Loy. L.A. L. Rev.
1217, 1218 (1999) (suggesting election law has improved by shifting focus to “more
pragmatic and structural view of politics as a matter of institutional arrangements”).
60. See, e.g., Spencer Overton, Voter Identification, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 631, 674
(2007) [hereinafter Overton, Identification] (“Judges should not ignore questions of
democratic structure and skewed results . . . .”).
61. See, e.g., David Schleicher, “Politics as Markets” Reconsidered: Natural
Monopolies, Competitive Democratic Philosophy and Primary Ballot Access in American
Elections, 14 Supreme Ct. Econ. Rev. 163, 167 (2006) (“[T]he American political system
has structural characteristics that do not fit neatly into a simple market analogy.”).
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tion of an appropriately competitive political order.”62 On the other
hand, Justice Breyer,63 Elmendorf,64 and Overton65 have argued for the
primacy of voter participation, considered in the aggregate rather than
individually. Under either account, election law disputes should be analyzed directly in terms of their implications for the relevant structural
value. Courts should invalidate practices that unjustifiably suppress competition (or turnout), and uphold practices that do not.66
Both the competitive and the participatory variants of structuralism
derive from normative visions of a properly functioning democracy.
According to its proponents, competition is necessary for the achievement of two key democratic goals: accountability, the ability of voters to
oust from office politicians whose records they dislike, and responsiveness, the degree to which shifts in voters’ preferences result in changes in
the composition (and policies) of the government.67 Similarly, participation is lauded by its advocates because it enhances the legitimacy of electoral outcomes, exposes politicians to more of the public’s views, and
connects voters more closely to their representatives.68 Competition and
62. Issacharoff & Pildes, Politics as Markets, supra note 35, at 716; see also, e.g.,
Issacharoff, Gerrymandering, supra note 46, at 615 (“[T]he concept of ‘fair’
representation has no meaning outside an appropriately competitive electoral process.”);
Kang, Contestation, supra note 56, at 738 (defining and arguing for “democratic
contestation”); Klarman, supra note 58, at 497–98 (defining and arguing for “antientrenchment”); Daniel R. Ortiz, Got Theory?, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 459, 485–90 (2004)
[hereinafter Ortiz, Got Theory?] (discussing anticompetitive effects of partisan
gerrymandering); Pildes, Democracy, supra note 41, at 688 (“[A]s long as the system
remains open to constant change—remains competitive—courts ought not intervene.”).
63. See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 53, at 5 (emphasizing importance of citizen
participation in modern liberty).
64. See, e.g., Elmendorf, Undue Burdens, supra note 54, at 653 (arguing that
“aggregate pattern of voter participation is a proper object of constitutional concern”).
65. See, e.g., Overton, Identification, supra note 60, at 673 (discussing effect of photo
identification laws on aggregate turnout); see also Spencer Overton, The Donor Class:
Campaign Finance, Democracy, and Participation, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 73, 105 (2004)
[hereinafter Overton, Donor Class] (noting financial disparities’ impact on citizens’
electoral participation).
66. See Michael S. Kang, When Courts Won’t Make Law: Partisan Gerrymandering
and a Structural Approach to the Law of Democracy, 68 Ohio St. L.J. 1097, 1113 (2007)
(“[Structuralists] argue that . . . in the law of democracy, courts ought to serve those
structural goals more directly.”).
67. See Issacharoff, Gerrymandering, supra note 46, at 600, 615–16 (discussing
gerrymandering’s implications for accountability); Issacharoff & Pildes, Politics as Markets,
supra note 35, at 646 (noting genuinely competitive process is required to ensure
responsiveness); Richard H. Pildes, Commentary, The Theory of Political Competition, 85
Va. L. Rev. 1605, 1607 (1999) [hereinafter Pildes, Political Competition] (arguing that
“‘artificial’ barriers to robust partisan competition” must “not be permitted”).
68. See, e.g., Elmendorf, Undue Burdens, supra note 54, at 677 (“The aggregate rate
of voter participation might be thought an object of constitutional concern insofar as it
signifies the legitimacy of the political order.”); Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote:
Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1705, 1710 (1993) [hereinafter Karlan,
Rights to Vote] (arguing that voter participation promotes “civic inclusion”); Overton,
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participation therefore are instrumental rather than intrinsic values.
They matter not for their own sake but because they allegedly make possible a healthy democratic order.
A final group of scholars do not fit easily into either the balancing or
the structuralist camps. Their hallmark, in fact, is that they hope to
bridge the divide between the camps, to forge a synthesis between
individual- and polity-centered theories of election law. For instance,
Guy-Uriel Charles has argued that electoral disputes are inherently
dualistic, in that they involve both genuine rights claims and
consequences for underlying political arrangements. Courts should (and
do) consider both of these aspects when resolving the disputes.69
Likewise, Daniel Farber has proposed an approach that “lies somewhere
between structuralism and the traditional conception of individual
rights,” in that it recognizes systemic harms but asks courts to address
them only when they are manifested in identifiable individual injuries.70
And Joseph Fishkin has contended that the appropriate judicial
methodology varies based on the doctrinal context. Rights-and-interests
balancing works well in franchise restriction cases, while structural
analysis is necessary in areas such as redistricting and minority
representation.71
Much more could be—and has been72—said about the roiling
theoretical debate in the election law literature. But my aim in describing
the debate was not to cover its every nuance, but rather to demonstrate
that the alignment approach, despite its intuitiveness, has not yet been
advanced in any sort of systematic fashion. In the next section, I explain
how the approach draws, but also stands distinct, from much existing
doctrine and scholarship. Alignment is related to other structural values
(and their democratic ends), but it is far from the same thing.

Identification, supra note 60, at 636, 657 (arguing that “widespread participation” furthers
democratic deliberation, accountability, responsiveness, and citizen self-definition).
69. See Guy-Uriel Charles, Judging the Law of Politics, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 1099, 1113–
30 (2005) [hereinafter Charles, Law of Politics] (reviewing Hasen, Election Law, supra
note 48) (articulating dualistic theory).
70. Daniel A. Farber, Implementing Equality, 3 Election L.J. 371, 377 (2004)
(reviewing Hasen, Election Law, supra note 48).
71. See Fishkin, Individual Right, supra note 51, at 1292 (noting suitability of rightsand-interests balancing in certain contexts); Joseph Fishkin, Weightless Votes, 121 Yale L.J.
1888, 1893 (2012) [hereinafter Fishkin, Weightless Votes] (advocating structural approach
in one-person, one-vote context).
72. Works that discuss this debate in more detail include Hasen, Election Law, supra
note 48; Charles, Law of Politics, supra note 69; Yasmin Dawood, The Antidomination
Model and the Judicial Oversight of Democracy, 96 Geo. L.J. 1411 (2008); Fishkin,
Individual Right, supra note 51; Luke P. McLoughlin, The Elysian Foundations of Election
Law, 82 Temp. L. Rev. 89 (2009); Pildes, Political Competition, supra note 67; and Yen-Tu
Su, Retracing Political Antitrust: A Genealogy and Its Lessons, 27 J.L. & Pol. 1 (2011).
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C. The Missing Structural Value
Beginning with the Supreme Court’s framework, it is clear that balancing rights and interests is different from aligning voters’ and representatives’ preferences. No individual right to a properly aligned representative has ever been recognized by the Court. Nor would such a right
make any conceptual sense, since it is only the median voter, not every
voter, whose preferences have normative significance under the alignment approach. The median voter is pivotal because, by definition, she
speaks for a majority of all voters. Nonmedian voters have no comparable
claim that their preferences should be shared by their representatives.
It is true that alignment may be invoked doctrinally as a justification
for burdening an individual right. In fact, as discussed later in the
Article, the concept occasionally has surfaced in Court opinions in precisely this manner.73 But states only rarely try to defend their electoral
regulations against rights challenges by pointing to the regulations’
aligning attributes. And even if states more often mounted such defenses,
courts still would be able to endorse alignment only in cases where rights
claims triggered judicial review in the first place. Courts would not be
able to strike down misaligning practices that do not burden any individual rights. Nor would courts be able to strike down misaligning practices
that do burden rights (at least on the basis of the misalignment), since
interests other than alignment obviously would be used to justify the
practices.
Of course, it is unsurprising that the alignment approach cannot be
reconciled with the Court’s rights-and-interests balancing. Alignment is a
quintessential structural value—a value that matters to the entire polity,
not to any particular group or individual—and the whole point of the
structuralist critique is that the Court’s jurisprudence does not adequately account for such values. How, then, does alignment relate to the
literature’s favored values of competition and participation? Are they actually distinct concepts?
They plainly are. Competition refers above all to the margin of victory in elections, though it also covers related ideas such as how often
incumbents are defeated, how many campaigns are uncontested, and
what proportion of races are expected (even if they do not turn out) to
be close.74 At the level of an individual district, it is easy for an election to
be competitive but to produce partisan or policy misalignment. For example, one candidate may receive 48% of the vote, another candidate
may receive 45%, and a third candidate may get 7%, all of whom prefer
the second candidate to the first. This election is extremely competitive,
with a margin of victory of only 3%, but it also results in a winner who is
73. See infra Part II.C (showing that alignment principle has made repeated
appearances in certain Justices’ opinions).
74. See, e.g., Issacharoff, Gerrymandering, supra note 46, at 620–30 (discussing
competition in all of these senses).
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not preferred by the median voter. Similarly, even in a two-party election,
a candidate may win a close race but may then start casting votes in the
legislature that diverge sharply from the preferences of the median voter.
In this (all too common75) scenario, a high level of competition is
compatible with significant policy misalignment.
At the level of the legislature as well, a competitive district plan is
not necessarily a properly aligned one. Suppose that a state has ten districts and a thousand voters, of whom 55% are Republicans and 45% are
Democrats. Suppose also that eight of the districts elect Democrats by a
52% to 48% margin and two of them elect Republicans by a 83% to 17%
margin. The median margin of victory is just 4% in this case but the
partisan misalignment is staggering—Democrats prevail in eight of the
ten districts even though the median voter is a Republican. Conversely,
imagine that six of the districts elect Republicans by a 65% to 35%
margin and four of them elect Democrats by a 60% to 40% margin. The
median margin of victory is 30% in this case, a very high level, but there
is no partisan misalignment at all. The median voter is a Republican and
so is the median representative.
That alignment is not the same thing as participation is even clearer.
Considered in the aggregate, participation refers to the rate of voter
turnout in an election.76 Alignment and turnout simply are unrelated
concepts. Voters’ and representatives’ preferences may be aligned
whether turnout is high or low, just as they may be misaligned no matter
how many or how few people show up at the polls. To be sure, there may
be links between alignment and turnout, but, if so, this is because the
concepts are connected by certain causal chains, not because they are
alternative terms for the same phenomenon.
But recall from the above discussion that competition and participation are instrumental rather than intrinsic values—values that matter,
above all, because of the kind of democracy that they allegedly bring
about.77 Interestingly, alignment is related more closely to the demo75. See, e.g., Stephen Ansolabehere et al., The Effects of Party and Preferences on
Congressional Roll-Call Voting, 26 Legis. Stud. Q. 533, 540–41 & fig.1 (2001) [hereinafter
Ansolabehere et al., Roll-Call Voting] (showing distribution of legislators’ roll-call votes is
far more bimodal than distribution of constituents’ opinions); Joseph Bafumi & Michael
C. Herron, Leapfrog Representation and Extremism: A Study of American Voters and
Their Members in Congress, 104 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 519, 528–29 & fig.1 (2010) (same);
Seth E. Masket & Hans Noel, Serving Two Masters: Using Referenda to Assess Partisan
Versus Dyadic Legislative Representation, 65 Pol. Res. Q. 104, 109–10 & fig.1 (2012)
(same).
76. See Elmendorf, Undue Burdens, supra note 54, at 690–91 (advocating
“representative” over “rampant” voter participation); Fishkin, Individual Right, supra note
51, at 1301 (noting importance of participation for political clout); Overton,
Identification, supra note 60, at 672–74 (emphasizing importance of aggregate over
individual voter turnout).
77. See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text (discussing array of democratic
ends served by competition and participation).
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cratic ends of competition and participation than it is to the values themselves. Competition, first, is deemed vital by its proponents because it increases responsiveness,78 which in turn has been defined as “a positive
correlation between opinion and policy”79 or “the degree to which the
partisan composition of the legislature responds to changes in voter
preferences.”80 Responsiveness is similar to alignment in that it too describes how public opinion is linked to important outputs such as legislative composition, politicians’ voting records, and actual public policy. It
too acknowledges that, in a democracy, the will of the people ultimately
should be sovereign.81
But responsiveness differs from alignment in that it refers to the rate
at which these outputs change given some shift in public opinion.
Alignment, in contrast, denotes whether or not the outputs are congruent
with the public’s preferences.82 To illustrate the difference, suppose that
in one election the Democrats receive 51% of a state’s vote and 41% of
the state’s seats, and that in the next election they receive 52% of the
state’s vote and 49% of its seats. Both elections result in partisan misalignment between the median voter and the median representative. But,
in tandem, the elections reflect an extremely high level of responsiveness—an 8% swing in seats for just a 1% swing in votes. Analogously, imagine (quite plausibly) that a politician is highly unlikely to vote for
same-sex marriage when 55% of his constituents support the policy, but
highly likely to do so when 65% support it.83 Then the politician’s preferences are misaligned with those of the median voter at the 55% point but
properly aligned at the 65% point. And responsiveness is very high when
public opinion moves from 55% to 65% but very low for all other opinion shifts.
78. See sources cited supra note 67 (explaining competition’s connection to
responsiveness).
79. Jeffrey R. Lax & Justin H. Phillips, The Democratic Deficit in the States, 56 Am. J.
Pol. Sci. 148, 148 (2012).
80. Andrew Gelman & Gary King, Enhancing Democracy Through Legislative
Redistricting, 88 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 541, 542 (1994).
81. More specifically, some responsiveness is necessary to achieve alignment
whenever public opinion shifts. Without any responsiveness, misalignment inevitably
would ensue whenever people’s preferences change.
82. As Lax and Phillips explain, “Policy adoption may increase with higher public
support (suggesting responsiveness), but policy may still often be inconsistent with
majority opinion (suggesting a lack of congruence).” Lax & Phillips, supra note 79, at 148;
see also Boris Shor, All Together Now: Putting Congress, State Legislatures, and
Individuals in a Common Ideological Space to Assess Representation at the Macro and
Micro Levels 2 (Apr. 25, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1697352 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting that
responsiveness “denotes the idea that legislators . . . respond to their constituents’ policy
preferences” while congruence requires that “preferences of constituents and the
representative . . . match in some common metric”).
83. See Lax & Phillips, supra note 79, at 156 fig.2 (showing relationship between
probability of policy adoption and public opinion for array of issues).
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Competition theorists might respond that I am taking their references to responsiveness too literally. Competition, they might argue,
promotes both responsiveness and alignment. The trouble with this claim
(aside from the fact that it has not been made) is that, empirically, there
is only a weak relationship between competition and alignment. Voters’
and representatives’ preferences are only slightly more congruent in
highly competitive districts than they are in highly uncompetitive districts.84 The levels of policy misalignment in highly competitive districts
still are staggering.85 The evidence that competition fosters alignment
therefore is much less compelling than the evidence that it fosters responsiveness (which includes a strong negative correlation between responsiveness and the average margin of victory in a jurisdiction).86 At the
very least, if alignment were one’s core democratic objective, one would
not seek to achieve it primarily by making elections more competitive.
As for participation, one of the democratic goals that it is supposed
to attain is the enhancement of the legitimacy of electoral outcomes.87
Outcomes are more legitimate, according to Elmendorf, when “the distribution of interests and concerns among the voting public [mirrors]
the corresponding distribution within the normative electorate as a
whole.”88 Asking how similar the preference distributions are of actual
voters and of eligible voters, it is true, is similar to asking how aligned the
preferences are of the median actual voter and of the median eligible
voter. However, one difference between the approaches is that a preference distribution is more complex, and more difficult to analyze, than the
mere position of the median. Another difference is that distributional
alignment is not ultimately a majoritarian value, but rather one that
sounds in the register of proportional representation. Moreover, the
84. See Ansolabehere et al., Candidate Positioning, supra note 26, at 145 (finding
shift from 30% margin of victory to perfect tie increases candidate convergence by only
0.069 points on 0 to 1 scale); Thomas L. Brunell & Bernard Grofman, Evaluating the
Impact of Redistricting on District Homogeneity, Political Competition, and Political
Extremism in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1962 to 2006, in Designing Democratic
Government: Making Institutions Work 117, 131–32 (Margaret Levi et al. eds., 2008)
(showing almost no relationship between Democratic share of two-party House vote and
representative’s voting record).
85. See sources cited supra note 75 (finding high policy misalignment even when
districts are very competitive).
86. According to data on file with the Columbia Law Review, this correlation was -0.72
for state legislative elections held between 1968 and 2012. See also John D. Griffin,
Electoral Competition and Democratic Responsiveness: A Defense of the Marginality
Hypothesis, 68 J. Pol. 911, 919 (2006) (finding “as competitiveness within districts
increases, legislators become more responsive to change in their district’s liberalism”).
87. See sources cited supra note 68 (describing greater legitimacy and other ends
allegedly achieved by increased participation).
88. Elmendorf, Undue Burdens, supra note 54, at 675–76; see also Fishkin, Individual
Right, supra note 51, at 1308–09 (describing antifraud measures that, by reducing
participation, cause “political distortion or skew”); Overton, Identification, supra note 60,
at 668–69 (explaining skewing effect of voter fraud measures on certain communities).
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skewing of distributions of “interests and concerns” corresponds to only
one kind of misalignment: policy misalignment at the district level. To
the extent that other kinds of misalignment are troubling as well—such
as partisan misalignment and misalignment at the legislative level—such
skewing is an inadequate articulation of the democratic harm.
Why has the legal literature overlooked a value as seemingly intuitive
as alignment?89 One answer is that scholars may have supposed, incorrectly, that the democratic ends advanced by their own preferred values
are functionally identical to alignment. They may have thought that by
arguing for responsiveness or for undistorted preference distributions
they also were arguing for a properly aligned political system.90 Another
answer is that the empirical advances that have made possible the quantification (and comparison) of voters’ and representatives’ policy preferences are very recent. Until the last few years, alignment could have been
proposed as a normative ideal, but it could not have been measured with
any confidence.
A final explanation for the oversight is that, over the last generation,
“debates about democratic theory” in the legal literature “have been organized around conflicts between competitive and rights-oriented conceptions of democracy.”91 Scholars have quarreled extensively about
whether electoral disputes are better conceived in competitive or in
rights terms—but they have neglected, for the most part, the exploration
of other democratic values. This Article’s introduction of the alignment
approach therefore is similar to the efforts by certain scholars to stress
the significance of voter participation.92 It too is an attempt to raise the
profile of a crucial value that has been underappreciated to date.

89. Of course, alignment has not been overlooked entirely by the literature. Some of
the works that have addressed it in passing include Charles, Constitutional Pluralism,
supra note 28, at 1146 (describing responsiveness to majority interests as basic tenet of
democracy); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Not by “Election Law” Alone, 32 Loy.
L.A. L. Rev. 1173, 1181 (1999) (criticizing “structural obstacles to the realization of
majority preferences in American democracy” (emphasis omitted)); Karlan, Rights to
Vote, supra note 68, at 1717 (describing hypothetical voter’s concern for effective interest
representation); and Nathaniel Persily, Toward a Functional Defense of Political Party
Autonomy, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 750, 806 (2001) [hereinafter Persily, Autonomy] (describing
skeptically “system that intends to channel elections toward the choice of the median
voter”).
90. Cf. Posner, supra note 42, at 165–66 (conflating “responsiveness to public
opinion” with “align[ing] the behavior of politicians and officials with the people’s
interests”).
91. Pildes, Democracy, supra note 41, at 686; see also Nathaniel Persily, Reply, In
Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial Acquiescence to IncumbentProtecting Gerrymanders, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 649, 651 (2002) (“[T]he debate has revolved
around the desirability of a jurisprudential shift away from rights-based analysis toward an
emphasis on electoral competition.”).
92. See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text (citing efforts of Justice Breyer,
Elmendorf, and Overton).
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II. THE ALIGNMENT APPROACH
In order to raise the profile of alignment, of course, it is necessary to
define the concept carefully, to identify its intellectual and doctrinal origins, and to explain why it is normatively attractive. Alignment cannot
possibly be embraced until it is clear what it is. In this Part, then, I begin
the project of explicating and defending the alignment approach. I first
discuss what ought to be aligned and at which levels. It is voters’ partisan
and policy preferences that should correspond to those of their representatives, and these preferences should match within both each district
and the jurisdiction as a whole. Partisan and policy alignment are related
in interesting ways, as are district-specific and legislative alignment.
Next, I consider what the democratic theory literature has to say
about alignment. An overlapping consensus exists, among several sorts of
thinkers, that voters’ and representatives’ preferences should be congruent. One therefore can adhere to any of several perspectives on democracy and still regard alignment as an important value. From theory I then
move on to doctrine. In the Supreme Court’s case law too, the significance of alignment has been recognized in contexts including party regulation, campaign finance, and redistricting. The Court rarely has focused
on alignment, but it often has acknowledged it. Finally, I articulate what I
take to be the normative appeal of the alignment approach. By emphasizing how closely voters’ and representatives’ preferences correspond, the
approach directs our attention to the crux of what it means to be a democracy. The people only rule—we only have a kratos of the demos—when
the views of the governed and of the governing ultimately are consistent.
A. Conceptual Framework
The most obvious question about the alignment approach is what
should be aligned—and the most obvious answer is voters’ and representatives’ partisan preferences.93 If a majority of a jurisdiction’s voters prefer Party A to Party B, then a politician from Party A should represent the
voters. The partisan preference of the median voter should correspond
to the partisan affiliation of the representative. Any other outcome would
be undemocratic because it would thwart the unambiguous will of the
majority.
This point likely seems correct but banal. Of course, the majority’s
partisan preference should not be frustrated, but how can it be frustrated? In fact, partisan misalignment can arise in two distinct ways (even
in an election that is not rigged). First, in a race with multiple candidates
93. Although this section is largely descriptive, it inevitably includes more normative
elements as well. See David Held, Models of Democracy 6 (Polity Press 3d ed. 2006)
(1987) (noting discussions of democracy “involve necessarily . . . a shifting balance
between descriptive-explanatory and normative statements”). Part II.D, infra, presents a
more explicitly normative case for the alignment approach.
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competing for a single position under a plurality voting rule—a common
scenario in the United States—the candidate preferred by the median
voter easily can fail to be elected. Suppose that Candidate A receives 48%
of the vote, Candidate B receives 45%, and Candidate C gets 7%, and
that all of Candidate C’s supporters prefer Candidate B to Candidate A.
In this case, Candidate A is elected even though the electorate prefers
Candidate B by a 52% to 48% margin.94 This kind of misalignment is depicted in Figure 1, and it occurs whenever the median voter’s partisan
preference is not satisfied due to the way the vote is divided among multiple candidates.
FIGURE 1: PARTISAN MISALIGNMENT DUE TO MULTIPLE CANDIDATES

Second, even in a two-party race in which the partisan preference of
the median actual voter necessarily is satisfied, the partisan preference of
a different person with normative significance may not be realized. A disjunction then emerges between the median actual voter (whose preferred candidate is elected) and the normatively significant person
(whose preferred candidate is not). Imagine that a majority of eligible
voters who would like to vote—a group with clear normative appeal—
94. This is the same hypothetical that I used earlier to demonstrate the difference
between alignment and competition. Supra text accompanying notes 74–75; see also G.
Bingham Powell, Jr. & Georg S. Vanberg, Election Laws, Disproportionality and Median
Correspondence: Implications for Two Visions of Democracy, 30 Brit. J. Pol. Sci. 383, 399
(2000) (“[T]he presence of multiple parties may split the votes in a way such that the party
closest to the median is not even the plurality winner.”).
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prefer Candidate A to Candidate B. Imagine too that some of these people are prevented from voting by a franchise restriction, and that
Candidate B ends up receiving the most votes. Then Candidate B prevails, because he is the choice of the median actual voter, but his election
is troubling because he is not the choice of the median eligible voter who
would have participated in the absence of the restriction. This type of
misalignment is illustrated in Figure 2, and it is possible whenever the
actual electorate is distorted relative to the normative electorate.95
To be clear, the alignment approach does not assist in the selection
of the normatively significant person whose partisan preference should
be satisfied. This figure can be chosen only on the basis of other democratic values, such as civic participation or political equality.96 But once
this figure has been picked, the alignment approach provides a useful
framework for analyzing electoral policies. Policies that widen the gap
between the median actual voter and the normatively significant person
are problematic because they make it more likely that the latter figure’s
preferred candidate will fail to be elected. Conversely, policies that
shrink the gap are appealing because they reduce the odds of such
wrong-winner outcomes.
FIGURE 2: PARTISAN MISALIGNMENT DUE TO DISTORTION OF ELECTORATE

95. See Elmendorf, Undue Burdens, supra note 54, at 677 (arguing “representative
voting public best approximates the electoral ideal in which public officials are chosen by
and accountable to the normative electorate as a whole”).
96. See infra Part III.A, C (discussing median eligible voter who wishes to participate
in election and median hypothetical voter exposed to even campaign expenditures).
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While partisan alignment is a crucial first step, alone it does not suffice to realize key democratic values. For the will of the people actually to
be authoritative, representatives should share not only median voters’
partisan preferences but also their policy preferences—that is, their general political ideologies as well as their views on more specific policy matters.97 Only policy alignment enables constituents to exercise genuine
substantive control over their representatives. Partisan alignment merely
ensures that constituents can pick their representatives’ party labels,
which is quite a modest conception of popular sovereignty. As political
theorist Michael McDonald has written, “To be truly democratic, the
rules for [elections] should empower the voter median by ensuring that
it is also the policy position of the [representative].”98
Policy misalignment is almost inevitable whenever there is partisan
misalignment. Since the parties hold different policy views,99 if the partisan preferences of the median voter100 and the representative are not
congruent, it is a virtual certainty that their policy preferences also will be
at odds. But policy misalignment can arise as well in the absence of partisan misalignment. Even if the partisan affiliation of the representative is
consistent with the wishes of the median voter, the representative’s policy
stances might not be. The representative might compile a highly conservative voting record while the median voter prefers center-right moderation. Or the representative might support universal health insurance
while the median voter prefers a more limited expansion of existing government programs. This characteristic kind of policy misalignment, in

97. Cf. Barry C. Burden, Institutions and Policy Representation in the States, 5 St.
Pol. & Pol’y Q. 373, 374 (2005) (noting importance of both “general policy
representation” and “representation on particular issues”).
98. Michael D. McDonald et al., What Are Elections For? Conferring the Median
Mandate, 34 Brit. J. Pol. Sci. 1, 2 (2004). For examples of other works that treat policy
alignment as normatively desirable, see G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Elections as Instruments of
Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Visions 122 (2000) (“In contemporary
democracies elections are supposed to establish connections that compel or greatly
encourage the policymakers to do what the citizens want.”); Bafumi & Herron, supra note
75, at 519 (critiquing “distinct lack of congruence between federal legislators and their
constituencies”); Matt Golder & Jacek Stramski, Ideological Congruence and Electoral
Institutions, 54 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 90, 90–91 (2010) (describing different conceptions of
“congruence”); and John D. Huber & G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Congruence Between
Citizens and Policymakers in Two Visions of Liberal Democracy, 46 World Pol. 291, 291–
92 (1994) (“[C]ongruence between the preferences of citizens and the actions of
policymakers constitutes a major claim and goal of liberal democracy.”).
99. See, e.g., Ansolabehere et al., Candidate Positioning, supra note 26, at 138
(finding “enduring historical pattern in American politics” that “[c]andidates diverge at
the district level, just as parties diverge nationally”).
100. As discussed above, one kind of partisan misalignment involves a divergence
between the median voter and the representative, while the other kind involves a gap
between the median actual voter and another figure with normative significance. I use
“median voter” here as shorthand for both types of misalignment.
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which the representative’s views are more extreme than those of the median voter, is shown in Figure 3.101
FIGURE 3: POLICY MISALIGNMENT DUE TO REPRESENTATIVE’S EXTREMISM

A potential concern about policy alignment is that it may be impossible to determine voters’ and representatives’ policy preferences, let
alone to collapse them onto a single common axis that enables their
comparison. Fortunately, political scientists recently have made great
strides in quantifying policy views using tools such as surveys, interest
group ratings, and voting records.102 The most exciting new work takes
advantage of questions answered by both voters and representatives to

101. See supra note 75 (citing findings by political scientists that representatives
generally are more extreme than their constituents).
102. See, e.g., Ansolabehere et al., Candidate Positioning, supra note 26, at 139–40
(using National Political Awareness Test (NPAT) and voting records); Bafumi & Herron,
supra note 75, at 522–24 (using Cooperative Congressional Election Study and voting
records); Elisabeth R. Gerber & Rebecca B. Morton, Primary Election Systems and
Representation, 14 J.L. Econ. & Org. 304, 313 & n.19 (1998) (using Americans for
Democratic Action ratings); Cheryl Boudreau et al., Legal Interventions in the Market for
Political Information: Lessons from Survey Experiments in Local Elections 5, 12 (Apr.
2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (using surveys of
candidates and voters); Thad Kousser et al., Reform and Representation: Assessing
California’s Top-Two Primary and Redistricting Commission 6–7 (Aug. 27, 2013)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2260083 (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (using NPAT and surveys); Shor, supra note 82, at 3 (same).

2014]

ELECTIONS AND ALIGNMENT

309

plot their positions in a common policy space.103 Political scientists also
have determined that, at least over the last generation, policy preferences
with respect to a vast array of issues can be captured by a single left-right
dimension corresponding to governmental intervention in the economy.104 A second dimension corresponding to civil rights views formerly
was necessary as well, but has receded in importance since the 1970s.105
Voters’ and representatives’ ideologies therefore seem both intelligible
and relatively simple in structure.106 There is little risk of them falling victim to familiar traps such as Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem or
Condorcet’s Paradox.107
Of course, voters’ views on specific policy matters often are less stable and intense than their overall political ideologies. A voter may be a
committed liberal or conservative, as a general matter, but may not have
a consistent or strongly held position on a particular policy question.
Overall ideological alignment, then, is more important than alignment
on each individual issue that appears on the political docket. Similarly,
103. See, e.g., Bafumi & Herron, supra note 75, at 522–25 (using legislator and voter
data sets to compare estimated ideal points); Boudreau et al., supra note 102, at 9–10
(combining data “to place voters and local legislative candidates on the same ideological
scale”); Kousser et al., supra note 102, at 7 (“Measuring and placing voters’ and
lawmakers’ ideologies on the same scale is the first step toward quantifying
representation.”); Shor, supra note 82, at 3 (using methodology “measuring ideological
distributions of state congressional delegations, legislatures, and citizens all on the same
scale”).
104. See Nolan McCarty et al., Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and
Unequal Riches 22 (2006) [hereinafter McCarty et al., Polarized] (finding single left-right
policy dimension for members of Congress); Boudreau et al., supra note 102, at 10–12, 21
(finding similar progressive-moderate dimension for San Francisco representatives and
voters); Shor, supra note 82, at 10–13 (finding left-right dimension for state legislative
members and voters).
105. See McCarty et al., Polarized, supra note 104, at 22–23 (“Other dimensions, such
as a civil rights dimension, have largely vanished . . . .”).
106. See Stephen A. Jessee, Spatial Voting in the 2004 Presidential Election, 103 Am.
Pol. Sci. Rev. 59, 72 (2009) (finding “not only do ordinary citizen[s] possess real
ideological beliefs, but also these beliefs map onto specific policy proposals in much the
same way as do the ideologies of senators and the president”).
107. Arrow argued that no rank-order voting system can comply simultaneously with
a set of basic fairness criteria (rationality, unrestricted domain of citizen preferences,
nondictatorship, unanimity producing preferred result, and decisionmaking independent
of irrelevant alternatives). See Kenneth J. Arrow, A Difficulty in the Concept of Social
Welfare, 58 J. Pol. Econ. 328, 328–29 (1950) (introducing paradox); Richard H. Pildes &
Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value
Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 2121, 2131–32 (1990) (describing
fairness criteria). Condorcet noted that if people’s individual preferences are
nontransitive, voting can result in paradoxical cyclic outcomes. See Marquis de Condorcet,
An Essay on the Application of Analysis to the Probability of Decisions Rendered by a
Plurality of Votes (1785), reprinted in Classics of Social Choice 91, 97–104 (Iain McLean &
Arnold B. Urken eds. & trans., 1995); see also Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and
Individual Values 93–96 (Yale Univ. Press 2d ed. 1963) (1951) (describing subsequent
theoretical elaboration of Condorcet’s paradox).
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persistent policy misalignment is more problematic than misalignment
that is temporary and that soon resolves. Indeed, short-term deviations
from constituents’ preferences, in the form of logrolling and tactical
concessions, sometimes may promote long-term congruence. Accordingly, the subset of policy misalignment that is most worrisome is ongoing ideological misalignment. Time-limited and issue-specific instances of
noncongruence more easily may be forgiven.
To this point, the discussion has assumed that it is a single representative’s preferences that should be congruent with those of a district’s
median voter. But alignment is a useful concept at the level of not only
the individual district (where there is one representative) but also the
jurisdiction as a whole (where there are many). At the latter level, it is the
preferences of the legislature’s median representative that should correspond to those of the jurisdiction’s median voter. This kind of correspondence—legislative alignment rather than district-specific alignment—
makes it more likely that the balance of power in the legislature will reflect the balance of opinion in the electorate. It makes it more likely that
the views of the jurisdiction’s median voter in fact will be followed. As
Robert Weissberg has observed, “Th[e] dyadic perspective (i.e., one legislator and one constituency) is surely important, but it is not the only way
of approaching representation. . . . [A] long and equally valid tradition
exists that views representation in terms of institutions collectively representing a people.”108
Legislative misalignment may arise when multiple district-specific
misalignments are aggregated. For example, if a third party plays spoiler
to the same major party in several districts, then it is possible that the major party will be denied a legislative majority even if it is preferred by the
jurisdiction’s median voter. On the other hand, multiple district-specific
misalignments also may cancel out and thus lead to legislative alignment.
For instance, even if most representatives hold more extreme policy views
than their constituents, the median member of the legislature might be a
moderate whose opinions are congruent with those of the jurisdiction’s
median voter. Furthermore, legislative misalignment is possible even in
the absence of district-specific misalignment. In particular, gerrymandering typically does not affect preference congruence within districts, but it
often prevents the party preferred by most voters in a jurisdiction from
winning a legislative majority.109 The relationships between district108. Robert Weissberg, Collective vs. Dyadic Representation in Congress, 72 Am. Pol.
Sci. Rev. 535, 535 (1978) (emphasis omitted); see also, e.g., Bafumi & Herron, supra note
75, at 519 (distinguishing between “micro-level” alignment at district level and “macrolevel” alignment between “aggregate American voter preferences and aggregate
preferences at the congressional chamber level”); Gerber & Morton, supra note 102, at
305–06 (distinguishing dyadic from collective representation).
109. See, e.g., Elisabeth R. Gerber, Legislatures, Initiatives, and Representation: The
Effects of State Legislative Institutions on Policy, 49 Pol. Res. Q. 263, 265 (1996)
[hereinafter Gerber, Institutions] (noting that redistricting may result in individual
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specific and legislative misalignment, and between partisan and policy
misalignment, are depicted in Figure 4. As noted earlier, partisan misalignment leads almost inevitably to policy misalignment,110 while districtspecific misalignments may or may not aggregate into legislative misalignment.
FIGURE 4: RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TYPES OF MISALIGNMENT

While only partisan and policy alignment are possible at the district
level, another kind of alignment could be pursued at the legislative level:
congruence between the median voter’s policy preferences and the actual policies enacted by the government. In other words, perhaps the
policies preferred by the median voter should be passed, not just supported by the median representative. I am sympathetic to this argument,
and in fact several studies have evaluated democratic systems by examining how closely voters’ policy views correspond to policy outcomes.111
legislator congruence but still “produce policies that deviate from the population majority
preference”).
110. Supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text.
111. See, e.g., Robert S. Erikson et al., Statehouse Democracy: Public Opinion and
Policy in the American States 244–45 (1993) (describing study of correlation between
voter policy preference and policy outcomes); Lax & Phillips, supra note 79, at 152–57
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However, policy outcome alignment (as opposed to policy preference
alignment) probably is too ambitious a goal for election law to achieve.
The laws that a government enacts are the product of not only politicians’ policy preferences, but also the relationship between the executive
and legislative branches, legislative structures and voting rules, lobbying
efforts, and many other factors that are beyond the domain of election
law.112 If elections are organized so that they make policy preference
alignment more probable—which in turn may improve the odds of policy outcome alignment too—then they are doing all that reasonably can
be expected of them.
A few final points about this conceptual framework may help resolve
any lingering confusion. First, the reason why the median voter and representative are so important is that only they belong by definition to a
popular or legislative majority. Any position other than the median in a
distribution along a single axis may be outvoted by another position that
is closer to the median.113 Second, while it is possible in theory to compare voter and legislator distributions in their entirety, such comparisons
require additional data and address issues other than whether the majority’s preferences are realized, and hence are conducted very rarely. According to Matt Golder and Jacek Stramski, “To our knowledge, there is
no research on representation that explicitly conceptualizes ideological
congruence as a many-to-many relationship.”114
Third, voters’ and representatives’ preferences are not fixed, but rather vary as they hear new arguments, receive more information, or undergo changes in their circumstances.115 The point of the alignment ap(same); John G. Matsusaka, Popular Control of Public Policy: A Quantitative Approach, 5
Q.J. Pol. Sci. 133, 142–44 (2010) (same).
112. I discuss some of these nonlegal determinants of policy outcome misalignment
in Part IV.B, infra.
113. See, e.g., Michael D. McDonald & Ian Budge, Elections, Parties, Democracy:
Conferring the Median Mandate 26 (2005) (arguing that actors at median have
bargaining power to move enacted position to their own); Huber & Powell, supra note 98,
at 293 (“On a single issue or a single-issue dimension . . . the position of the median voter
is the only policy that is preferred to all others by a majority of voters.”). And the reason
why the median voter is so important (as opposed to the median donor or the median
volunteer) is that, in a democracy, voting is the mechanism by which people ultimately
determine who will have the privilege of governing them.
114. Golder & Stramski, supra note 98, at 95–96; see also Hee-Min Kim & Richard C.
Fording, Extending Party Estimates to Governments and Electors, in Mapping Policy
Preferences: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments 1945–1998, at 157, 159 (Ian
Budge et al. eds., 2001) (noting often “it is not feasible to describe the exact shape of the
voter distribution on an ideological dimension”). In particular, a comparison of voter and
legislator distributions in their entirety would indicate how accurately all voter
preferences, not just those held by a majority, are reflected in the legislature. Such
accurate reflection is the fundamental goal of proportional representation systems, but it
is at most a secondary aim of U.S.-style plurality voting regimes.
115. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Preferences and Politics, 20 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 3, 10
(1991) [hereinafter Sunstein, Preferences] (“[P]references are shifting and . . . are a
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proach is that their preferences should correspond after this dynamic
process has unfolded, not before. Fourth, the approach applies with
equal force to both courts and policymakers. Courts should take alignment into account when deciding election law cases, while policymakers
should consider it when designing democratic institutions. Lastly, alignment is not quite the same thing as raw majoritarianism. Majoritarianism
usually implies that a majority can get whatever it wants—that the median
position of the majority inevitably is enacted. But under the alignment
approach it is not the majority’s median that matters but rather that of the
distribution as a whole. True, the overall median is necessarily supported
by a majority, but it is still distinct from (and more moderate than) the
median of the majority alone.116
B. Intellectual Origins
Interestingly, no particular thinker is associated with the normative
argument that voters’ and representatives’ preferences should be
aligned. The economist Anthony Downs famously explained why candidates and parties converge on the median voter under certain conditions,117 and a large political science literature has sought to measure the
extent of this convergence.118 But neither Downs nor his empirically
minded successors have set forth a normative account of why alignment
is desirable. Instead, they typically have assumed its desirability before
embarking on elaborate investigations of whether it in fact is being
achieved.119
In the democratic theory literature, on the other hand, normative
analyses abound, and scholars from several different schools have portrayed alignment as an appealing democratic principle. I do not purport
to exhaust this literature in the brief discussion that follows. My aim, rafunction of current information, consumption patterns, legal rules, and general social
pressures.”).
116. See Marty Cohen et al., The Party Decides: Presidential Nominations Before and
After Reform 25 (2008) (distinguishing “median position of the majority party” from
“median of the legislature as a whole”); Ansolabehere et al., Roll-Call Voting, supra note
75, at 560 (making same distinction).
117. Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy 114–27 (1957) (describing
incentives for parties on both ends of spectrum to appeal to center).
118. For just a taste, see the sources cited above in notes 75, 98, and 102.
119. See, e.g., Andrew Rehfeld, Representation Rethought: On Trustees, Delegates,
and Gyroscopes in the Study of Political Representation and Democracy, 103 Am. Pol. Sci.
Rev. 214, 219 (2009) (“The reigning view within empirical political science presumes the
delegate model of representation as the ideal.”); Andrew Sabl, Does “Democracy” Mean
that Outcomes Should Track Voter Preferences? Why Empirical Political Scientists Assume
the Answer Is Yes and Political Theorists Assume It’s No 4 (Sept. 1, 2012) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2104914 (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (noting “many political scientists . . . assume . . . something like the
correspondence theory”). Two studies that include more extended theoretical discussions
of alignment before commencing their empirical analyses are McDonald & Budge, supra
note 113, and Powell, supra note 98.

314

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 114:283

ther, is to show that even though no theory of democracy makes alignment its centerpiece, several prominent accounts treat it as an important
value that any polity should hope to realize. Alignment has at least as distinguished an intellectual pedigree as structural values such as competition and participation.120
First, in the Madisonian theory that underpins the American constitutional system, it was thought vital that members of the House of
Representatives (though not necessarily other politicians) share the views
and values of their constituents. Madison wrote that “it is particularly essential that [the House] should have an immediate dependence on, and
an intimate sympathy with, the people.”121 He added that “[f]requent
elections are unquestionably the only policy by which this dependence
and sympathy can be effectually secured.”122 Recurring elections motivate
House members to stay faithful to their constituents’ positions—and enable their punishment at the polls if they stray too far.
Second, for scholars of representation, one of the classic conceptions of the representative is the delegate model. A delegate “must do what
his principal would do, must act as if the principal himself were acting
. . . must vote as a majority of his constituents would,” as Pitkin put it in
her landmark work.123 In other words, a delegate must align his own
preferences with those of his constituents. He must not deviate from his
constituents’ views even if he is urged to do so by his party or personal
ideology.
Third, the minimalist theory of democracy views a rough form of
alignment as one of the only functions of elections. Minimalists understand campaigns to be struggles between competing elites, and they expect the electorate to do nothing more than choose between candidates
on the basis of their records and promises. A plausible outcome of this
process, in which candidates usually prevail when their stances are shared
by the electorate and vice versa, is the congruence of voters’ and representatives’ positions. According to Posner, “The essence of [minimalist]

120. See supra notes 62–68 and accompanying text (discussing competition and
participation).
121. The Federalist No. 52, at 347 (James Madison) (Harvard Univ. Press ed. 2009);
see also The Federalist No. 57, supra, at 377 (James Madison) (“[T]he House of
Representatives is so constituted as to support in the members an habitual recollection of
their dependence on the people.”).
122. The Federalist No. 52, supra note 121, at 347 (James Madison); see also Bernard
Manin, The Principles of Representative Government 162–63 (1997) (arguing in
Madisonian theory “[a] link of some sort was thus posited or presupposed between the
preferences of the people and the decisions of their representatives”).
123. Pitkin, supra note 15, at 144–45; see also, e.g., Donald J. McCrone & James H.
Kuklinski, The Delegate Theory of Representation, 23 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 278, 278 (1979)
(“The delegate theory of representation . . . posits that the representative ought to reflect
purposively the preferences of his constituents.”).
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democracy . . . is that the interests (preferences, values, opinions) of the
population . . . be represented in government.”124
Fourth, pluralists see elections as opportunities for groups of all
stripes to pursue their respective interests and influence the policymaking process. Elections play this role because, after winning office, representatives have a strong incentive to support the positions of the groups
that helped elect them. In Robert Dahl’s words, elections “vastly increase
the size, number, and variety of minorities whose preferences must be
taken into account by leaders in making policy choices.”125 The minorities whose views are considered may not accurately reflect the public at
any given moment, but they should mirror the electorate over the long
run (or at least that is the pluralist hope).
Fifth, for participatory democrats, one of the normative rationales
for mass participation is that it raises the salience of the public’s preferences and makes it more likely that they will be respected.
Representatives should find it more difficult to ignore voters’ opinions
when their legitimacy has been enhanced through intensive involvement.
As David Held has written, “If people know opportunities exist for effective participation in decision-making, they are likely to . . . hold that collective decisions should be binding.”126 An engaged public is more apt
than an apathetic one to insist on alignment.
Finally, the deliberative theory of democracy does not value deliberation for its own sake, but rather because it refines voter preferences that
then ought to be converted into policy. Deliberation is only worthwhile if
the outcome of all the reasoned dialogue eventually is enacted into law.
According to Joshua Cohen, “The point of deliberative democracy is not
for people to reflect on their preferences, but to decide, in light of reasons, what to do.”127 The point, in other words, is for deliberation to re124. Posner, supra note 42, at 165; see also, e.g., Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism,
Socialism, and Democracy 269, 273 (2d ed. 1947) (defining democracy as “competitive
struggle for the people’s vote” and arguing this definition “assure[s] the standing of the
majority system within the logic of the democratic method”).
125. Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory 132 (1956); see also, e.g., David
B. Truman, The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion 318 (1962)
(“A group that can point to activities suggesting a contribution to the election results is
not likely to be turned away by a recently elected official.”).
126. Held, supra note 93, at 212; see also, e.g., Benjamin R. Barber, Strong
Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age 151 (1984) (“[Strong democracy] turns
dissensus into an occasion for mutualism and private interest into an epistemological tool
of public thinking.”); Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy 132 (2000) (“Without
. . . citizen participation, the connection between the representative and constituents is
most liable to be broken . . . .”).
127. Joshua Cohen, Deliberative Democracy, in Deliberation, Participation and
Democracy 219, 222 (Shawn W. Rosenberg ed., 2007); see also, e.g., Bessette, supra note
16, at 36 (arguing that representatives’ deliberation “should result in policies” similar to
what “people themselves would have chosen”); Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson,
Democracy and Disagreement 130 (1996) (“[I]n a deliberative democracy constituents
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shape voters’ views, and in turn to reshape representatives’ positions and
actions.
To be sure, there are accounts of democracy that do not place much
weight on alignment. For example, the other classic conception of the
representative is the trustee model. Trustees are supposed to exercise
their own independent judgment when deciding how to act in the legislature, not to abide by the preferences of their constituents.128 Similarly,
Madison may have wanted House members to be tied closely to the people, but he also believed that popular opinions should be “refine[d] and
enlarge[d] . . . by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of
citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country.”129 Later in this Part, I discuss the normative appeal of theories that
cast representatives as statesmen who should pursue the public interest as
they perceive it.130 But here the point must be conceded that scholars do
not all agree about the importance of alignment in a democracy. There
may be an overlapping consensus on this issue, but there plainly is not
unanimity.
C. Doctrinal Hints
In the Supreme Court’s case law, there is not even an overlapping
consensus—nothing close to it, in fact. As discussed earlier, the Court’s
typical approach in election law cases is to identify any rights that have
been burdened by electoral regulations and then to weigh the burdens
against the interests served by the regulations. This methodology pays no
heed to the congruence of voters’ and representatives’ preferences.131
Nevertheless, the idea that such congruence is desirable has made repeated appearances in certain Justices’ opinions, in contexts including
party regulation, campaign finance, and redistricting.132 At least occasionshould be able to give effect to their views . . . by influencing the judgments that their
representatives make in the legislative process.”).
128. See Pitkin, supra note 15, at 127 (describing trustee theory); Rehfeld, supra note
119, at 215 (detailing differences between trustee and delegate theories).
129. The Federalist No. 10, supra note 121, at 58 (James Madison); see also The
Federalist No. 71, supra note 121, at 470 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The republican
principle . . . does not require an unqualified complaisance to every sudden breeze of
passion, or to every transient impulse which the people may receive . . . .”); James A.
Gardner, Madison’s Hope: Virtue, Self-Interest, and the Design of Electoral Systems, 86
Iowa L. Rev. 87, 129–30 (2000) (concluding that founders saw “purpose of election” as
“select[ing] leaders,” not “involv[ing] the public in affairs of government”).
130. Infra Part II.D.
131. See supra Part I.A (surveying Court’s election law doctrine).
132. Alignment also has made more limited appearances in two other election law
contexts: franchise restriction and minority representation. See, e.g., Bartlett v. Strickland,
129 S. Ct. 1231, 1245 (2009) (plurality opinion) (defending Court’s holding that minority
group must constitute majority of proposed district’s population in order to prevail under
section 2 of Voting Rights Act by invoking “special significance, in the democratic process,
of a majority”); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965) (striking down ban on voting by
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ally, some Justices do seem to think that voters’ partisan and policy positions should be shared by their elected leaders. Alignment therefore is
not alien to the law, and it easily could be made a more significant factor
in the doctrine if a majority of the Court were persuaded of its value.133
Beginning with the party regulation context, alignment has manifested itself in both its partisan and policy guises. First, with respect to
partisan alignment, several Justices have defended statutes that limit the
ability of third parties to secure places on the ballot on the ground that
these laws make it more likely that candidates preferred by majorities of
voters will be elected. In a 1968 case involving Ohio’s rules for qualifying
for the ballot, Justice Stewart worried that third-party contestation could
cause elections to be won by “candidates who gain a plurality but who
are, vis-à-vis their principal opponents, preferred by less than half of
those voting.”134 He added that “the State’s interest in attempting to ensure that a minority of voters do not thwart the will of the majority is a
legitimate one”135—a view that Justice Harlan endorsed as well.136 Likewise, in a 1972 case involving Texas’s ballot access requirements, the
Court declared that “the State understandably and properly seeks to . . .
assure that the winner is the choice of a majority.”137 The Court then referred approvingly to a provision requiring a runoff election if no candidate received a majority in the first round.138
Second, with respect to policy alignment, a number of Justices have
expressed support for primaries that are open to voters who are not party
members, reasoning that they are more likely to produce nominees
members of military in part because “‘[f]encing out’ from the franchise a sector of the
population because of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible”).
133. I do not claim that the alignment approach is constitutionally compelled, but it
is worth noting here that several modalities of constitutional argument do support it. This
section sets forth the doctrinal case for the approach. Arguments based on text
(particularly the Republican Guarantee Clause), history (particularly the Madisonian
conception of the House), democratic theory, and prudential consequences also can be
made on its behalf. Cf. Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation 12–13 (1991)
(summarizing modalities of constitutional interpretation).
134. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 54 (1968) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 56.
136. See id. at 46 n.8 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting “presence of
third parties may on occasion result in the election of the major candidate who is in reality
less preferred by the majority of the voters” and listing various reforms that could prevent
this scenario from occurring). The majority also recognized the importance of partisan
alignment, but held that it was outweighed by the burden on third parties’ participational
rights. See id. at 32 (majority opinion) (“Concededly, the State does have an interest in
attempting to see that the election winner be the choice of a majority of its voters.”).
137. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 145 (1972).
138. See id. (justifying provision on basis of avoiding “expense and burden of runoff
elections”). However, in the case’s principal holding, the Court struck down high filing
fees that prevented some candidates from running in primary elections. See id. at 145–49
(“[T]he imposition of filing fees ranging as high as $8,900 tends to limit the number of
candidates entering the primaries.”).

318

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 114:283

whose views correspond (and appeal) to the median general election
voter. In a 1981 case, Justice Powell argued that, “[b]y attracting participation by relatively independent-minded voters,” Wisconsin’s open primary “may enlarge the support for a party at the general election.”139
Similarly, in a 1986 case, the Court held that the open primary sought by
Connecticut’s Republican Party would help it determine “how . . . most
effectively [to] appeal to the independent voter.”140 “By inviting
independents to assist in the choice at the polls . . . the Party rule is intended to produce the candidate and platform most likely to achieve that
goal.”141 And in a 2000 case, Justice Stevens contended that California’s
interest in increasing the “representativeness” of its elected officials was
compelling—and thus that the state’s innovative blanket primary should
have been upheld.142
Policy alignment also has been an occasional concern of the Court
in the campaign finance context. Here the Justices have worried that
large contributions might induce politicians to adopt the views of their
donors rather than those of their constituents. In a 1985 case, Justice
White argued in favor of a restriction on spending by outside groups because “[t]he candidate may be forced to please the spenders rather than
the voters, and the two groups are not identical.”143 Likewise, in a 2000
case, the Court used the vocabulary of alignment to define the state interest that was advanced by a Missouri contribution limit. “[W]e recognize[] . . . the broader threat from politicians too compliant with the
wishes of large contributors.”144 And in its historic 2003 decision upholding the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, the Court affirmed the state’s
alignment interest in still more striking terms. “Just as troubling to a
139. Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 133
(1981) (Powell, J., dissenting).
140. Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 221 (1986).
141. Id.
142. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 600 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
In a blanket primary, each voter selects in which party’s race to cast a ballot, and may vary
her choice from race to race. See id. at 570 (majority opinion) (reviewing history of
California voting procedures). In an open primary, each voter must select a single party’s
primary in which to participate (for all races). The majority in Jones was critical of the
blanket primary’s aligning effects because the policy threatened to produce misalignment
within the party. A nominee could have views congruent with those of the median general
election voter, but incongruent with those of the median party member. See, e.g., id. at
578–79 (describing misalignment generated by blanket primary); cf. Burdick v. Takushi,
504 U.S. 428, 439–40 (1992) (upholding ban on write-in voting in order to prevent “party
raiding” that could produce misalignment within party); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S.
752, 760–61 (1973) (upholding law requiring voters to enroll in party thirty days before
primary for same reason).
143. FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 517 (1985)
(White, J., dissenting).
144. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000). In dissent, Justice
Thomas attacked this alignment-oriented conception of corruption, calling “it a new, farreaching (and speech-suppressing) definition.” Id. at 423 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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functioning democracy as classic quid pro quo corruption is the danger
that officeholders will decide issues not on the merits or the desires of
their constituencies, but according to the wishes of those who have made
large financial contributions valued by the officeholder.”145
Lastly, in the redistricting domain, fears about misalignment at the
legislative level have motivated several of the Court’s most important interventions. The Court imposed the one-person, one-vote rule in the
1960s in part because of its view that “in a society ostensibly grounded on
representative government, it would seem reasonable that a majority of
the people of a State could elect a majority of that State’s legislators.”146
Prior to the rule’s imposition, rural minorities in many states had been
able to control majorities in the states’ legislatures and congressional
delegations.147 Similarly, a recurrent theme in the Court’s gerrymandering doctrine is that a partisan minority also should not command a legislative majority. In the 1986 case that first recognized a cause of action for
gerrymandering, the plurality stated that “evidence of continued frustration of the will of a majority of the voters” is necessary to establish a constitutional violation.148 In a 2004 case, Justice Breyer sharply criticized
“situation[s] in which a party that enjoys only minority support among
the populace has nonetheless contrived to take, and hold, legislative
power.”149 And in the Court’s most recent gerrymandering decision,
Justice Stevens devoted much of his dissent to statistics showing that if
Texas’s Democrats had won a majority of the statewide vote, they would
have won only twelve of the state’s thirty-two congressional seats.150
It is true that these references to alignment are rare snippets in a
body of doctrine that is far more interested in rights-and-interests balanc145. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 153 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United
v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). Justice Kennedy again denied the importance of policy
alignment, arguing that “[i]t is in the nature of an elected representative to favor certain
policies[] and . . . contributors who support those policies.” Id. at 297 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
146. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964). Even some of the dissenters in the
great one-person, one-vote cases embraced the alignment principle. See, e.g., Lucas v.
Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 753–54 (1964) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he [district] plan must be such as not to permit the systematic frustration of the will
of a majority of the electorate of the State.”).
147. See, e.g., Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 543 (referring to “rural strangle hold” on Alabama
legislature).
148. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 133 (1986) (plurality opinion). In her
concurrence, Justice O’Connor oddly equated partisan alignment with proportional
representation, which she argued “is in serious tension with essential features of state
legislative elections.” Id. at 159 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
149. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 360 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Like Justice
O’Connor in Bandemer, the plurality in Vieth claimed that partisan alignment is equivalent
to proportional representation—and judicially unworkable to boot. See id. at 287–89
(plurality opinion).
150. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 466–67 (2006)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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ing than in preference congruence. The point of this discussion certainly
is not that the Court somehow has adopted the alignment approach sub
silentio. Rather, the claim is that the case law contains tantalizing hints
that the approach may appeal to the Court—at least to certain Justices in
certain kinds of cases—and may offer a workable framework for resolving
election law disputes. The doctrinal roots of alignment plainly are shallow. But its doctrinal future may still be bright.
D. Democratic Appeal
Alignment is not only promising because it enjoys support in the
democratic theory literature and in the case law. It also could serve as a
unifying election law principle because it is normatively attractive—because it flows directly from the core meaning of democracy. Below I describe the democratic provenance of the principle. I then explain why
other key democratic values are realized as well in a properly aligned political system. Lastly, I argue that the appeal of alignment is not undercut
by trustee theories of representation that downplay the relevance of
popular preferences.
The most basic definition of democracy is a government (kratos) of
the people (demos).151 A polity is democratic if the people are sovereign,
if their will is acknowledged and, ultimately, heeded by their elected representatives. This is not the idiosyncratic view of a particular camp. It is,
rather, a “minimal core conception, one on which a number of more
specific theories converge,” according to Bernard Manin.152 The notion
of “congruence between the preferences of citizens and the actions of
policymakers . . . is not a unique position but rather . . . a common assumption of those who theorize about liberal democracy,” in the words
of John Huber and G. Bingham Powell.153
As the second quote reveals, the alignment approach is so closely related to the essence of democracy that to state the latter is almost to articulate the former. If it is the people who are sovereign, then it is their
preferences, as to both party and policy, that should be followed. If it is
the people who rule, then it is their preferences that should be reflected
in the positions of their representatives and, ideally, in the laws that their
government enacts. And since not all of the people’s preferences can be
151. E.g., Giovanni Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revisited 21 (1987) (“[T]he
etymological definition of democracy is, very simply, that democracy is the rule or power
of the people.”).
152. Bernard Manin et al., Introduction to Democracy, Accountability, and
Representation 1, 2 (Adam Przeworski et al. eds., 1999).
153. Huber & Powell, supra note 98, at 292; see also Jane Mansbridge, Rethinking
Representation, 97 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 515, 526 (2003) (arguing “constituent-representative
congruence . . . is a factor in each of the forms of representation”); Sunstein, Preferences,
supra note 115, at 6 (“Should a constitutional democracy take preferences as the basis for
political choice? In contemporary politics, law, and economics, the usual answer is
affirmative.”).
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followed, it is the view of the majority (embodied by the median voter)
that should be heeded when there is disagreement. Analogously, in the
legislature, it is the pivotal (typically the median) legislator who should
be aligned with the median voter, so that the weight of public opinion
corresponds to the fulcrum of legislative power. Median-median alignment of this sort increases the likelihood that the people’s preferences
will be realized. It increases the likelihood, in other words, that a polity
genuinely will be democratic.154
The democratic appeal of the alignment approach also is evident
from the sense of injustice that is provoked by cases of misalignment. Suppose that a majority of voters wish to be represented (or governed) by
Party A, but instead it is Party B that holds the reins of power. Hamilton
deemed this situation a “poison” in The Federalist Papers, because it “subject[s] the sense of the greater number to that of the lesser.”155 The
unfairness is comparable when it is a nonpartisan majority preference—a
preference as to general ideology or specific policy—that is frustrated. If
the majority favors conservative representation and a minority backs liberalism, why should it be the latter position that prevails? If the majority
wants stricter gun control laws and a minority does not, why should
elected officials privilege the view of the smaller group?156 None of this is
to say that the will of the majority should triumph even in areas that the
Constitution has declared off-limits to ordinary politics.157 But it is to say
that it is troubling when the majority operates within constitutional
bounds but nevertheless is thwarted by a minority. Majorities should not
be losers in a democracy, at least not too often, or else the polity’s very
claim to be a democracy may start to be called into question.158
Beyond its connection to the core meaning of democracy, the
alignment approach is attractive because it promotes the achievement of
154. See, e.g., Powell, supra note 98, at 16 (arguing if congruence “between voters
and policymakers[] is very strong, then elections seem to be performing well as
instruments of democracy”).
155. The Federalist No. 22, supra note 121, at 136 (Alexander Hamilton).
156. One possible answer is that the minority’s preferences are more intense, and
thus that aggregate utility will increase if they are satisfied. But in a democracy that is
committed to the political equality of all citizens, it is difficult to justify the unequal
weighting of people’s preferences. In theory, if not in fact, everyone is supposed to be
equal when votes are cast and public policies are enacted. See Sartori, supra note 151, at
227 (noting “majority principle” embraced by democracies “disregards the unequal
intensity of individual preferences”); see also Powell, supra note 98, at 167 (finding
people’s mean preferences, which take intensity into account, do not vary appreciably from
their median preferences, which do not).
157. See Elaine Spitz, Majority Rule 109 (1984) (“Majority sovereignty says nothing
about which substantive decisions . . . are within the majority’s purview.”).
158. See The Federalist No. 22, supra note 121, at 134 (Alexander Hamilton)
(referring to “fundamental maxim of republican government, which requires that the
sense of the majority should prevail”); The Federalist No. 58, supra note 121, at 387
(James Madison) (referring to “fundamental principle of free government” that “majority
. . . would rule”).
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key democratic goals such as accountability, responsiveness, and legitimacy. (These, of course, are precisely the goals that advocates of competition and participation hope to attain.)159 With respect to accountability,
the approach provides a valuable benchmark by which the performance
of elected officials can be assessed. Officials can be ousted from office
when their records are incongruent with the preferences of their constituents and reelected when their records are congruent.160 Similarly, with
respect to responsiveness, a properly aligned political system necessarily
is responsive to changes in public opinion. If voters’ and politicians’ positions correspond both before and after shifts in opinion occur, then politicians must be responding with alacrity to swings in the mood of the
electorate. As for legitimacy, it is hard to see what could be more appropriate in a democracy than representation (and, ideally, public policy)
that accurately reflects the views of the people. Legitimacy stems directly
from alignment.161
It bears repeating here that my argument is only that alignment is
democratically appealing, not that it is the most appealing democratic
principle. Later in the Article, I discuss the plurality of election law values
and offer some tentative thoughts as to which values are most salient in
which contexts.162 It also is true that at least one prominent family of
democratic theories—those that conceive of representatives as trustees
who pursue the public interest as they see it—places little weight on
alignment. The whole point of a trustee is that she does what she thinks
is in the best interest of her constituency, not what her constituents want
her to do.163 Do these trustee theories undermine the normative case for
the alignment approach? They do not, in my view, for three reasons.
First, there often may be no difference between what an elected official thinks is in the best interest of her constituency and what her constituents want her to do. In this case—which scholars of representation
regard as the norm164—trustee theories and the alignment approach
159. See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text (discussing these scholars).
160. See Brandice Canes-Wrone et al., Out of Step, Out of Office: Electoral
Accountability and House Members’ Voting, 96 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 127, 133 (2002) (“[A]n
incumbent receives a significantly lower electoral margin the more he votes with the
extreme of his party . . . .”); Shor, supra note 82, at 38 (“[S]patial proximity between voters
and their House incumbents does very well in predicting individual vote.”). Of course,
voters may well want to hold representatives accountable for more than their voting
records. Constituent service, seniority, good character, and many other factors also may
play into voters’ decisions.
161. Cf. Sartori, supra note 151, at 135 (arguing “majority principle . . . adds an
element of legitimacy” to public policy).
162. Infra Part IV.A.
163. See supra notes 128–129 and accompanying text (discussing role of
independent judgment in trustee theory).
164. See, e.g., Pitkin, supra note 15, at 165 (“Normally, the conflict between what
[the representative] thinks best (for them) and what they want (as best for themselves)
simply should not arise.”).
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point in the same direction. Second, when the policy assessments of a
politician and of the electorate do diverge, it is by no means clear that
the politician’s judgment is superior. The politician may be corrupt or
ignorant or motivated by an ideology that the public does not share, and
even a fair-minded expert frequently is less accurate than an aggregation
of many laypeople.165 Lastly, there is abundant empirical evidence that, at
least in contemporary American politics, representatives very rarely behave as trustees. Representatives often respond to the policy preferences
of their constituents, and they almost always respond to the demands of
their political party. But the quantum of legislative behavior that cannot
be explained by these factors (and that could be attributable to impartial
analysis of the public interest) is very small.166 Accordingly, even if trustee
theories are theoretically alluring, their practical applicability to modern
politics is highly limited.167
***
The alignment approach, then, calls for the congruence of voters’
and representatives’ preferences, with respect to both party and policy, at
the levels of both the individual district and the entire jurisdiction. The
approach is supported by an overlapping consensus in the democratic
theory literature as well as by occasional references in the case law. And
the approach is normatively attractive because it derives from the basic
definition of democracy itself. In the next Part, I show how the approach
could be used to reframe election law disputes in a variety of areas. I
show, that is, how election law might look through the prism of alignment.
III. ALIGNMENT AND ELECTION LAW
Election law would look quite different indeed through the alignment prism. In field after field, the attention of courts and scholars
would be directed to how closely voters’ and representatives’ preferences
correspond—not to rights-and-interests balancing or to structural con165. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Infotopia: How Many Minds Produce Knowledge
(2006) (describing means and benefits of aggregating knowledge).
166. See, e.g., McCarty et al., Polarized, supra note 104, at 37–41 (showing that
constituency and party variables explain 76% to 90% of variation in House members’
voting records from 1973 to 2003); Elisabeth R. Gerber & Jeffrey B. Lewis, Beyond the
Median: Voter Preferences, District Heterogeneity, and Political Representation, 112 J.
Pol. Econ. 1364, 1375–78 (2004) (finding that same variables explain over 90% of
variation in California legislators’ voting records in 1990s); Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos,
Our Electoral Exceptionalism, 80 U. Chi. L. Rev. 769, 826, 830 (2013) [hereinafter
Stephanopoulos, Exceptionalism] (using empirical evidence to argue for inapplicability of
trustee theories to redistricting context).
167. Another argument against trustee theories is that they are too elitist for the
more populist modern conception of democracy. See James S. Fishkin, The Voice of the
People: Public Opinion and Democracy 62 (1995) (“The elite democracy of the Founders . . .
has given way in successive battles and innovations to . . . mass democracy.”).
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siderations such as competition and participation. Election law would be
focused on one of the most crucial values that elections are meant to realize.168
Below I explore how the alignment approach could be applied to
five distinct election law contexts: franchise restriction, party regulation,
campaign finance, redistricting, and minority representation. With each
context, I start by summarizing the prevailing judicial and academic accounts of the harms that may arise and the ways that they may be alleviated. I then explain how the relevant injuries might helpfully be reconceived under the alignment approach. Next I offer sketches of how
courts could use the approach to uphold aligning policies and strike
down misaligning ones. Lastly, I draw on the political science literature
to estimate the current level of misalignment in each area. The level is
high and growing higher—meaning that the need for a theory that advocates alignment has never been more urgent.
A. Franchise Restriction
I begin my election law survey with franchise restrictions: measures
that make it more difficult for otherwise eligible individuals to vote.169 In
earlier periods, these restrictions included property ownership requirements, pauper exclusions, poll taxes, literacy tests, and grandfather
clauses.170 They typically aimed to (and did) prevent members of disfavored groups such as immigrants, the poor, and African Americans from
participating in elections.171 In recent years, many new restrictions have
been enacted around the country. In 2011 and 2012 alone, nineteen
states adopted photo identification requirements for voting, proof-ofcitizenship requirements for registering to vote, limits on voter
registration drives, cutbacks to early voting, or stricter felon

168. In the next Part, I discuss reasons why the alignment approach is not always
applicable. But here my focus is on the election law areas to which the approach does
indeed apply.
169. The line between franchise restrictions and eligibility requirements for voting is
not always very clear. The alignment approach also could be applied to eligibility
requirements—many of which likely would survive review, even if they have misaligning
effects, because they serve important state interests such as defining the normative
electorate.
170. For a comprehensive list of these earlier restrictions, see Alexander Keyssar, The
Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the United States app. tbls.A.1–A.16
(rev. ed. 2009).
171. See, e.g., id. at 91 (“[T]he late-nineteenth-century effort to transform the
South’s electorate was grounded solidly in class concerns as well as racial antagonism.”);
id. at 104, 111 (describing class-based and anti-immigrant rationales for franchise
restrictions in North); J. Morgan Kousser, The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage
Restriction and the Establishment of the One-Party South, 1880–1910, at 7 (1974) (noting
partisanship as motive for racial disenfranchisement).
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disenfranchisement laws.172 This burst of activity constitutes the most
significant retrenchment in the public’s access to the polls since the end
of the Civil Rights Era.
When franchise restrictions are challenged in litigation, courts
weigh the limitation on the right to vote against the state interests served
by the restrictions (improving election administration, preventing fraud,
and the like).173 Courts thus conceptualize the injury that is inflicted as
an encumbrance on an individual right, which is to be tolerated only if
the resulting cost is outweighed by the benefits that accrue when the
state’s interests are advanced. Some of the legal literature endorses this
sort of rights-and-interests balancing.174 Other scholars argue that the key
harm caused by franchise restrictions is a decline in competition. A decline occurs, on this view, when a party seeks to entrench itself in office
by preventing its opponent’s supporters from voting.175 Still other scholars regard the harm of these restrictions as mostly participational. Voter
turnout is vital in a democracy, but it declines when barriers to casting
ballots are high.176
Under the alignment approach, in contrast, the injury perpetrated
by franchise restrictions is the potential divergence between the median
actual voter and the median eligible voter who would have gone to the
polls in the absence of the restrictions. The partisan preference of the
172. Weiser & Kasdan, supra note 1, at 1–6, 17–21. This trend has accelerated since
2012 thanks to the Supreme Court’s recent invalidation of section 4(b) of the Voting
Rights Act, which previously had prevented southern states from adopting many franchise
restrictions. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (holding Voting
Rights Act’s coverage formula unconstitutional); see also, e.g., Michael Cooper, After
Ruling, States Rush to Enact Voting Laws, N.Y. Times, July 6, 2013, at A9 (“State officials
across the South are aggressively moving ahead with new laws requiring voters to show
photo identification after the [Shelby County] decision striking down a portion of the
Voting Rights Act.”).
173. See, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (setting forth standard
that strict scrutiny applies when franchise restrictions are severe, but “‘reasonable,
nondiscriminatory restrictions’” should be upheld if they serve “‘State’s important
regulatory interests’” (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983))); Dunn
v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (noting that restrictions on voting are subject to
close scrutiny); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969)
(observing that apportionment “statutes, which may dilute the effectiveness of some
citizens’ votes, receive close scrutiny”).
174. See, e.g., Hasen, Election Law, supra note 48, at 97 (“I agree with the Court’s
jurisprudence that a balancing of interests is required . . . .”); Fishkin, Individual Right,
supra note 51, at 1292 (arguing “individual-rights-versus-state-interests doctrinal
framework . . . will remain the right approach”).
175. See, e.g., Issacharoff & Pildes, Politics as Markets, supra note 35, at 652–74
(discussing “partisan manipulation” of franchise); Klarman, supra note 58, at 535–36
(expressing suspicion of restrictions on ballot access).
176. See, e.g., Elmendorf, Undue Burdens, supra note 54, at 675 (“[A] requirement
is constitutionally suspect to the extent that it reduces the total number of eligible citizens
who participate.”); Overton, Identification, supra note 60, at 673 (arguing that judges
should assess policies’ aggregate effects on turnout).

326

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 114:283

median actual voter necessarily is dispositive in a two-party race, and her
policy preferences also exert a substantial influence on the positions
taken by her representative.177 But in a democracy committed to the principle that all people who are entitled to vote should be able to do so if
they so desire,178 the median actual voter is a less compelling figure than
the median eligible voter who wishes to participate in an election. A gap
between these two individuals emerges whenever franchise restrictions
distort the partisan or ideological composition of the electorate. A gap
emerges, that is, whenever the restrictions impose different voting burdens on different political groups.
In this Article’s terminology, partisan misalignment at the district
level is the most obvious harm that may occur as a consequence of
measures that make it more difficult to vote. This kind of noncongruence arises if the partisan preference of the median actual voter differs
from that of the median eligible voter who would have participated had
the measures not been enacted. For example, the median actual voter
might be a Republican, but the median eligible voter who would have
turned out had there not been, say, a photo identification requirement
might be a Democrat. Another harm that franchise restrictions may
cause, even if there is no partisan mismatch, is policy misalignment at the
district level. This sort of noncongruence develops if a representative
adopts the views of the median actual voter and if these views are not
shared by the median eligible voter who would have liked to participate.
For instance, the median actual voter might be highly conservative, but
the median eligible voter who would have turned out had there not
been, say, a proof-of-citizenship requirement might be relatively moderate.179

177. See John D. Griffin & Brian Newman, Are Voters Better Represented?, 67 J. Pol.
1206, 1207–09 (2005) (finding representatives far more responsive to voters than to
nonvoters).
178. See, e.g., Blumstein, 405 U.S. at 336 (“[A] citizen has a constitutionally protected
right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction.”);
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968) (extolling “right of qualified voters, regardless
of their political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively”). Of course, the participatory
principle is not absolute. Some franchise restrictions—for instance, set hours for polling
places—are necessary in order to conduct elections in the first place. Restrictions essential
to the basic operation of the electoral system should be upheld even if they happen to
have misaligning effects. The misaligning effects are outweighed in such cases by the
compelling interests served by the restrictions. Moreover, the participatory principle also
plainly stems from a democratic value other than alignment itself. As noted earlier, the
alignment principle does not help in selecting the normatively significant person whose
preferences should be satisfied. Supra text accompanying note 96.
179. These district-level misalignments, if they occur in multiple constituencies, may
aggregate into partisan or policy misalignment at the legislative level too.
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It is worth noting here that many franchise restrictions aim to prevent voter fraud,180 and that fraud itself may result in misalignment. If
enough fraudulent votes are cast to change an election’s outcome, then a
clear disjunction emerges between the median lawful ballot and the median ballot that actually is counted.181 However, levels of fraud have been
found to be very low in recent American elections.182 The misalignment
that might be caused by fraud therefore pales in comparison to the misalignment that is produced by measures that make it more difficult to
vote. This is an area in which the cure is worse than the ailment.
How, then, should courts tackle cases involving franchise restrictions
under the alignment approach? My goal in this Article is not to make
detailed doctrinal recommendations, but the crucial point is that courts
should seek out—and then focus on—evidence about the misalignment
that is likely to result from the measures at issue. If the measures probably will impose similar voting burdens on different political groups, then
they probably should be upheld.183 But if the odds are high that the policies will affect some groups (minorities, the poor, the young) more than
others (whites, the affluent, the middle-aged), then they should be regarded with significant skepticism. All of the varieties of misalignment
are more likely to materialize in this case, and such risks should be accepted only if the interests asserted by the state are highly compelling.
The alignment approach therefore might take the form not of rightsand-interests balancing but rather of congruence-and-interests balancing.
The greater the danger of misalignment, the stronger the state’s interests
would need to be to sustain the relevant measures (and the tighter the
measures’ tailoring), and vice versa.184

180. See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 194–97 (2008)
(plurality opinion) (discussing antifraud interest asserted by Indiana in case involving
photo ID requirement).
181. See, e.g., Fishkin, Individual Right, supra note 51, at 1307 (“The first and most
obvious reason to prevent fraudulent votes is that they might alter an election
outcome . . . .”).
182. See, e.g., Lorri Minnite & David Callahan, Securing the Vote 4, 15 (2003)
(finding “incidence of election fraud [was] minimal” between 1992 and 2002); Natasha
Khan & Corbin Carson, Comprehensive Database of U.S. Voter Fraud Uncovers No
Evidence that Photo ID Is Needed, News21 (Aug. 12, 2012, 10:39 AM),
http://votingrights.news21.com/article/election-fraud/ (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (finding “infinitesimal” rate of voter fraud since 2000).
183. More precisely, such measures should not be invalidated on an alignment
theory, but could still be struck down because of their infringements of individual rights.
See infra Part IV.A (discussing plurality of election law values).
184. For example, photo identification requirements would be unlikely to be upheld
under the alignment approach because they produce moderate levels of misalignment, see
infra notes 186–188 and accompanying text, without preventing a substantial amount of
voter fraud, see, e.g., Crawford, 553 U.S. at 194 (conceding there was “no evidence” of voter
impersonation fraud ever taking place in state). I should also note that my earlier
criticisms of the Court’s rights-and-interests framework, supra Part I, were directed at the
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The political science literature sheds light on how great the danger
of misalignment actually is with different kinds of franchise restrictions.
First, the most common restrictions in the Jim Crow South, poll taxes
and literacy tests, disproportionately reduced the turnout of African
Americans and poor whites, thus strengthening the electoral position of
the then-dominant Democratic Party. According to one analysis, the poll
tax increased the Democratic share of seats in southern state legislatures
by about 3%, and the literacy test increased it by about 8%.185 Second,
the partisan impact of the most controversial modern restrictions, photo
identification requirements for voting, is still hotly debated. Surveys of
eligible voters typically find substantial differences in the possession of
valid identification between Democratic- and Republican-leaning
constituencies.186 However, studies that examine actual election results
usually conclude that photo identification laws have smaller effects.187
The best estimates are that such laws reduce overall turnout by 2% to 3%
and produce a pro-Republican swing of 0% to 1%.188
exclusion of alignment from the Court’s balancing analysis, not at balancing per se. I see
nothing objectionable about balancing as long as the right factors are being balanced.
185. Timothy Besley & Anne Case, Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence
from the United States, 41 J. Econ. Literature 7, 27 tbl.4 (2003); see also Keyssar, supra
note 170, at 85, 91–92, 138 (discussing historical partisan impact of franchise restrictions);
Kousser, supra note 171, at 240 (noting that in Jim Crow South “there were massive
declines in turnout and opposition party strength after suffrage restriction[s]” were
enacted).
186. See, e.g., Matt A. Barreto et al., The Disproportionate Impact of Voter-ID
Requirements on the Electorate—New Evidence from Indiana, 42 PS: Pol. Sci. & Pol. 111,
114 (2009) (finding valid identification gap of 4.5% between registered Democrats and
Republicans in Indiana); Charles Stewart III, Voter ID: Who Has Them? Show Shows
Them? [sic] 22 (Apr. 4, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (finding valid identification gap of 2% to 3% between registered Democrats and
Republicans nationwide); see also, e.g., Brennan Ctr. for Justice, Citizens Without Proof: A
Survey of Americans’ Possession of Documentary Proof of Citizenship and Photo
Identification 3 (2006), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/
legacy/d/download_file_39242.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (finding that
16% to 25% of voting-age African American and Hispanic citizens lack valid identification
compared to 8% of voting-age white citizens).
187. See, e.g., R. Michael Alvarez et al., The Effect of Voter Identification Laws on
Turnout 3 (Cal. Inst. of Tech., Social Science Working Paper No. 1267R, 2008), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1084598 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“In general,
there does not seem to be a discriminatory impact of the [voter identification]
requirements on some subpopulations of registered voters . . . .”); Brad T. Gomez, Uneven
Hurdles: The Effect of Voter Identification Requirements on Voter Turnout 19 (Apr.
2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (finding “slight”
increase in Republican vote share in states with photo identification laws); Timothy
Vercellotti & David Anderson, Protecting the Franchise, or Restricting It? The Effects of
Voter Identification Requirements on Turnout 11 (2006) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/d/download_file_
50903.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (finding 2.9% decline in turnout in states
with photo identification requirements).
188. See Nate Cohn, Finally, Real Numbers on Voter ID, New Republic (July 22,
2013),
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/113986/voter-id-north-carolina-law-hurts-
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Third, other common modern restrictions seem to have widely divergent partisan consequences. One study determined that early closing
dates for voter registration and purges of voter rolls cause significant declines in turnout but do not alter the partisan composition of the electorate.189 In contrast, two other studies found that the elimination of election day registration both reduces turnout and results in a proRepublican swing of about 5%.190 And a study of felon disenfranchisement laws concluded that the people they prevent from voting lean
Democratic by a two-to-one margin, and that at least seven Senate elections over the last few decades would have had different outcomes had
ex-felons been able to vote.191 Lastly, there is evidence that elected officials’ voting records are more consistent with the policy preferences of
voters than with those of nonvoters.192 Since voters and nonvoters tend to
have different preferences,193 policies that deter eligible individuals from
going to the polls are likely to produce policy misalignment.
Unfortunately, the political science literature rarely has linked the
partisan swings caused by franchise restrictions to the views of the median eligible voter, and the work on the policy misalignment generated
by these measures remains in its infancy. Still, there is little doubt that
the misaligning effects of voting rules can be quantified and then predemocrats (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (estimating pro-Republican swing of
about 0.6% if North Carolina enacts photo identification law); Nate Silver, Measuring the
Effects of Voter Identification Laws, N.Y. Times: FiveThirtyEight (July 15, 2012, 9:28 AM),
http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/15/measuring-the-effects-of-voteridentification-laws (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (concluding that switch from no
photo identification law to strict photo identification law can reduce turnout by as much
as 2.4% and cause pro-Republican swing of up to 1.2%); see also Gomez, supra note 187,
at 19 (“[I]n states with photographic identification requirements, the Republican Party
does experience a slight (but significant) increase in vote share.”).
189. See Glenn E. Mitchell & Christopher Wlezien, The Impact of Legal Constraints
on Voter Registration, Turnout, and the Composition of the American Electorate, 17 Pol.
Behav. 179, 186, 195 (1995) (finding that measures “constrain registration” and
“ultimately diminish turnout,” but “partisan balance . . . remain[s] largely unaltered”).
190. Besley & Case, supra note 185, at 25–26 (finding that “[s]tates with . . .
registration on polling day, or not requiring registration at all [] have voter turnout that is
roughly 2 percentage points higher on average”); Barry C. Burden et al., Election Laws
and Partisan Gains: The Effects of Early Voting and Same Day Registration on the Parties’
Vote Shares 8 (2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(finding that elimination of election day registration results in 5% to 6% pro-Republican
swing and elimination of early voting results in similarly sized pro-Democratic swing).
191. See Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Democratic Contraction? Political
Consequences of Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States, 67 Am. Soc. Rev. 777,
786–89 (2002) (discussing felons’ seven-to-one Democratic lean and potential effects on
Senate elections since 1978).
192. See Griffin & Newman, supra note 177, at 1207–09, 1216 (concluding that
senators are disproportionately responsive to voters’ interests).
193. See id. at 1214–15 (finding voters generally more conservative than nonvoters);
see also Jack Citrin et al., What if Everyone Voted? Simulating the Impact of Increased
Turnout in Senate Elections, 47 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 75, 81 (2003) (concluding that voters are
generally more Republican than nonvoters).
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sented in a usable format to courts. There also is little doubt that these
effects vary widely from case to case, but at least sometimes are large
enough to wreak serious democratic damage. Accordingly, no empirical
obstacle exists to the adoption of the alignment approach in the franchise restriction context, and in fact abundant empirical evidence indicates that the ill it seeks to combat is substantial. Misalignment is not
mere conjecture in this domain, but rather well-documented reality.
B. Party Regulation
I next consider regulations of political parties, two kinds of which often result in litigation. First, all states impose ballot access requirements
with which parties must comply in order to secure places on the general
election ballot. They include laws that certain numbers of signatures be
gathered, filing deadlines for the completion of the signature-gathering
process, and “sore loser” provisions that bar candidates defeated in primaries from running again in the general election.194 Second, all states
also regulate the procedures that parties use to determine their general
election nominees. Primaries almost universally are required for legislative positions, and their particular form typically is specified as well. The
most common variants are closed primaries (in which only party members may vote) and open primaries (in which any voter may participate).
Two rarer options are blanket primaries (in which voters decide race by
race in which party’s election to cast a ballot) and top-two primaries (in
which voters choose among all of the available candidates and then the
two with the most votes advance to the general election).195
When party regulations are challenged, courts assess them using exactly the same rights-and-interests framework that they employ in the
franchise restriction context. An array of rights potentially are implicated
in these disputes: the right of voters to cast a ballot for whom they please,
the right of candidates to run for office, and the right of parties to control their nomination procedures. Burdens on these rights are weighed
against countervailing state interests such as avoiding voter confusion,

194. See Dmitri Evseev, A Second Look at Third Parties: Correcting the Supreme
Court’s Understanding of Elections, 85 B.U. L. Rev. 1277, 1282–87 (2005) (discussing
ballot access requirements generally); Barry C. Burden et al., Nominations and the Supply
of Candidates: The Connection Between Sore Loser Laws and Congressional Polarization
33 tbl.1 (2013) [hereinafter Burden et al., Polarization] (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://users.polisci.wisc.edu/behavior/Papers/BurdenJonesKang2013.pdf
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (listing sore loser provisions by state).
195. See Christopher Westley et al., Primary Election Systems and Candidate
Deviation, 30 E. Econ. J. 365, 371 tbl.2 (2004) (listing primary type by state);
Congressional and Presidential Primaries: Open, Closed, Semi-Closed, and “Top Two,”
FairVote, http://www.fairvote.org/congressional-and-presidential-primaries-open-closedsemi-closed-and-top-two (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Dec. 31, 2013)
(same).
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increasing voter participation, and promoting political stability.196 Some
of the legal literature is supportive of this methodology.197 Other scholars
contend that party regulations should be evaluated based on their implications for competition. They should be particularly suspect when they
make it difficult for third parties to qualify for the ballot198 or mute the
policy differences between the two major parties.199 Still other scholars
maintain that party autonomy is paramount, and that governmental intrusions into how parties manage their affairs usually should be struck
down.200 Yet another perspective is that parties, especially when they conduct elections, are nothing more than adjuncts of the state that may be
regulated in whatever fashion the state deems desirable.201
Under the alignment approach, on the other hand, the core concern about party regulations is that they may produce misalignment, either by changing the choices presented to voters in the general election,
or by altering the electorate that is entitled to participate in primary elections. To begin with, ballot access requirements may result in partisan
misalignment if they enable a third party to qualify for the ballot and if
this party then acts as a “spoiler” that prevents the party preferred by the
median voter from prevailing. To return to a hypothetical I have already

196. E.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983) (holding that courts
must first consider “character and magnitude” of any infringement of protected rights,
must then determine “legitimacy and strength” of state’s interests, and finally must
evaluate “extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s
rights”); accord, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997)
(applying Anderson balancing test); Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208,
214 (1986) (same).
197. See, e.g., Hasen, Election Law, supra note 48, at 97 (“I agree with the Court’s
jurisprudence that a balancing of interests is required . . . .”); Evseev, supra note 194, at
1322–30 (defending Anderson approach and arguing that it be “revitalized”).
198. See, e.g., Issacharoff & Pildes, Politics as Markets, supra note 35, at 681–87
(explaining ballot access restrictions as anticompetitive “barriers to entry”).
199. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Private Parties with Public Purposes: Political
Parties, Associational Freedoms, and Partisan Competition, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 274, 299
(2001) (criticizing blanket primaries because of their tendency to push parties toward
center). But see Daniel R. Ortiz, Duopoly Versus Autonomy: How the Two-Party System
Harms the Major Parties, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 753, 773–74 (2000) (defending blanket
primaries because they moderate parties’ anticompetitive excesses).
200. See, e.g., Bruce E. Cain, Point/Counterpoint, Party Autonomy and Two-Party
Electoral Competition, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 793, 805 (2001) (“[I]t is functionally important
in a free, democratic system for groups undertaking party-like functions . . . to have the
greatest possible degree of self-determination and autonomy.”); Persily, Autonomy, supra
note 89, at 752 (making “pro-party autonomy argument” that is “in favor of broad judicial
protection for political parties’ First Amendment right to determine who should be
allowed to vote in party primaries”).
201. See, e.g., Nathaniel Persily & Bruce E. Cain, The Legal Status of Political Parties:
A Reassessment of Competing Paradigms, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 775, 779–82 (2000)
(describing “managerial” conception of political parties, under which states have “near
plenary authority to regulate”).
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mentioned,202 suppose that Party C qualifies for the general election ballot thanks to a permissive regulation, and that it then receives 7% of the
vote while Party A gets 48% and Party B (the second choice of Party C
supporters) gets 45%. Then the lax rule is directly responsible for the
partisan misalignment that ensues. Party B would have won had Party C
not made it onto the ballot.
This is not to say, of course, that third parties should be excluded
from American politics. They have played an important role at several
historical junctures,203 and the current two-party duopoly is unsatisfactory
in many respects. The point is only that third parties are potentially problematic in an electoral system that relies on single-member districts and
plurality voting rules. If these aspects of the system were revisited, then
third (and fourth, and fifth) parties could compete vigorously without
fomenting any fear of partisan misfire.204
Ballot access requirements also may result in misalignment in two
subtler ways. First, as Michael Kang has noted, a common consequence
of sore loser laws is that moderate candidates who are defeated in primaries cannot run again in the general election, either as independents or
under a different party’s banner.205 If the laws did not exist, these candidates would be able to run again—and if they won in the general election,
closer policy congruence between their views and those of the moderate
median voter would follow.206 Second, when a third party qualifies for the
ballot thanks to a lax regulation, policy misalignment may arise even if
partisan misalignment does not, due to the implications of the third
party’s involvement for the positioning of the two major parties. Imagine
that a centrist third party competes effectively for the support of voters in
the middle of the policy spectrum. Then the two major parties may safely
shift their positions toward the spectrum’s edges, because the votes they
lose by doing so go to the third party, not to their principal rivals. Policy
divergence thus may develop between the major parties—which in turn

202. Supra text accompanying notes 74–75, 94; see also Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S.
23, 54 n.8 (1968) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (presenting analogous hypothetical).
203. See generally Steven J. Rosenstone et al., Third Parties in America 215–30 (2d
rev. ed. 1996) (concluding that third parties historically “popularize[d] ideas that the
major parties would otherwise ignore” and have “serve[d] as political vehicles for
citizens[’] discontent with . . . major parties”).
204. For instance, single-member districts with instant-runoff voting rules would
drastically reduce the likelihood of partisan misalignment, as would multimember districts
with some kind of proportional representation.
205. Michael S. Kang, Sore Loser Laws and Democratic Contestation, 99 Geo. L.J.
1013, 1015–16 (2011).
206. See id. at 1030 (“By loosening restrictions on ballot access . . . it may be possible
to . . . tip party politics in the direction of centrism.”). The presence of a third-party
candidate on the ballot thus is not inherently misaligning. If the third-party candidate
wins, and if her views are closer to those of the median voter than the views of the majorparty candidates, then her involvement has an aligning effect.
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may produce policy misalignment when one of these parties triumphs
despite having deviated from the preferences of the median voter.207
Regulations of party primaries may give rise to policy misalignment
as well, by making more likely the selection of nominees who are extreme relative to the median voter. In particular, when jurisdictions require primaries to be closed to nonmembers, nominees tend to reflect
the views of the party’s median voter. This figure is quite different from—
and more ideologically polarized than—the median voter in the general
election. Conversely, when jurisdictions mandate open primaries, the
distribution of opinions in the primary electorate is more similar to the
distribution in the general electorate. Nominees therefore tend to diverge less from the preferences of the median general election voter.208
This aligning effect is even stronger when blanket or top-two primaries
are employed. If voters decide race by race in which party’s primary to
cast ballots, then the gap between the primary and general electorates
shrinks as nonparty members “cross over” to participate in races that interest them.209 And if voters choose among all of the available candidates,
then the gap between the electorates disappears almost entirely and the
median primary voter becomes almost identical to the median general
election voter.210
Under the alignment approach, then, judicial review of party regulations would vary based on the type of rule at issue. If a rule is potentially
misaligning (such as a sore loser law), courts would engage in precisely
207. See James Adams & Samuel Merrill, III, Why Small, Centrist Third Parties
Motivate Policy Divergence by Major Parties, 100 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 403, 406 (2006)
(modeling polarization of major parties in presence of centrist third party); Gary W. Cox,
Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems, 34 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 903, 915
(1990) (describing electoral incentives to run toward “extremes” when parties cluster
around center). On the other hand, “the effect of a minor, peripheral party contesting the
election is typically to shift the optimal strategies of both major parties in the direction
opposite to that of the small party.” Adams & Merrill, supra, at 414. Whether the third
party’s impact is aligning or misaligning in this scenario depends on which major party
prevails. If the major party closer to the third party wins, then the impact generally is
aligning, and vice versa.
208. However, it is worth noting that open primaries (and their variants) only have
an aligning effect if sincere crossover voting predominates over strategic crossover voting.
If many nonparty members cross over in order to vote for candidates they expect to be
weaker in the general election, then open primaries may produce more extreme
nominees. Fortunately, primary “raiding” of this sort seems to be quite rare. See Will
Bullock & Joshua D. Clinton, More a Molehill than a Mountain: The Effects of the Blanket
Primary on Elected Officials’ Behavior from California, 73 J. Pol. 915, 917 (2011)
(reviewing literature finding “almost no evidence of ‘raiding’”).
209. However, as noted earlier, blanket primaries may result in better alignment
between nominees and the median general election voter at the cost of worse alignment
between nominees and parties’ median voters. The Supreme Court invalidated the blanket
primary in Jones in part for this very reason. See supra note 142.
210. The most important reason why the primary and general electorates are not
perfectly identical under a top-two system is that turnout typically is higher in the general
election.
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the same congruence-and-interests balancing as in the franchise restriction context. The greater the likelihood of misalignment, the more
compelling the state’s interests would need to be for the rule to be sustained (and the tighter the rule’s tailoring), and vice versa. Conversely, if
a rule is potentially aligning (such as a mandatory inclusive primary or a
measure that restricts third-party ballot qualification), courts would balance the rule’s potential benefit in congruence against its attendant burden on parties’ associational rights. The rule would be upheld if its aligning benefit were deemed to outweigh its rights burden, and struck down
if not. Alignment would be treated as an additional state interest that
could justify the encumbrance of parties’ rights. Under either sort of inquiry, of course, accurate data about the alignment or misalignment that
is likely to ensue would be crucial.
Unfortunately, no political science studies address how often thirdparty involvement prevents the party preferred by the median voter from
prevailing. But in 2000, Ralph Nader’s presence on the ballot cost Al
Gore Florida (and with it the presidency),211 and in the most recent election, the votes received by third parties exceeded the major party’s margin of victory in about a dozen House races.212 With respect to the policy
divergence that third parties may generate, a British study found that the
more seats the centrist Liberal Democrats contest in an election, the
higher the level of polarization is between the Conservative and Labor
Parties. When the Liberal Democrats contest almost every seat, the gap
between the major parties’ policy platforms is more than twice as high as
when they contest only a handful of seats.213 Similarly, another study determined that states with sore loser laws feature ideological differences
between the Democratic and Republican candidates that are 13% larger
than in states without the laws.214 The provisions’ presence also is linked
to an increase in legislative polarization, measured using incumbents’
voting records, of 5% to 10%.215
As for party primaries, the majority of studies have concluded that
inclusive primaries bolster moderate candidates who are closer to the
median voter, while a minority have found no relationship between primary type and policy alignment. According to the majority of scholarship, primary electorates are ideologically more similar to general elec211. See, e.g., Michael C. Herron & Jeffrey B. Lewis, Did Ralph Nader Spoil Al Gore’s
Presidential Bid? A Ballot-Level Study of Green and Reform Party Voters in the 2000
Presidential Election, 2 Q.J. Pol. Sci. 205, 206 (2007) (finding 60% of Nader supporters
preferred Gore to Bush and thus Nader “was a spoiler for Gore”).
212. See Election 2012—House Results, N.Y. Times, http://elections.nytimes.com/
2012/results/house/big-board (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last updated Nov.
29, 2012) (listing 2012 House election results).
213. See Adams & Merrill, supra note 207, at 412 (noting that Liberal Democrats’
“presence in the party system . . . motivates the major parties to polarize”).
214. Burden et al., Polarization, supra note 194, at 19.
215. Id. at 21–23.
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torates under inclusive systems;216 House members217 and state legislators218 elected via inclusive systems adopt policy views more proximate to
those of their constituents; and in California, moderate candidates enjoyed greater electoral success during the state’s experiment with the
blanket primary in the 1990s.219 According to the academic minority, levels of polarization do not vary among the states based on the kinds of
primaries that they use,220 and California’s more recent experiment with
the top-two primary has not narrowed the preference gap between
elected officials and the median voter.221 There is thus no consensus in
the literature about the implications of inclusive primaries, but the

216. See, e.g., Karen M. Kaufmann et al., A Promise Fulfilled? Open Primaries and
Representation, 65 J. Pol. 457, 465 (2003) (“[P]rimary reform produces some ideological
convergence of the party primary vote.”).
217. See, e.g., Gerber & Morton, supra note 102, at 321–22 (“U.S. representatives
from states with closed primaries take more extreme policy positions, relative to their
district’s median voter, than representatives from states with more open primaries.”);
Kristin Kanthak & Rebecca Morton, The Effects of Electoral Rules on Congressional
Primaries, in Congressional Primaries and the Politics of Representation 116, 126 (Peter F.
Galderisi et al. eds., 2001) (“Candidates who are selected from semiclosed, semiopen, and
nonpartisan states are significantly more likely to have moderate positions relative to their
districts’ median voters than are those selected from pure-closed primary states.”); Westley
et al., supra note 195, at 373 (“[M]ore open primaries produce candidates with positions
that are closer to those of the median voter.”).
218. See Besley & Case, supra note 185, at 30 (“[O]pen primaries are associated with
reductions in the absolute differences between the ideologies of citizens and [state]
elected officials . . . .”).
219. See Eric McGhee with Daniel Krimm, Pub. Policy Inst. of Cal., At Issue: Open
Primaries 8 (2010), available at http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/atissue/
AI_210EMAI.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“[E]vidence—much of it from
California’s experience with the blanket primary—points toward a slight advantage to
moderate candidates.”); Bullock & Clinton, supra note 208, at 923 (“[T]he adoption of
the blanket primary does appear to result in the election of slightly more moderate
representatives.”); Elisabeth R. Gerber, Strategic Voting and Candidate Policy Positions, in
Voting at the Political Fault Line: California’s Experiment with the Blanket Primary 192,
210 (Bruce E. Cain & Elisabeth R. Gerber eds., 2002) (observing that blanket primary
“clearly made a difference in the State Assembly races, leading to the nomination of a
significantly greater number of moderates”); see also R. Michael Alvarez & Betsy Sinclair,
Electoral Institutions and Legislative Behavior: The Effects of Primary Processes, 65 Pol.
Res. Q. 544, 545 (2012) (finding “legislators elected under [California’s] blanket primary
are more likely to agree and compromise with other legislators”).
220. See, e.g., Eric McGhee et al., A Primary Cause of Partisanship? Nomination
Systems and Legislator Ideology 11 (May 1, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1674091 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“[T]he
predictions of a heterogeneous effect are fragile and dependent on assumptions that may
not be realistic in practice.”).
221. See Kousser et al., supra note 102, at 32 (noting that “top-two primary has [not]
halted the continuing partisan polarization of California’s elected lawmakers or their drift
away from the average voter in each district”).
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weight of authority does suggest that they have at least some aligning effects.222
Accordingly, there again is no empirical impediment to the adoption of the alignment approach in the party regulation context, and
again the available evidence confirms that misalignment is a genuine
worry in this domain. Courts would not be chasing chimeras by orienting
their review of party rules around the preference noncongruence that
they may produce. Next I consider how the field of campaign finance
might look if it too were organized around the alignment principle. I
consider, that is, how money in politics may distort the relationships between voters and their representatives (and how the law may seek to correct these distortions).
C. Campaign Finance
A small number of policies are employed (or often proposed) to
regulate money in American politics. First, limits on contributions to
candidates and other political actors apply at the federal level223 and in
almost all states.224 Second, expenditure restrictions on candidates and
other political actors used to exist at the federal and state levels, but have
been deemed unconstitutional by the courts.225 Third, both contributions
and expenditures typically must be disclosed to the public.226 Lastly, public financing is available in presidential elections227 and in about half of
the states,228 in return for which candidates usually must agree to limit
222. Some reasons why more inclusive primaries may not produce the expected
aligning effects are that voters may not be able to identify candidates’ ideological positions
accurately and that crossover voting may be too infrequent to make any real difference.
McGhee et al., supra note 220, at 11 n.2, 28–29.
223. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a) (2012) (prescribing dollar limits on individual contributions
in federal elections).
224. See, e.g., Contribution Limits: An Overview, Nat’l Conference of State
Legislatures,
http://ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections/campaign-contributionlimits-overview.aspx (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last updated Oct. 3, 2011)
(reviewing state restrictions on election contributions).
225. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 896–99, 916–17 (2010) (striking
down bans on corporate expenditures); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 58–59 (1976) (per
curiam) (striking down restrictions on expenditures by candidates and other political
actors). Prior to Citizens United, bans on corporate and union expenditures existed in
about half of the states. See, e.g., Life After Citizens United, Nat’l Conference of State
Legislatures,
http://ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections/citizens-united-and-thestates.aspx (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last updated Jan. 4, 2011) (describing
“[l]aws in 24 states . . . affected by Citizens United”).
226. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 434, 441d (detailing reporting and public disclosure
requirements).
227. Id. § 441a(b) (setting expenditure limits on presidential candidates using public
financing); 26 U.S.C. §§ 9031–9042 (2012) (describing eligibility, conditions, and
procedures for receiving public financing).
228. See, e.g., Public Financing of Campaigns: An Overview, Nat’l Conference of
State Legislatures, http://ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections/public-financing-of-
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their fundraising and spending. Despite these measures, the total cost of
American elections has increased steadily, especially in recent years. Between 2000 and 2012, outlays approximately doubled in campaigns for
both Congress (from $1.7 billion to $3.6 billion) and the White House
(from $1.4 billion to $2.6 billion).229
When campaign finance laws are challenged, courts evaluate them
using a variant of the rights-and-interests balancing on which they rely in
several other domains. The right at issue in these cases is the freedom of
speech: the ability of citizens, candidates, and other actors to donate and
spend money in accordance with their political beliefs. The only countervailing state interest that courts have recognized is the prevention of
corruption and its appearance.230 Expenditure restrictions are particularly suspect under this framework, while contribution limits are reviewed
more leniently.231 In the legal literature, the most common argument is
that another compelling interest also justifies campaign finance laws:
preventing inequalities in wealth from being translated into inequalities
in political influence. On this view, political equality is a crucial value
that is undermined when some groups and individuals are able to dedicate far greater resources than others to swaying electoral outcomes.232
Other perspectives stress the implications of campaign finance laws for
competition,233 the possibility that low-dollar donations could enhance

campaigns-overview.aspx (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last updated Jan. 23,
2013) (describing public financing schemes in twenty-five states). The extent of public
financing varies widely among these states, from tax incentives for citizens to full
governmental funding. See, e.g., id.
229. Election Money, supra note 4.
230. See FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496–97
(1985) (“[P]reventing corruption or the appearance of corruption are the only legitimate
and compelling government interests thus far identified for restricting campaign
finances.”).
231. See, e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 246–48 (2006) (plurality opinion)
(holding that contribution limits must meet less rigorous “closely drawn” standard); FEC v.
Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 259–60 (1986) (“[R]estrictions on contributions
require less compelling justification than restrictions on independent spending.”);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1976) (per curiam) (upholding contribution limits
closely drawn to prevent corruption or its appearance).
232. See, e.g., David Cole, First Amendment Antitrust: The End of Laissez-Faire in
Campaign Finance, 9 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 236, 237 (1991) (asserting that economic
imbalances give “certain voices inordinate influence” in shaping political views); Edward
B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter: A Constitutional Principle of Campaign Finance, 94
Colum. L. Rev. 1204, 1204 (1994) (advocating equal expenditures per voter to eliminate
disproportionate influence of wealthy); David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and
Campaign Finance Reform, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1369, 1370 (1994) (arguing that concern
over corruption can be mitigated by achieving “appropriate level of equality”).
233. See, e.g., Bruce E. Cain, Moralism and Realism in Campaign Finance Reform,
1995 U. Chi. Legal F. 111, 138 (describing anticompetitive effects of incumbents’ financial
and fundraising advantages); Klarman, supra note 58, at 522 (noting legislators’ “obvious
incentive” to entrench themselves using campaign finance laws).
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opportunities for civic participation,234 and the impairment of
representation that follows when candidates devote too much of their
time to fundraising.235
Under the alignment approach, in contrast, the fear about money in
politics is that it may cause the preferences of voters and representatives
to diverge—and the hope is that well-crafted regulations may prevent this
divergence from emerging. To begin with, partisan misalignment may
occur when asymmetric spending creates a gap between the median actual voter and the median hypothetical voter exposed to more even expenditures. Suppose that Candidate A outspends Candidate B by a large
margin and then wins the election.236 Suppose also that had Candidate A
and Candidate B spent the same amount of money, Candidate B would
have prevailed. Then the partisan preference of the median actual voter
is realized, but that of the median hypothetical voter exposed to more
even outlays is not. Relatedly, unbalanced spending may give rise to policy misalignment even in the absence of partisan misalignment. Imagine
that Candidate A outspends Candidate B by a large margin, wins comfortably, and then embraces the views of the median voter. Imagine too
that had Candidate A and Candidate B spent the same amount of money,
Candidate A still would have won, but the median voter would have arrived at different policy views. Then the policy preferences of the median
actual voter again are satisfied, but those of the median hypothetical
voter exposed to more even outlays again are not.237
These forms of misalignment may seem less troubling than most of
the other varieties discussed in this Article. This is because the figure
whose preferences are not realized in these scenarios—the median hypothetical voter exposed to more symmetric spending—is not highly normatively compelling, at least not to most contemporary Americans. For
better or worse, our democracy is not committed to the notion that campaign spending should be equalized, let alone to the idea that the “right”
electoral outcomes are those that would arise under conditions of even
outlays.238 Still, there is at least some force to the argument that voter
234. See, e.g., Overton, Donor Class, supra note 65, at 105 (suggesting that campaign
finance laws should “empower more citizens to participate in the funding of campaigns”).
235. See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund-Raising:
Why Campaign Spending Limits May Not Violate the First Amendment After All, 94
Colum. L. Rev. 1281, 1282–83 (1994) (arguing that eliminating necessity of excessive
fundraising would produce better governance).
236. Here I am referring to all of the expenditures that are made on behalf of
candidates (including by outside groups), not just to the candidates’ own spending.
237. Of course, these district-level misalignments, if they occur in multiple
constituencies, can aggregate into partisan or policy misalignment at the legislative level
too. In addition, I assume here that campaign spending can influence both the partisan
and the policy preferences of voters. This does not strike me as a controversial assumption.
238. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976) (per curiam) (labeling
“wholly foreign to the First Amendment” the “concept that government may restrict the
speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others”);
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preferences should not be reshaped by lopsided spending, because then
election results reflect the uneven expenditures rather than voters’ balanced assessments of their needs and interests. The above forms of misalignment capture this view, even though it is not the dominant perspective in the campaign finance context.
The other kind of misalignment that may arise from money in politics derives not from candidates’ spending but rather from their fundraising. Candidates at all levels, of course, must raise money to fund their
campaigns. They are therefore likely to be quite attentive to the policy
preferences of their donors, since it is the donors who provide them with
the resources they need to run successfully for office. If the donors differ
in their policy views from the electorate as a whole, then policy misalignment ensues to the extent that candidates espouse the positions of
the median donor rather than those of the median voter.239 And donors
do typically differ from voters at large, in that they are wealthier, better
educated, and, by definition, more politically active.240 Their high socioeconomic status endows donors with a distinctive set of views on many
policy issues,241 while their high political engagement tends to polarize
them ideologically relative to the general population.242
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 663,
677–78 (1997) (discussing difficulties of using disproportionate campaign contributions as
proxy for electoral distortion). As noted earlier, whatever the normative appeal may be of
the median hypothetical voter exposed to more even outlays, it stems from a democratic
value—political equality—distinct from alignment itself. See supra Part III.A.
239. Exactly the same kind of misalignment ensues if the donor is an outside group
rather than an individual, or if the money takes the form of an expenditure rather than a
contribution. I focus here on individual donors because of the empirical evidence that
corporate and union contributions have only a minor influence on politicians’ voting
records. See, e.g., Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Why Is There So Little Money in U.S.
Politics?, J. Econ. Persp., Winter 2003, at 105, 114 (summarizing this evidence).
240. See, e.g., Donald A. Gross & Robert K. Goidel, The States of Campaign Finance
Reform 24 (2003) (discussing donor demographics); Henry E. Brady et al., Redistribution,
Polarization, and Medians: Bringing Data to Downsian Puzzles 17 (Aug. 30, 2009)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1451280 (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (finding median campaign dollar is contributed by donor with
family income in top 10% of overall distribution).
241. See, e.g., Martin Gilens, Affluence and Influence: Economic Inequality and
Political Power in America 97–124 (2012) (examining variation in policy preferences
across income spectrum); Benjamin I. Page et al., Democracy and the Policy Preferences
of Wealthy Americans, 11 Persp. on Pol. 51, 53–64 (2013) (presenting results of opinion
survey of Americans in top 1% of wealth distribution).
242. See, e.g., McCarty et al., Polarized, supra note 104, at 153–58 (showing that
donors’ views tend to be ideologically extreme relative to general population); Bafumi &
Herron, supra note 75, at 536–37 & fig.6 (showing that ideological distribution of donors
is much more bimodal than that of voters); Jesse H. Rhodes & Brian F. Schaffner,
Economic Inequality and Representation in the U.S. House: A New Approach Using
Population-Level Data 35 (Apr. 7, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (finding higher levels of ideological polarization among donors than
voters).
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Under the alignment approach, then, the central issue for courts assessing campaign finance laws would be the measures’ capacity to curb
the noncongruence that stems from electoral spending and fundraising.
If the laws promise to exert substantial aligning effects, then courts would
be more likely to tolerate the burden they impose on First Amendment
rights, and vice versa. This methodology probably would result in expenditure restrictions being upheld more often than under the status
quo. Since asymmetric spending may give rise to partisan and policy misalignment, it follows that measures aimed at evening outlays sometimes
would be valid. Contribution limits also typically would be sustained under the alignment approach, even if they are quite low. When candidates
must solicit smaller contributions from larger numbers of donors, the
median donor ceases to be so different from the median voter. Lastly,
public financing regimes would sit on even sturdier legal ground than
they do today. If candidates receive comparable resources from the state
and have less need to solicit donations on their own, then both relevant
forms of misalignment are addressed in a single stroke.243
In the political science literature, scholars are divided as to both
whether asymmetric spending influences election results and whether
laws that tend to equalize expenditures have any electoral impact. With
respect to spending, studies have found that Republican presidential
candidates average a 3.5% increase in vote margin thanks to their financial advantage over Democratic candidates,244 and that a 1% change in a
party’s share of campaign receipts results in a 0.5% change in the party’s
share of state senate seats.245 But studies also have determined that
spending by incumbents makes almost no difference in U.S. House races
(although challenger spending is somewhat more effective).246 Similarly,
with respect to campaign finance laws, studies have found that corporate
contribution limits increase the share of state legislative seats held by

243. I recognize, of course, that most existing public financing regimes neither
provide for perfectly even spending nor end the need to fundraise. They therefore reduce
the misalignment caused by money in politics, but they do not eliminate it.
244. Larry M. Bartels, Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded
Age 123 (2008).
245. See Andrew B. Hall, Systemic Effects of Campaign Spending 18 (Mar. 24, 2013)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2120637 (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (“In state upper houses, a one percentage-point increase in the
Democratic share of total campaign contributions is estimated to cause a 0.45 percentagepoint increase in the Democratic share of the legislature on average.”).
246. See, e.g., Steven D. Levitt, Using Repeat Challengers to Estimate the Effect of
Campaign Spending on Election Outcomes in the U.S. House, 102 J. Pol. Econ. 777, 780
(1994) (finding that “campaign spending has an extremely small impact on election
outcomes”); Thomas Stratmann, Some Talk: Money in Politics. A (Partial) Review of the
Literature, 124 Pub. Choice 135, 138 (2005) (finding that U.S. House incumbents’
spending has insignificant positive or even negative effect while “challenger spending . . .
increases challengers’ vote shares”).
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Democrats by anywhere from 2.1% to 6.0%,247 and that the Supreme
Court’s recent rejection of all corporate spending bans made Republican
candidates 2.0% more likely to prevail in the 2010 election.248 But studies
also have determined that contribution limits have virtually no impact on
vote margins in gubernatorial elections,249 and that corporate and union
spending bans are unrelated to seat shares250 and policy liberalism251 in
state legislatures.
In contrast to this muddled picture, there is near consensus in the
empirical literature that politicians’ positions more accurately reflect the
views of their donors than those of their constituents. This heightened
sensitivity to donor preferences is evident, first, in the bimodality of politicians’ voting records, which matches the twin-peaked distribution of
donors but not the more normal distribution of voters. Other forces are
responsible for legislative polarization too, but a crucial “contributing
factor [is] the relative extremism of donating voters.”252 The influence of
donors on elected officials also is evident in the much greater attention
that politicians pay to the views of their wealthy constituents. According
to an array of studies, the preferences of the rich exert a powerful impact

247. Besley & Case, supra note 185, at 27 tbl.4, 31 tbl.5; Hall, supra note 245, at 28
tbls.3 & 4.
248. Tilman Klumpp et al., Money Talks: The Impact of Citizens United on State
Elections 9 (Univ. of Alta. Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 2012-18, 2012), available at
http://www.economics.ualberta.ca/~/media/economics/FacultyAndStaff/WPs/WP201218-Klumpp-Mialon-Williams (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
249. See Gross & Goidel, supra note 240, at 80–81 (finding almost no statistically
significant differences in margins between states with and without regulations); David M.
Primo et al., State Campaign Finance Reform, Competitiveness, and Party Advantage in
Gubernatorial Elections, in The Marketplace of Democracy: Electoral Competition and
American Politics 268, 277–78 (Michael P. McDonald & John Samples eds., 2006) (finding
organizational contribution limits to have no effect on margins).
250. See Raymond J. La Raja & Brian F. Schaffner, The (Non-)Effects of Campaign
Finance Spending Bans on Macro Political Outcomes: Evidence from the States 16 (Mar.
1, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2017056 (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (finding that “corporate spending bans have little, if any
effect on [state legislative] political and policy outcomes”).
251. See Timothy Werner & John J. Coleman, Assessing the Potential Effects of
Citizens United: Evidence from the States 20, 31 (Aug. 2012) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2108171 (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(finding “relative lack of connection between independent expenditure bans and political
and policy outcomes”).
252. Bafumi & Herron, supra note 75, at 536; see also Christopher Ellis,
Understanding Economic Biases in Representation: Income, Resources, and Policy
Representation in the 110th House, 65 Pol. Res. Q. 938, 945 (2012) [hereinafter Ellis,
Understanding Economic Biases] (presenting regression results showing that large donors
are closer ideologically to their representatives and tend to get their preferred policies
enacted more frequently); Rhodes & Schaffner, supra note 242, at 35 (finding U.S. House
members’ roll call votes “more strongly associated with the views of their donors (and
outside donors) than with those of their voting constituents”).
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on the voting records of House members253 and senators,254 as well as on
actual policy outcomes at the federal255 and state256 levels. By comparison,
the preferences of the middle class have only a modest effect, and the
preferences of the poor make almost no difference at all.257 Again, there
are several explanations for this divergent pattern of representation, but
again, “wealthy individuals’ much greater propensity to contribute . . .
plays an important role in explaining why high wealth groups enjoy
greater responsiveness.”258
The available evidence therefore indicates that fundraising-induced
misalignment is a significant threat, while spending-induced misalignment is a more uncertain proposition. Since the normative case for worrying about the latter kind of noncongruence is weaker as well, the implication is that courts (and scholars) should concentrate on the former.
Politicians’ proclivity to better represent their donors than their constituents is both democratically troubling and empirically corroborated, and
it would be the focus of the alignment approach in the campaign finance
context.
D. Redistricting
I turn next to redistricting, the decennial redrawing of congressional, state, and local district boundaries. When they reshape their district lines, jurisdictions must comply with the one-person, one-vote rule,
which compels almost perfect population equality at the congressional

253. See, e.g., Ellis, Understanding Economic Biases, supra note 252, at 943 (finding
U.S. House vote representativeness significantly associated with constituent income level);
Rhodes & Schaffner, supra note 242, at 37 (“[W]ealthier citizens . . . receive more
representation from members of the House of Representatives than the least wealthy.”).
254. See, e.g., Bartels, supra note 244, at 253, 259–61 (finding senators “vastly more
responsive to affluent constituents than to constituents of modest means”).
255. See, e.g., Gilens, supra note 241, at 79–82 (finding federal policy
“responsiveness to the preferences of the 90th [income] percentile . . . equally strong
whether their preferences diverge from the poor, from the middle class, or even from . . .
the 70th percentile”).
256. See, e.g., Patrick Flavin, Income Inequality and Policy Representation in the
American States, 40 Am. Pol. Res. 29, 43–44 (2011) (“[C]itizens with low incomes receive
little substantive political representation in the policy decisions made by state
governments.”).
257. Supra notes 253–256. In addition, the representational gap between the rich
and poor is growing over time; it is now four times as large as it was in the 1970s. See
Christopher Ellis, Representational Inequity Across Time and Space: Exploring Changes
in the Political Representation of the Poor in the U.S. House 2–3 (n.d.) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
258. Rhodes & Schaffner, supra note 242, at 38; see also Bartels, supra note 244, at
280 (finding that if senators responded only to donors, they would be six times more
responsive to affluent constituents than to middle-income constituents—a differential that
corresponds closely to reality); Gilens, supra note 241, at 10 (“Money . . . is the root of
representational inequality . . . .”).
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level259 and a high degree of equality at the state level too.260 Jurisdictions
also must comply with the nebulous constitutional prohibition of gerrymandering.261 An array of race-related requirements apply to redistricting as well, and are discussed in the next section.262 Lastly, many states
impose additional line-drawing criteria such as compactness, respect for
political subdivisions, and respect for communities of interest.263
When courts consider equal population challenges to district plans,
they understand the potential injury to be entirely personal. The right to
vote belongs to the particular individual, and it is violated if districts vary
unjustifiably in population.264 In contrast, courts do not currently adhere
to any coherent theory in gerrymandering disputes.265 But during the two
decades in which a justiciable standard did exist in this domain, it emphasized both adverse election results and (somewhat oddly) restrictions
on voter participation.266 In the legal literature, scholars tend to accept
the courts’ conceptual framework in malapportionment cases, though
they sometimes offer structural twists on the one-person, one-vote rule.267

259. See, e.g., Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 730–31 (1983) (noting requirement
that congressional “districts be apportioned to achieve population equality ‘as nearly as is
practicable’” (quoting Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1964))); Wesberry, 376 U.S. at
7–8 (“We do not believe that the Framers of the Constitution intended to permit . . .
districts containing widely varied numbers of inhabitants.”).
260. See, e.g., Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842 (1983) (noting application of
“mathematical equality” principle to state legislatures); Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407,
409–10 (1977) (noting “elemental requirement of the Equal Protection Clause . . . that
[state] legislative districts be ‘as nearly of equal population as is practicable’” (quoting
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964))).
261. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 305 (2004) (plurality opinion) (mustering
only four votes to hold partisan gerrymandering nonjusticiable and thus leaving cause of
action in doctrinal limbo).
262. Infra Part III.E.
263. See, e.g., Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, Redistricting Law 2010, at 125–
27 (2009), available at http://redistrictingonline.org/uploads/Redistrictinglaw2010.pdf
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (listing redistricting criteria by state).
264. See, e.g., Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 561 (stating in malapportionment cases “rights
allegedly impaired are individual and personal in nature”); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368,
380 (1963) (“Every voter’s vote is entitled to be counted once.”).
265. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 414 (2006)
(discussing “disagreement over what substantive standard to apply”); Vieth, 541 U.S. at 305
(plurality opinion) (finding no “judicially enforceable limit” to apply).
266. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132 (1986) (plurality opinion) (holding
unlawful gerrymandering “occurs only when the electoral system is arranged in a manner
that will consistently degrade a voter’s or a group of voters’ influence on the political
process as a whole”). As noted earlier, hints of the alignment approach can be found in
several Justices’ opinions in the gerrymandering context. Supra notes 148–150 and
accompanying text.
267. See, e.g., Fishkin, Weightless Votes, supra note 71, at 1892–93 (“[I]n one
person, one vote cases . . . the real action is . . . in structural questions about the allocation
of group political power.”); Gerken, Minimalism, supra note 42, at 1421–27 (discussing
principles potentially justifying one-person, one-vote standard); Karlan, Rights to Vote,
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With respect to gerrymandering, the most prominent camp contends
that its key harm is the lack of competition that ensues when incumbents
are placed in overly safe districts.268 Other perspectives stress how
symmetrically the major parties are treated,269 the shape and composition
of individual districts,270 and whether the purpose underlying a plan is
excessively partisan.271
Under the alignment approach, on the other hand, the chief concern about district boundaries is that they may give rise to preference
noncongruence—both within particular constituencies and in the jurisdiction as a whole. At the district level, policy misalignment may develop
if highly demographically, socioeconomically, or ideologically heterogeneous constituencies are drawn. The signals that the residents of such
districts convey to their representatives are unusually varied and difficult
to interpret. The representatives therefore may be unsure how to act in
accordance with the wishes of the median voter, and instead may take
their behavioral cues from their donors, political parties, or personal
predilections. To illustrate the point, suppose that one district is half rich
and half poor, while another is mostly middle-class. It may be harder for
the representative of the former district to identify and vote consistently
with the views of the median voter. It may be easier, that is, for policy
misalignment to emerge.272
supra note 68, at 1717–18 (“One-person, one-vote provided a relatively self-executing,
clearly judicially manageable standard . . . .”).
268. See, e.g., Issacharoff, Gerrymandering, supra note 46, at 600 (arguing “risk in
gerrymandering is . . . constriction of the competitive processes by which voters can
express choice”); Klarman, supra note 58, at 516 (describing gerrymandering as
anticompetitive); Ortiz, Got Theory?, supra note 62, at 484–90 (noting under
gerrymandering “[f]ew, if any, districts will remain in true competition”); Pildes,
Constitutionalization, supra note 46, at 60–62 (describing gerrymandering as “covenant
not to compete between the incumbents of the two parties”).
269. See, e.g., Gelman & King, supra note 80, at 545–46 (analyzing gerrymandering’s
effect on “partisan bias,” i.e. “deviation from partisan symmetry”); Bernard Grofman &
Gary King, The Future of Partisan Symmetry as a Judicial Test for Partisan
Gerrymandering After LULAC v. Perry, 6 Election L.J. 2, 5 (2007) (praising Justices’
apparent openness to arguments about asymmetry).
270. See, e.g., Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. Popper, The Third Criterion:
Compactness as a Procedural Safeguard Against Partisan Gerrymandering, 9 Yale L. &
Pol’y Rev. 301, 302 (1991) (“[W]e suggest that those who define district boundaries must
also be required to respect . . . the constraint of compactness.”); Nicholas O.
Stephanopoulos, Redistricting and the Territorial Community, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1379,
1435–40 (2012) [hereinafter Stephanopoulos, Redistricting] (“[D]isruption [of
communities] can and should be minimized by intelligent district drawing.”).
271. See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Managing Gerrymandering, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 781,
825–28 (2005) (explicating “excessive partisanship” as criterion for evaluating redistricting
schemes); Richard Briffault, Defining the Constitutional Question in Partisan
Gerrymandering, 14 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 397, 399 (2005) (“[E]xcessive partisanship is
the most important constitutional argument against partisan gerrymandering.”).
272. See generally Stephanopoulos, Exceptionalism, supra note 166, at 825–28
(making this argument at greater length).
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At the legislative level, both malapportionment and gerrymandering
may produce both partisan and policy misalignment. Malapportionment
may result in partisan misalignment when there are partisan patterns to
districts’ population discrepancies. Imagine that a state has ten districts
and a thousand voters, of whom 52% are Democrats and 48% are
Republicans. Imagine also that two of the districts have 200 voters (of
whom 140 are Democrats and 60 are Republicans), while eight of the
districts have 75 voters (of whom 30 are Democrats and 45 are
Republicans). Then the overpopulation of the Democratic districts and
the underpopulation of the Republican districts give rise to a startling
degree of partisan misalignment. Eight of the ten districts elect
Republicans while the state’s median voter is a Democrat.
A minor adjustment to this hypothetical demonstrates how malapportionment may produce policy misalignment even in the absence of
partisan misalignment.273 If the two overpopulated Democratic districts
each have 125 Democrats and 75 Republicans, then the state’s median
voter becomes a Republican and there is no longer any partisan misalignment. But policy misalignment is still probable because, while the
electorate now leans Republican by a miniscule 51% to 49% margin, the
median district features a much larger 60% to 40% Republican
advantage. The state’s median voter thus is likely to be a center-right
moderate, but, as long as politicians’ positions are related to the partisan
makeup of their districts, the legislature’s median member is likely to be
substantially more conservative.274
Analogously, gerrymandering may result in partisan misalignment
when there are partisan patterns to districts’ margins of victory (even if
the districts are equal in population). Take the above state with its ten
districts, thousand voters, and 51% to 49% Republican-Democratic
composition. If three of the districts elect Republicans by a 72% to 28%
margin, while seven of them elect Democrats by a 58% to 42% margin,
then a stark partisan mismatch arises between the state’s median voter (a
Republican) and the legislature’s median member (a Democrat). Again,
a small tweak to the hypothetical shows how gerrymandering may generate policy misalignment even in the absence of partisan misalignment. If
273. Of course, policy misalignment follows almost inevitably when there is partisan
misalignment. See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text (discussing this
relationship); see also Gerber, Institutions, supra note 109, at 265 (noting possibility of
policy misalignment “if districts are drawn such that the median of the district median
positions differs from the overall population median”).
274. The empirical evidence indicates that the relationship between voting record
and district composition is modest but real. See Nolan McCarty et al., Does
Gerrymandering Cause Polarization?, 53 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 666, 670–71 & fig.3 (2009)
(showing that, in both 1972 and 2004, politicians’ voting records became somewhat more
conservative as their districts’ Republican vote shares increased); Walter J. Stone &
Elizabeth N. Simas, Candidate Valence and Ideological Positions in U.S. House Elections,
54 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 371, 372 (2010) (summarizing literature finding “members of Congress
differ in the positions they take consistent with variations in district preferences”).
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the first three districts elect Republicans by a narrower 62% to 38% margin, then the state’s overall composition shifts to 52% Democratic and
there is no longer any partisan misalignment. But policy misalignment is
still probable because the median district (at 58% Democratic) diverges
considerably from the midpoint of the electorate. The state’s median
voter is likely to be a center-left moderate, while the legislature’s median
member is likely to be more liberal.275
Under the alignment approach, then, courts would evaluate both
individual districts and entire district plans by weighing their misaligning
potential against the legitimate interests they advance. At the district
level, courts would be skeptical of highly heterogeneous constituencies
because of the policy misalignment they promote. Such districts might be
permitted only if they are necessary for compliance with the one-person,
one-vote rule, the Voting Rights Act (VRA),276 or some similarly pressing
state goal.277 At the legislative level, the reddest flag for courts would be
district plans that threaten, through either malapportionment or gerrymandering, to give one party control of the legislature even though the
state’s median voter prefers the opposing party.278 Such plans might be
upheld only if there is no alternative that is consistent with the applicable
legal requirements. Lastly, courts would be wary as well of plans that result in large divergences between a state’s median district and its electorate as a whole. Plans of this sort tend to produce policy misalignment
in the legislature, and thus would require a compelling justification to be
sustained.279
In the political science literature, substantial evidence confirms the
danger of policy misalignment in highly heterogeneous districts. One
study found that as the ideological diversity of Los Angeles-area districts
increases, elected officials become less likely to abide by the preferences
of the median voter, and more likely to vote in unison with their party.280
Another study determined that the policy positions taken by Senate can275. I assume again that voting record and district composition are related. See supra
note 274 (establishing relationship).
276. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973–1973bb-1 (2006), invalidated in part by Shelby Cnty. v.
Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
277. See Stephanopoulos, Redistricting, supra note 270, at 1435–40 (making similar
proposal).
278. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 360–62 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(making similar proposal).
279. See Christopher S. Elmendorf & David Schleicher, Districting for a LowInformation Electorate, 121 Yale L.J. 1846, 1876 (2012) (arguing for district plans in
which “median voter in the median district is also the median voter in the polity as a
whole”). On the other hand, unlike under current law, interdistrict population
discrepancies that do not result in any noncongruence might be upheld under the
alignment approach.
280. Gerber & Lewis, supra note 166, at 1368 (“Regression analyses reveal that the
effect of the median voter on legislator roll call voting behavior decreases as the variance
in district preferences increases.”).

2014]

ELECTIONS AND ALIGNMENT

347

didates are less congruent with the views of the median voter in states
that are more demographically or ideologically diverse.281 Still other studies concluded that incumbent senators’ votes on free trade issues are better explained by constituency characteristics in socioeconomically homogeneous states, but by partisan affiliation in diverse states.282 And in my
own prior work, I have found that House members’ voting records correspond more closely to key district attributes in geographically homogeneous constituencies, but to partisanship in spatially diverse districts.283
With respect to partisan misalignment at the legislative level, political scientists have devised a metric—partisan bias—that captures the concept almost perfectly. Partisan bias refers to the divergence in the share
of seats that each party would win given the same share of the statewide
vote.284 For example, if Democrats would win 48% of the seats with 50%
of the vote (in which case Republicans would win 52% of the seats), then
a district plan would have a pro-Republican bias of 2%. Bias typically is
calculated at the point at which each party receives 50% of the vote,285
and thus reveals both whether and to what extent partisan misalignment
exists.
Because population equality has now been required for half a century, it is necessary to look to an earlier era to determine the misaligning
effects of malapportionment. Prior to the Supreme Court’s intervention
in the 1960s,286 then, there was a persistent pro-Republican bias of about
6% in House elections held in non-southern states.287 Interestingly, how281. Benjamin G. Bishin et al., Does Democracy “Suffer” from Diversity? Issue
Representation and Diversity in Senate Elections, 129 Pub. Choice 201, 206–10 (2006)
(“[C]andidates’ positions in politically and demographically homogeneous states are
significantly more responsive to the average citizen’s ideological preferences compared to
candidates’ positions in heterogeneous states.”).
282. Michael Bailey & David W. Brady, Heterogeneity and Representation: The
Senate and Free Trade, 42 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 524, 537 (1998) (noting voting patterns more
aligned with constituents’ views in homogeneous states); Christopher Dennis et al.,
Constituency Diversity and Congress: The Case of NAFTA, 29 J. Socio-Economics 349, 355
(2000) (same).
283. Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Spatial Diversity, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1903, 1944–46
(2012) [hereinafter Stephanopoulos, Diversity].
284. See Gelman & King, supra note 80, at 545–46 (defining term); Grofman & King,
supra note 269, at 8 (same).
285. See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 466–68
(2006) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining and applying
standard); Janet Campagna & Bernard Grofman, Party Control and Partisan Bias in 1980s
Congressional Redistricting, 52 J. Pol. 1242, 1245 (1990) (showing theoretical and
mathematical basis for standard).
286. The Court’s intervention began with Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), and
culminated in Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964), which mandated population
equality for congressional districts, and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), which did
the same for state legislative districts.
287. Gary W. Cox & Jonathan N. Katz, Elbridge Gerry’s Salamander 59 (2002); see
also David W. Brady & Bernard Grofman, Sectional Differences in Partisan Bias and
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ever, this bias was the result not of unequal population but rather of gerrymandering by Republican-controlled legislatures. The average
Democratic district was actually somewhat smaller in population than the
average Republican district, and it was the heavily Republican suburbs
that were most sharply underrepresented.288 But while malapportionment was not a major driver of partisan misalignment in this period, it
does seem to have fostered policy misalignment. Underrepresented
counties consistently received fewer state funds than overrepresented
counties, suggesting that governmental spending did not correspond to
the views of the median voter.289 These distributional inequities vanished
within years of the Court’s decisions as rural areas lost their longstanding
overrepresentation.290 So too did the pro-Republican bias in much of the
country, though due not to population equality but rather to the substitution of neutral plans for maps that favored the Republicans.291
As for the bias attributable to gerrymandering, it has fluctuated
widely over the years, but is now both higher and more tilted in a
Republican direction than at any other point in modern history. According to one study, there was an overall pro-Republican bias of about 6% in
the 2012 House election, the highest figure since 1956.292 According to
my own calculations, the typical 2012 congressional plan featured an absolute bias of about 11% and a net pro-Republican bias of about 6%,
both the highest scores in my 1966–2012 database.293 Not surprisingly,
Electoral Responsiveness in US House Elections, 1850–1980, 21 Brit. J. Pol. Sci. 247, 253–
55 (1991) (describing historical pro-Republican bias in non-southern states).
288. Cox & Katz, supra note 287, at 14–15.
289. See Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Equal Votes, Equal Money: Court-Ordered
Redistricting and Public Expenditures in the American States, 96 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 767,
770–72 (2002) [hereinafter Ansolabehere et al., Equal Votes] (“[C]ounties that had less
representation received relatively less money during the pre-Baker era.”); see also Yusaku
Horiuchi & Jun Saito, Reapportionment and Redistribution: Consequences of Electoral
Reform in Japan, 47 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 669, 676 (2003) (reporting similar findings for Japan);
Jonathan Rodden, Strength in Numbers? Representation and Redistribution in the
European Union, 3 Eur. Union Pol. 151, 163 (2002) (finding same for European Union).
290. See Ansolabehere et al., Equal Votes, supra note 289, at 775–76 (detailing
redistributional consequences of Baker).
291. E.g., Cox & Katz, supra note 287, at 60; cf. Brady & Grofman, supra note 287, at
255 (“[B]y the late 1970s, bias in both the non-South and the nation as a whole was very
low.”).
292. John Sides & Eric McGhee, Redistricting Didn’t Win Republicans the House,
Wash. Post: Wonkblog (Feb. 17, 2013, 11:33 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
wonkblog/wp/2013/02/17/redistricting-didnt-win-republicans-the-house/?wprss=rss_ezra
-klein (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (displaying information in first graph). This
figure controls for incumbency.
293. Calculations are on file with the Columbia Law Review; see also Nicholas O.
Stephanopoulos, The Consequences of Consequentialist Criteria, 3 U.C. Irvine L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 9, 12–13), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2230955 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing assembly of database
and calculation of partisan bias). Unlike Sides and McGhee, I did not control for
incumbency.

2014]

ELECTIONS AND ALIGNMENT

349

scholars have found that when a party is in full control of a state government, the district plans it enacts tend to award it about 6% more seats
than if the opposing party had been responsible for redistricting.294 The
recent spike in pro-Republican bias thus stems from the Republicans’
capture of many state houses in 2010, right before the latest redistricting
cycle began. However, it is important to note that not all bias is the
product of gerrymandering. The geographic distribution of the parties’
supporters—in particular, the overconcentration of Democratic voters in
urban areas—also influences the level of bias, and indeed is thought by
some scholars to be its most significant determinant.295
Accordingly, the empirical case for the alignment approach is
strongest with respect to the policy misalignment caused by heterogeneous districts and the partisan misalignment caused by gerrymandering. In
both of these areas, there is abundant evidence that misalignment exists,
can be measured accurately, and is substantial in magnitude. In contrast,
there is less proof at present regarding the misaligning effects of malapportionment or policy misalignment at the legislative level. Courts (and
policymakers) thus would be wise to defer intervention on these grounds
until the harms to be addressed have been established more definitively.
E. Minority Representation
The final election law topic that I examine here is minority representation: specifically, the set of statutory and constitutional rules that
help determine the composition and number of districts in which
minority groups are able to elect their preferred candidates. Under
section 2 of the VRA, large and geographically concentrated minority
groups typically are entitled to the construction of districts in which they
comprise a majority of the population.296 Under section 5 of the statute,
certain jurisdictions (mostly in the South) formerly were required to
receive federal approval in order for their district plans to go into effect,
and were prohibited from reducing their existing levels of minority
294. E.g., Gelman & King, supra note 80, at 553; see also Besley & Case, supra note
185, at 34 (finding party responsible for redistricting wins larger proportion of seats in
state legislative elections).
295. See Jowei Chen & Jonathan Rodden, Using Legislative Districting Simulations to
Measure Electoral Bias in Legislatures 30 (July 15, 2010) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://polmeth.wustl.edu/media/Paper/ChenRodden.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (finding district plans of most U.S. states containing major cities
biased in Republican direction); Jonathan A. Rodden, The Long Shadow of the Industrial
Revolution: Political Geography and the Representation of the Left 5–6 (Mar. 25, 2011)
[hereinafter Rodden, Long Shadow] (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.stanford.edu/~jrodden/wp/shadow.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (“[B]ecause of electoral geography, small, compact winner-take-all districts in
industrial societies have been quite good for parties of the right.”).
296. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006), construed in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30,
47–51 (1986) (Brennan, J.) (prohibiting dilution of minority voting power by
redistricting).
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representation.297 And under the Equal Protection Clause, intentional
racial vote dilution is forbidden,298 as is the formation of districts with
race as the predominant motive (i.e., racial gerrymandering).299
To the extent courts subscribe to an overarching theory in this domain, it is that minority groups’ claims to representation are most compelling when either their ability to participate in the political process has
been burdened or they constitute cohesive geographic communities. In
its first wave of vote dilution cases in the 1970s, the Supreme Court ruled
in favor of minority plaintiffs only when they could demonstrate some
kind of participational impairment.300 More recently, majority-minority
districts have been mandated under section 2, and upheld against racial
gerrymandering challenges, only when they have corresponded to distinct minority communities.301 In the legal literature, some scholars argue
that the VRA should be extended to all minority groups, including geographically diffuse ones,302 or to all instances of racially polarized voting.303 Other scholars contend that the VRA may no longer be necessary
now that one-party Democratic rule in the South has been replaced with

297. § 1973c, invalidated by Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
298. See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 617 (1982) (describing as
unconstitutional voting schemes “‘conceived or operated as purposeful devices to further
racial discrimination’ by minimizing, cancelling out or diluting the voting strength of
racial elements in the voting population” (quoting Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149
(1971))); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765–70 (1973) (noting that Court entertains
“claims that multimember districts are being used invidiously to cancel out or minimize
the voting strength of racial groups”).
299. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) (explaining that test for
invalidity is whether “race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature’s decision
to place a significant number of voters within or without a particular district”); Shaw v.
Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 649 (1993) (enunciating standard that “plaintiff challenging a
reapportionment statute . . . may state a claim by alleging that the legislation, though race
neutral on its face, rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to
separate voters into different districts on the basis of race”).
300. See, e.g., White, 412 U.S. at 766 (sustaining vote dilution challenge by African
Americans who had suffered infringement of their “right . . . to register and vote and to
participate in the democratic processes”); Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 149 (rejecting vote
dilution challenge where there was no evidence that “poor Negroes were not allowed to
register or vote”).
301. See, e.g., Stephanopoulos, Redistricting, supra note 270, at 1416–21 (making
this argument at greater length).
302. See, e.g., Lani Guinier, Groups, Representation, and Race-Conscious Districting:
A Case of the Emperor’s Clothes, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1589, 1617–41 (1993) (“[T]he
assumption that a territorial district can accurately approximate a fixed racial-group
identity . . . is problematic.”); Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of
Geographic Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev.
173, 199–213 (1989) (arguing that “core concern in racial vote dilution cases must remain
political isolation, rather than geographical isolation”).
303. See, e.g., Christopher S. Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2: Of Biased Votes,
Unconstitutional Elections, and Common Law Statutes, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 377, 442–46
(2012) (arguing that VRA should be interpreted to authorize “depolarization claims”).
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robust two-party competition.304 Still other scholars believe that majorityminority districts conflict with a constitutional commitment to colorblindness, and thus are inherently illegitimate.305
Under the alignment approach, in contrast, the worry about policies
that promote minority representation is that they may produce preference noncongruence too, at the levels of both the individual district and
the entire legislature. At the district level, the VRA may encourage the
creation of constituencies that are highly heterogeneous with respect to
both race and other politically salient factors. (As discussed above, such
constituencies foster policy misalignment by hindering elected officials
from identifying and responding to their constituents’ views.306) The reason why the VRA may give rise to racially diverse districts is simply that it
requires majority-minority districts to be drawn in many circumstances.307
Such districts necessarily are racially diverse as long as the minority
group’s share of the population is not extremely high. Similarly, there
are two reasons why the VRA may generate districts that are heterogeneous with respect to nonracial factors. First, dissimilar minority populations often need to be combined in order to muster a district-wide majority,308 and second, these groups often need to be joined with miscellaneous “filler people” in order to hit the district population target.309
At the legislative level, the VRA may result in misalignment by inefficiently “packing” Democrats into majority-minority districts. Suppose that
a state has ten districts and a thousand voters, of whom 51% are
304. See, e.g., Issacharoff & Pildes, Politics as Markets, supra note 35, at 700–07
(arguing that “robust political markets” in modern South create pressures making VRA
potentially obsolete); Pildes, Constitutionalization, supra note 46, at 97–99
(“[C]ompetition itself creates the incentives and provides the checks that most effectively
realize representational equality.”). For a different competition-oriented perspective on
the VRA, see Kang, Contestation, supra note 56, at 738–42 (arguing that “growing
skepticism about the VRA is based on an impoverished account of political competition,”
which is only “a means to . . . greater democratic ends”).
305. See, e.g., Stephan Thernstrom & Abigail Thernstrom, America in Black and
White 477–83 (1997) (summarizing arguments that “drawing race-conscious legislative
districting lines . . . may widen the racial divide, heightening our sense of racial identity”).
306. Supra notes 269, 280–283 and accompanying text.
307. Under section 2, the relevant minority group must be able to constitute a
majority in at least one additional district in order to state a claim. See Bartlett v.
Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1245–46 (2009) (plurality opinion). Under section 5, a district
received protection even if the minority group comprised less than 50% of the population,
as long as the group reliably was able to elect the candidate of its choice. See Texas v.
United States, 887 F. Supp. 2d 133, 147–49 (D.D.C. 2012), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2885 (2013).
But any group large enough to wield such electoral power likely rendered the district that
contained it quite racially diverse.
308. However, the VRA may not require majority-minority districts to be created if
the minority communities that must be joined are too dissimilar. See League of United
Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 432–35 (2006) (rejecting district combining
urban Hispanics in Austin with rural Hispanics along Mexican border).
309. T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing
Constitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 588, 601 (1993).
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Democrats and 30% are African Americans. Suppose also that initially six
of the districts are 36% black and 55% Democratic,310 but that subsequently a successful VRA lawsuit forces the state to create three majorityminority districts that are 58% black and 79% Democratic.311 Then the
VRA is responsible for shifting the state from partisan congruence to
stark partisan misalignment, with seven Republican districts out of ten
even though the median voter is a Democrat. Analogously, if the state is
49% rather than 51% Democratic, then the VRA gives rise to policy misalignment even in the absence of partisan misalignment. In this scenario,
the median voter and the median member of the legislature are both
Republicans—but the median voter is a center-right moderate while the
median member (representing a 61% Republican district) is substantially
more conservative.312 Of course, these are precisely the same misaligning
effects that may be induced by conventional gerrymanders too.313
It should be emphasized, however, that these misaligning effects are
not inevitable. For one thing, majority-minority districts need not overconcentrate Democrats. If minority members comprise just over 50% of
such districts’ populations, and if the districts’ non-minority residents are
heavily Republican, then Democratic votes are not squandered needlessly.314 Similarly, after the requisite number of majority-minority districts have been drawn, other districts may be constructed in which
Democrats are reasonably likely to prevail. In southern states with racially
polarized voting, these often take the form of 30% to 50% black districts
in which a relatively small number of white votes suffice to hand victory
to Democratic candidates. Whether the VRA exerts a misaligning influence therefore depends on how exactly district lines are configured. If
minority voters are packed into a few districts and dispersed among the
rest, then misalignment is likely to follow. But if the filler people in majority-minority districts are staunch Republicans, and if additional districts are formed in which biracial coalitions often elect Democrats, then

310. Assuming for the sake of simplicity that there are only two district types in the
state, this means that the remaining four districts are 21% black and 45% Democratic.
311. With the same simplifying assumption, this means that the remaining seven
districts are 18% black and 39% Democratic.
312. I assume once again here that voting record and district composition are
related. See supra note 274 (establishing this relationship).
313. See supra Part III.D (detailing these misaligning effects).
314. See Adam B. Cox & Richard T. Holden, Reconsidering Racial and Partisan
Gerrymandering, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 553, 573 (2011) (noting optimal districts for
Democrats, assuming blacks are reliable Democratic voters, are ones in which “African
American Democrats . . . outnumber the white Republicans” by “thinnest margin”).
Moreover, if Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231 (2009) (plurality opinion), were
reversed and sub-50% crossover districts could be drawn under section 2 of the VRA, then
the tension between alignment and minority representation would be reduced still
further.

2014]

ELECTIONS AND ALIGNMENT

353

substantial minority representation indeed is compatible with legislative
alignment.315
Under the alignment approach, then, courts would strive to realize
the VRA’s goal of racial inclusion while also reducing the risk of preference noncongruence in both individual districts and the legislature as a
whole. At the district level, courts would favor constituencies whose minority and non-minority members are socioeconomically and culturally
similar and would frown on districts whose residents are excessively heterogeneous. Current VRA doctrine already requires courts to consider
the variation within districts’ minority populations,316 so it presumably
would be possible for courts to examine instead the variation within districts’ entire populations. At the legislative level, the judicial focus would
be on the levels of partisan and policy misalignment associated with different district plans. The judicial aim would be to minimize these levels
while still providing for a comparable degree of minority representation.
Plans therefore might be returned to their drafters even if minorities already were represented adequately, on the ground that the adequate
representation could have been achieved at a lower misalignment cost.
In the political science literature, there is substantial evidence that
majority-minority districts are heterogeneous along a number of dimensions (and thus prone to policy misalignment). With respect to race,
America’s twenty-six majority-black House districts in the 2000s had an
average black population of 59%, and the most heavily black district in
the country (Illinois’s Second) was only 69% black.317 Given current
demographic patterns, it apparently is infeasible to construct majorityminority House districts that are as racially homogeneous as many majority-white districts. With respect to political views, similarly, a recent study
discovered a strong relationship between ideological diversity and the
size of a district’s minority population.318 The relationship likely stems
from both the wide range of opinions held by minority members and the
gap between their opinions and those of whites.319 With respect to other
key variables too, I have found in earlier work that majority-minority dis315. Not surprisingly, the former approach is the preferred strategy of Republicans
responsible for redistricting, while the latter approach is the preferred strategy of
Democratic line-drawers. See, e.g., Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 469 (2003)
(describing Democratic plan in Georgia aiming to “maintain the number of majorityminority districts and also increase the number of Democratic Senate seats”).
316. See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 432–34
(2006) (noting “different characteristics, needs, and interests” of urban and rural Latino
communities); see also Stephanopoulos, Diversity, supra note 283, at 1929–33 (describing
cases where Court rejected merger of spatially heterogeneous minority groups).
317. Stephanopoulos, Exceptionalism, supra note 166, at 817 n.220.
318. See Scott Clifford, Reassessing the Unequal Representation of Latinos and
African Americans, 74 J. Pol. 903, 907 (2012) (finding district heterogeneity is positively,
and statistically significantly, related to Latino and African American population
percentages).
319. Id. at 906.

354

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 114:283

tricts are particularly heterogeneous. For example, majority-black House
districts in the 2000s exhibited greater spatial variation than their peers
in terms of both socioeconomic status and urbanism.320
The empirical literature also documents the adverse partisan and
policy impact that the VRA may have on Democrats and minorities, respectively. In the 1990s, southern states drew many more majority-minority districts than they had in previous decades, due to both amendments
in 1982 that strengthened the VRA and aggressive federal enforcement
of the statute.321 According to an array of studies, the creation of the new
majority-minority districts harmed the Democrats electorally at both the
congressional and state legislative levels. The Democrats lost about a
dozen House seats as a direct consequence,322 and they also suffered setbacks in every southern state legislature (including the Republican capture of two state houses for the first time since Reconstruction).323 Ironically, the greater descriptive representation that minorities obtained in
this period did not even result in improved substantive representation.
Several studies concluded that the hostile stances of the newly elected

320. Stephanopoulos, Exceptionalism, supra note 166, at 818 n.223. Majorityminority districts likely would be even more heterogeneous were it not for the Supreme
Court’s racial gerrymandering doctrine. As I have argued elsewhere, this doctrine exerts a
homogenizing influence by prohibiting some of the highly diverse districts that states
might otherwise draw to comply with the VRA. Id. at 818–19.
321. See Introduction to Joint Ctr. for Political and Econ. Studies, Redistricting and
Minority Representation 1, 1 (David A. Bositis ed., 1998) (“Following the 1990
reapportionment, there was a quantum increase in minority representation in the U.S.
House of Representatives, in state legislatures, and elsewhere.”). The changes in minority
representation in subsequent decades were much less dramatic, and thus have received
less attention in the literature.
322. See Carol M. Swain, Black Faces, Black Interests 232 (1995) (finding that
majority-minority districting cost Democrats “no fewer than five seats in 1992 and at least
twelve in 1994”); Kevin A. Hill, Does the Creation of Majority Black Districts Aid
Republicans? An Analysis of the 1992 Congressional Elections in Eight Southern States, 57
J. Pol. 384, 399 (1995) (finding “definite link between the rising fortunes of African
American and Republican representatives in the 1992 elections”); David Lublin & D.
Stephen Voss, The Partisan Impact of Voting Rights Law: A Reply to Pamela S. Karlan, 50
Stan. L. Rev. 765, 772 (1998) (“[R]acial redistricting played . . . a key role in the election
of greater numbers of African Americans (but overall fewer Democrats) in 1992 and
1994.”).
323. See David Epstein et al., Estimating the Effect of Redistricting on Minority
Substantive Representation, 23 J.L. Econ. & Org. 499, 506 (2007) (detailing Democratic
losses in South Carolina state senate); Lisa Handley et al., Electing Minority-Preferred
Candidates to Legislative Office, in Race and Redistricting in the 1990s, at 13, 30–34
(Bernard Grofman ed., 1998) (noting loss of “31 house and 26 senate seats in the South
and 10 house and 9 senate seats in the non-South” in state legislatures); David Lublin & D.
Stephen Voss, Racial Redistricting and Realignment in Southern State Legislatures, 44
Am. J. Pol. Sci. 792, 793 (2000) (“The new black districts cost the Democratic party
legislative seats in all ten southern states and likely account for the Democrats losing
control of state Houses in both South Carolina and Virginia for the first time since
Reconstruction.”).
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Republicans on issues such as civil rights more than outweighed the favorable positions of the new minority politicians.324
Unfortunately, the literature on the 1990s redistricting cycle has not
addressed alignment explicitly (because it has not analyzed the partisan
and policy swings that occurred in relation to the preferences of the median voter). Nor have the studies establishing the heterogeneity of majority-minority districts sought to determine whether they, like other diverse
districts, undermine the quality of representation. Still, there is enough
evidence in the existing scholarship for courts to be confident that misalignment is a real possibility in this domain. There is no reason why district diversity would have different consequences in the majority-minority
context,325 nor is it plausible that the median voter in the 1990s shifted as
rapidly as did electoral outcomes and representatives’ policy views. Accordingly, the alignment approach is empirically viable in this area too—
and, if adopted, it would strike an attractive balance between minority
representation on the one hand and preference congruence on the
other.
***
Much more could be said, of course, about how the alignment approach applies to the debates that dominate the field of election law. Past
cases could be reexamined based on their aligning implications, specific
standards could be proposed to convert theory into workable doctrine,
and empirical analyses could be conducted to investigate the prevalence
of misalignment. In future work, I plan to flesh out the approach in exactly these ways. Here, however, my aim has been merely to offer a snapshot—not an exhaustive exegesis—of what election law might look like
through the alignment prism. If I have persuaded the reader that the
prism is novel to the case law and legal literature, appealing because of
its democratic antecedents, and amenable to quantification by social sci-

324. See, e.g., Charles S. Bullock, III, The Impact of Changing the Racial
Composition of Congressional Districts on Legislators’ Roll Call Behavior, 23 Am. Pol. Q.
141, 149 (1995) (“Republicans who replaced Democrats were 24 points more conservative
and 53 points less supportive of civil rights than their predecessors.”); Charles Cameron et
al., Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in
Congress?, 90 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 794, 795 (1996) (finding tradeoff “between maximizing
the number of black representatives in Congress and maximizing the number of votes in
favor of minority-sponsored legislation”); Epstein et al., supra note 323, at 510 (discussing
post-redistricting changes in mean and median vote scores in South Carolina state senate);
Christine Leveaux Sharpe & James C. Garand, Race, Roll Calls, and Redistricting: The
Impact of Race-Based Redistricting on Congressional Roll Call, 54 Pol. Res. Q. 31, 42
(2001) (showing conservative shift in white House members’ voting after loss of minority
constituents).
325. Cf. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 434 (2006)
(observing heterogeneity of majority-Hispanic district “‘could make it more difficult
for . . . Latino-preferred candidates . . . to provide adequate and responsive representation’” (quoting Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 502 (E.D. Tex. 2004))).
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entists, then I have met my goal. The precise details of how the approach
would operate in each electoral context I leave for another day.
IV. THE LIMITS OF ALIGNMENT
To this point, I have focused on the affirmative case for the alignment approach. But it also is important to acknowledge the approach’s
limitations: the reasons why it cannot be applied to every election law
dispute and cannot guarantee that voters’ preferences in fact are congruent with those of their representatives. It is to these limitations that I
turn in this Part. I first concede that alignment is just one of several
compelling democratic values. Other values may be more salient than
alignment in certain kinds of cases, and alignment is less applicable when
it conflicts with competing concerns or when there is no serious risk of
noncongruence. I then explain why election law cannot hope to solve the
problem of misalignment by itself. Many of the factors that produce misalignment are political, historical, geographical, or even psychological—
and thus beyond the domain of the law, at least as the domain commonly
is understood. Law can (and should) exert an aligning influence, but the
actual achievement of preference congruence would require more than
legal reform.
A. Value Pluralism
As several scholars have recognized,326 elections implicate, and seek
to realize, a range of democratic values. This Article’s thesis is that preference alignment is one of these values, indeed one of the most significant of them. But it plainly is not the only relevant consideration in the
electoral sphere. Other noteworthy concerns (most of which have been
mentioned already) include: protecting individual rights such as the
franchise and the freedom to advocate one’s political views; promoting
electoral competition, especially when there is a danger of incumbent
entrenchment; increasing voter participation, turnout in particular; respecting the political equality of all citizens; and ensuring that minorities
are represented adequately in the halls of power.327 These values derive
from an array of cogent theories and cannot easily be ranked relative to
one another. Alignment therefore cannot pretend to clear the field of

326. See, e.g., Charles, Constitutional Pluralism, supra note 28, at 1142 (identifying
values of “majority rule, political participation, accountability, responsiveness, substantial
equality, and interest representation”); Fishkin, Individual Right, supra note 51, at 1297
(defending idea of “‘election law pluralism’: the proposition that there are multiple,
irreducibly distinct interests at stake in voting controversies”); Pildes, Democracy, supra
note 41, at 690 (“Democracy might be justified by a number of different values:
participation, accountability, representation, stability, legitimacy, economic growth, and
better policy outcomes, to name just a few.”).
327. See supra Part I (examining these concerns in detail).
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competing objectives. It is a valuable democratic goal, but it is not the
only such goal.
In which doctrinal contexts is each of these values most salient? This
is not the place for a definitive answer to this question, but I offer below
some tentative assessments, all based on the proposition that values apply
most urgently where they face the greatest potential threats. First, the
protection of individual rights seems most relevant in the franchise restriction, party regulation, and campaign finance fields. These are the
areas in which governmental action most directly may burden people’s
rights to vote, associate, or promote their political opinions.328 Second,
electoral competition likely matters most in the party regulation, redistricting, and franchise restriction contexts.329 Stringent ballot access requirements may prevent rival groups from even being able to challenge
incumbent parties, while bipartisan gerrymanders and impediments to
voting may make elections glaringly uncompetitive even if they nominally
are contested.
Third, voter participation probably is most germane in the franchise
restriction field, in which measures that make it more difficult to vote
may cause turnout to plummet.330 Participation also is a concern (albeit a
lesser one) in the party regulation and redistricting areas, in which inclusive primaries331 and homogeneous constituencies,332 respectively, may
result in modest turnout increases. Fourth, political equality appears
most applicable in the franchise restriction, campaign finance, and redistricting contexts. The norm is undermined when certain people, relative
to their peers, vote with greater ease, expend more resources to sway
elections, or reside in less populous districts.333 Lastly, minority
representation is implicated most directly by the legal rules that help de328. See Fishkin, Individual Right, supra note 51, at 1292 (arguing rights-andinterests balancing is “right approach to the rapidly expanding area of litigation now
known as ‘the new vote denial’”).
329. Not surprisingly, scholars who laud competition tend to focus their commentary
on precisely these areas. See, e.g., Issacharoff, Gerrymandering, supra note 46, at 601–30
(addressing redistricting); Issacharoff & Pildes, Politics as Markets, supra note 35, at 652–
87 (addressing franchise restriction and party regulation); Klarman, supra note 58, at 513–
17, 521–22 (addressing redistricting and party regulation).
330. As one also might expect, participation-oriented scholars devote much of their
attention to franchise restrictions. See, e.g., Elmendorf, Undue Burdens, supra note 54, at
653 (noting “franchise’s role in maintaining [constitutional] lines of accountability”);
Overton, Identification, supra note 60, at 673 (discussing photo identification
requirements as franchise restrictions).
331. See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 601 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (citing study showing “higher voter turnout levels in blanket primary States
than in . . . closed primary States”).
332. See Stephanopoulos, Exceptionalism, supra note 166, at 824–25 (presenting
evidence that turnout is higher in more demographically and socioeconomically
homogeneous districts).
333. See Hasen, Election Law, supra note 48, at 75 (setting forth series of political
equality principles applicable to these contexts).
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termine where minority groups will be able to elect their preferred candidates.334 The value also is at stake in disputes over voting regulations
that may disproportionately affect minority members.
Alignment, then, is a less compelling objective when (and to the extent that) it conflicts with the achievement of these other goals in the
areas in which they are most salient. Fortunately, there seems to be little
tension between alignment and voter participation or political equality.
Alignment and voter participation both are advanced by the lifting of
franchise restrictions, the use of inclusive primaries, and the creation of
homogeneous districts. Similarly, alignment and political equality both
are furthered by liberal voting rules, equally populated districts, and policies that increase the quantity and decrease the variation of campaign
contributions. Not surprisingly, different democratic values sometimes
point in the same direction.
But sometimes different values point in different directions. For instance, party and campaign finance regulations may burden the freedom
of speech while also exerting an aligning influence. There is no alternative to balancing in this situation—to weighing the cost in rights protection against the benefit in preference congruence.335 The regulations’
implications for individual liberties cannot simply be overlooked if the
liberties indeed matter in these contexts. Analogously, alignment and
competition offer divergent perspectives on strict ballot access requirements, inclusive primaries, and incumbent-protecting district plans.
Competition theorists oppose all three policies,336 while the alignment
approach favors the first two and is agnostic about the third.337 The approach’s prescriptions thus can be followed only if the relevant decisionmaker has made the difficult decision to prioritize alignment over
competition. Lastly, as noted earlier, the goals of alignment and minority
representation clash when certain kinds of majority-minority districts are
334. See Karlan, Rights to Vote, supra note 68, at 1740 (arguing “central task of
modern voting rights law must be to control the effects of this [racial] polarization”).
335. See supra Part III.B–C (advocating such balancing in party regulation and
campaign finance contexts); see also Farber, supra note 70, at 377 (arguing that when
election law values conflict, best “strategy is to ‘satisfice’: try to achieve a minimum
satisfactory level of each one”).
336. Competition theorists oppose strict ballot access requirements because they
keep third parties off the ballot; they oppose inclusive primaries because they mute the
policy differences between the major parties; and they oppose incumbent-protecting
district plans because they make elections less competitive. See supra notes 198–199, 268
and accompanying text (discussing these objections).
337. The alignment approach favors strict ballot access requirements (assuming
single-member districts and plurality voting rules) because they reduce the risk of a thirdparty spoiler; it favors inclusive primaries because they encourage nominees to adopt
positions closer to the median general election voter; and it is agnostic about bipartisan
gerrymanders because it regards partisan bias, not competitiveness, as the primary
measure of interest. See supra Part III.B, D (explicating alignment approach in these
areas).
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drawn.338 However, this conflict is not as stark since it often is possible to
create an equivalent number of majority-minority districts without generating misalignment at either the district or legislative levels.339
The alignment approach also is less applicable when the threat of
misalignment is less severe. If the danger against which the approach
guards is less apt to materialize, then the rationale for employing the approach (potentially at some cost to other election law values) weakens in
tandem. Earlier in the Article, I cited the best available estimates of the
extent of misalignment in different areas. These estimates often were
substantial—but sometimes they were rather small. For example, in the
franchise restriction context, photo identification laws seem to produce a
pro-Republican swing of only 0% to 1%, and closing dates for voter registration and purges of voter rolls apparently have no partisan consequences.340 Likewise, in the party regulation field, third parties rarely play
the role of spoiler, and the evidence about the aligning effects of inclusive primaries is mixed.341 In the campaign finance arena too, the literature is divided as to whether uneven spending alters election outcomes
and whether expenditure limits have any electoral impact.342 In all of
these areas, I therefore would hesitate to endorse the alignment approach unequivocally. Misalignment is a theoretical possibility in each
context, but the existing data does not permit the conclusion that it is an
empirical certainty.
In a few additional contexts (which I have ignored until now for this
very reason), misalignment is not even a theoretical possibility. Here
there is no reason to invoke alignment instead of one of the other values
that elections seek to realize. Fusion candidacies, in which multiple parties nominate the same candidate and then all of the candidate’s votes
are aggregated, present one such case.343 Since any votes that a third
party receives when it nominates a major party candidate accrue to the
candidate, there is no risk of a spoiler when fusion is permitted. Internal
party affairs that do not pertain to ballot access or nominee selection are
another topic about which the alignment approach has little to say. Neither attendance at party conventions,344 nor the organization of party

338. Supra notes 310–312 and accompanying text.
339. See supra notes 314–315 and accompanying text.
340. See supra notes 186–189 and accompanying text (reviewing franchise restriction
literature).
341. See supra notes 212, 216–222 and accompanying text (reviewing party
regulation literature).
342. See supra notes 244–251 and accompanying text (reviewing campaign finance
literature).
343. See, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 353–54 (1997)
(describing fusion candidacies and upholding state restrictions on them).
344. See Republican Party of Tex. v. Dietz, 940 S.W.2d 86, 87–88 (Tex. 1997)
(reciting facts).
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committees,345 to cite the facts of two leading cases, can give rise to any
form of misalignment. Still another issue that is unrelated to alignment is
the disclosure of campaign contributions and expenditures. As long as
voters’ partisan and policy preferences are not affected by disclosure
(and there is no evidence that they are), the availability of this information has no aligning implications.
Accordingly, the alignment approach cannot be applied unthinkingly to every kind of election law dispute. Sometimes the threat of misalignment is real, but other important values are implicated as well and
demand to be considered. Sometimes the threat of misalignment is insignificant, in which case the argument for taking other considerations
into account is even stronger. And sometimes misalignment is not a possibility at all, meaning that other concerns are the only ones that need to
be heeded. Unsurprisingly, there is no one-size-fits-all solution to the
many problems of election law. The alignment approach often is the
most democratically appealing and empirically supported framework for
deciding these cases. But occasionally it is not.
B. Law’s Domain
Suppose that every legal reform advocated by this Article were implemented. Franchise restrictions that disproportionately affect particular political groups would be eliminated. Blanket or top-two primaries
would be used to select nominees. Campaign contributions and expenditures would be limited and generous public financing would be provided. And district plans would be drawn so as to minimize partisan bias
while still maintaining the requisite level of minority representation.
Would these policies end the scourge of misalignment once and for all?
No, they would not. They undoubtedly would help, but, as I next discuss,
there are many reasons why voters’ and representatives’ preferences may
diverge, only some of which lie within the domain of election law. These
other explanations for misalignment are highly varied, sounding in partisan influence, legislative structure, political geography, and candidate
psychology, among others. What they have in common is that none relates to a topic that the law of democracy typically is thought to address.346
To begin with, political scientists have identified a host of nonlegal
factors that may result in policy misalignment at the district level (that is,
divergence between the policy preferences of the median voter and those
of her representative). Of these, partisan pressures probably are the most
important. Inside the legislature, party leaders urge representatives to
345. See Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 216–19 (1989)
(reciting facts).
346. To clarify, some of the factors considered in this section are law-related in the
sense that they sometimes can be the subjects of legislation or litigation. But they are not
commonly considered to be topics within the domain of election law in particular.
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vote with their party and threaten them with various adverse consequences—inferior committee assignments, reduced campaign contributions, perhaps even primary challenges—if they fail to do so.347 Outside
the legislature, party activists, who are much more polarized than the
general electorate, lobby candidates to shift their policy positions in the
activists’ direction. Candidates often comply because the activists’ volunteer service, campaign donations, and general enthusiasm are the lifeblood of their campaigns.348 The products of these partisan forces are
politicians whose policy stances are more consistent with their party’s
views than with those of the median voter.349
Institutional features of state government also may have significant
aligning implications at the district level. According to one study, both
legislative professionalization and the presence of term limits are linked
to higher levels of congruence between public opinion and public policy.350 More professional legislators have greater resources to ascertain
the views of the electorate, while term-limited legislators are less beholden to parties and other actors whose stances may differ from those of
voters.351 According to another set of studies, the availability of the voter
initiative promotes policy correspondence as well. At least with respect to
issues that are likely to be the subjects of ballot measures, politicians tend
to diverge less from the preferences of their constituents—perhaps because they fear embarrassment if their positions are repudiated by the
electorate.352
347. See Barbara Sinclair, Party Wars: Polarization and the Politics of National Policy
Making 67–142 (2006) (discussing transformation of internal House organization over last
generation); Sean M. Theriault, Party Polarization in Congress 142 (2008) (“Party leaders
have an arsenal of weapons to cajole recalcitrant members into casting party-loyal
votes . . . .”).
348. See Cohen et al., supra note 116, at 7 (describing parties as “vehicles by which
the most energized segments of the population attempt to pull government policy toward
their own preferences”); Geoffrey C. Layman et al., Activists and Conflict Extension in
American Party Politics, 104 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 324, 331–35, 343 (2010) (finding rise in
activist polarization over time and linking it to rise in polarization in Congress).
349. See McCarty et al., Polarized, supra note 104, at 42 (showing rise of withindistrict polarization over time even controlling for district characteristics); Ansolabehere
et al., Roll-Call Voting, supra note 75, at 542 (finding “increasing level of partisan
divergence as we move from constituents to candidates to legislators”); Masket & Noel,
supra note 75, at 115 (finding legislators “ideologically extreme relative to their districts”).
350. Lax & Phillips, supra note 79, at 160. This study assesses policy outcome
alignment, not policy preference alignment. But the reason why legislative
professionalization and term limits promote policy outcome alignment is that they tend to
make legislators’ policy preferences more consistent with those of their constituents.
Throughout this Part, I categorize studies based on the topics they investigate, not the
particular metrics they employ.
351. E.g., id. at 158–59.
352. See Kevin Arceneaux, Direct Democracy and the Link Between Public Opinion
and State Abortion Policy, 2 St. Pol. & Pol’y Q. 372, 383 (2002) (reporting findings
suggesting that “presence of initiatives and referenda leads to better policy representation
of public opinion”); Burden, supra note 97, at 384–85 (finding that initiative process has
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Still other nonlegal factors that may affect district-level policy alignment are psychological in nature, relating to the perceptions that representatives and voters have of one another.353 With respect to representatives (especially on the Republican side of the aisle), they typically believe
that their constituents are far more conservative than they actually are.354
The representatives therefore may think they are voting in accordance
with their constituents’ preferences when in fact they are not.355 With respect to voters, they tend to ascribe their own views to representatives of
whom they approve, often asserting erroneously that the representatives’
votes are more consistent with their preferences than the votes actually
are.356 Voters also display high levels of partisan loyalty, casting ballots for
candidates from their preferred party even if other candidates are closer
to them in policy terms.357 Voters thus are likely both to fail to grasp the
“positive effect on issue-specific policy responsiveness” for certain issues); Elisabeth R.
Gerber, Legislative Response to the Threat of Popular Initiatives, 40 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 99,
101 (1996) (reporting analysis suggesting that “states that allow initiatives pass legislative
policies . . . that more closely reflect the state’s estimated median preference”); Matsusaka,
supra note 111, at 149–52 (finding that “direct democracy” promotes congruence). But
see Lax & Phillips, supra note 79, at 160–63 (finding no link between voter initiative and
policy congruence); James Monogan et al., Public Opinion, Organized Interests, and
Policy Congruence in Initiative and Noninitiative U.S. States, 9 St. Pol. & Pol’y Q. 304, 319
(2009) (same).
353. A few more factors with aligning implications did not fit neatly into these
categories. Policy responsiveness is higher in individualistic states than in traditionalist
states. See Erikson et al., supra note 111, at 244–47 (showing correlation between “statelevel ideology” and policy responsiveness). Policy congruence is higher in election years.
See Gilens, supra note 241, at 170–74 (showing higher levels of responsiveness in
congressional and presidential election years). And politicians’ own preferences are
another (unsurprising) explanation for policy misalignment. See Michael H. Crespin et
al., Ideology, Electoral Incentives, and Congressional Politics, 34 Am. Pol. Res. 135, 153
(2006) (showing policymaking influence of “reelection goal” and “own policy
preference”).
354. See David E. Broockman & Christopher Skovron, What Politicians Believe About
Their Constituents: Asymmetric Misperceptions and Prospects for Constituency Control 3
(Mar. 3, 2013) (unpublished working paper), available at http://www.ocf.berkeley.edu/
~broockma/broockman_skovron_asymmetric_misperceptions.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (“[C]onservative politicians appear to overestimate support for
conservative policy views among their constituents by over 20 percentage points on
average.”).
355. See id. at 21–22 (“[N]early every conservative legislator . . . believes that they are
congruent with majority opinion in their districts, yet less than half actually are.”
(emphasis omitted)).
356. See J. Matthew Wilson, Testing the Limits of “Representation”: The Effects of
Citizen Biases on Legislative Accountability 12 (July 27, 2012) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2108253 (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(finding that when voter approves of senator, “rate of correct roll-call vote identifications
is dramatically higher when the vote is in accord with the respondent’s own position” and
vice versa).
357. See Jessee, supra note 106, at 73 (finding tendency toward partisan loyalty);
Boris Shor & Jon C. Rogowski, Proximity Voting in Congressional Elections 20–21 (May 8,
2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1643518 (on file
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true extent of policy misalignment (if they like their representatives) and
to vote for candidates despite the misalignment that they do perceive (if
the candidates hail from the right party).
At the legislative level, political geography is the most potent driver
of partisan misalignment that falls outside the scope of election law. As
noted earlier, Democratic voters tend to be highly concentrated in urban
areas, while Republican supporters tend to be distributed more efficiently in suburban, exurban, and rural regions.358 This spatial pattern
frequently results in district plans that exhibit a marked pro-Republican
bias—even if the line-drawing authority did not aim to advantage either
party. A recent study designed hypothetical congressional and state legislative plans for nineteen states using only contiguity and compactness as
criteria.359 Almost all of the resulting plans strongly favored the
Republicans, sometimes by 15% or more, despite the absence of any partisan intent in their formation.360 The only states without a significant
pro-Republican bias either lacked large cities (e.g., Wyoming), contained
dispersed African American populations (e.g., Mississippi), or possessed
nonurban clusters of white Democrats (e.g., Massachusetts).361
The very character of the American electoral system also may be responsible for legislative misalignment, though this time of the policy variety. A large literature analyzes how closely the policy preferences of the
median voter and of the governing party correspond under single-member districts with plurality voting rules versus under proportional representation (PR).362 Most of these studies find that PR systems systematically produce higher levels of correspondence.363 The inferior perforwith the Columbia Law Review) (noting that “self-identified partisans” tend to vote
consistent with affiliation). However, providing additional information to voters makes
them more likely to support candidates who are spatially more proximate. See Jessee,
supra note 106, at 73 (showing correlation between information level and willingness to
deviate from party affiliation); Boudreau et al., supra note 102, at 25 (finding that lowinformation voters voted more consistently with policy preferences when provided with
“voter guide”).
358. See supra note 295 and accompanying text (discussing literature showing this
concentration).
359. Chen & Rodden, supra note 295, at 15, 29 (explaining study methodology).
360. Id. at 49 fig.10.
361. Id. at 30, 49 fig.10; see also Rodden, Long Shadow, supra note 295, at 145–63
(finding persistent bias in favor of right-wing party in Australian, British, Canadian, and
New Zealand district plans).
362. E.g., McDonald & Budge, supra note 113; Powell, supra note 98; André Blais &
Marc André Bodet, Does Proportional Representation Foster Closer Congruence Between
Citizens and Policy Makers?, 39 Comp. Pol. Stud. 1243 (2006); Ian Budge & Michael D.
McDonald, Election and Party System Effects on Policy Representation: Bringing Time
into a Comparative Perspective, 26 Electoral Stud. 168 (2007); Golder & Stramski, supra
note 98; Huber & Powell, supra note 98; McDonald et al., supra note 98; Powell &
Vanberg, supra note 94.
363. See, e.g., McDonald & Budge, supra note 113, at 129 (finding median voter
better represented in proportional representation system); Powell, supra note 98, at 221
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mance of U.S.-style systems is due to both the vote-seat distortion that is
common with plurality voting rules and the smaller number of parties in
these systems, which makes it less likely that the governing party will reflect the views of the median voter. In contrast, PR systems convert votes
to seats with greater accuracy and give rise to a larger number of parties,
thus increasing the odds that the governing party (or coalition) will capture the median voter’s preferences.
Finally, though this Article does not emphasize policy outcome alignment,364 it is worth noting a few of the factors that may cause enacted law
not to match the median voter’s preferences even if the median legislator’s views do. First, the median legislator may not get the opportunity to
vote on a bill favored by the median voter. Party leaders maintain strict
agenda control in most modern legislatures, and they often have reasons
not to permit popular legislation to be put to a vote.365 Second, the median legislator rarely is the pivotal legislator whose consent is necessary
for a bill to pass. Committees that do not mirror the composition of the
entire body, supermajority voting rules, and the existence of two chambers with distinct preference distributions are just some of the features of
American legislatures that bestow great power upon legislators located
away from the overall median.366 Third, even if the median legislator is
the pivotal legislator and even if she gets to vote on a bill, the executive,
whose consent also is necessary for the bill to be enacted, may not share
the median voter’s preferences. In a government with separated powers,
both the median legislator and the executive must hold the median
voter’s views in order for these views to be realized.
None of this should be construed as the counsel of despair. The
right kinds of election law rules certainly can exert an aligning influence,
and indeed can eliminate one form of misalignment—partisan misalignment between the median voter and her representative—altogether.
Moreover, that some of the forces that cause voters’ and politicians’ pref(same); Budge & McDonald, supra note 362, at 175 (same); Huber & Powell, supra note
98, at 309 (same); McDonald et al., supra note 98, at 24 (same). But see Blais & Bodet,
supra note 362, at 1259 (finding no clear difference in policy alignment between U.S.-style
and PR systems); Golder & Stramski, supra note 98, at 101 (same).
364. See supra note 111 and accompanying text (citing and discussing studies
exploring outcome alignment in depth).
365. See generally Gary W. Cox & Matthew D. McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan:
Party Government in the House 237 (1993) (noting House Speaker’s agenda control
“stabiliz[es] policy decisions that may be far away in spatial terms from the median floor
member’s ideal point”); Theriault, supra note 347, at 53 (reviewing legislative majorities’
methods and strategies for controlling floor votes).
366. See Keith Krehbiel, Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking 232 (1998)
(arguing “strong form of the median voter theory—which claims that lawmaking outcomes
are always median-legislator outcomes—is . . . too strong”); Jim Battista et al., Policy
Representation in the State Legislatures 24–26 (Mar. 24, 2013) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://polisci.uga.edu/uploadedfiles/peress.pdf (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (finding model taking into account pivotal legislators and party cartels
explains policy outcomes better than median legislator model).
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erences to diverge are nonlegal simply means that law reform cannot
solve the problem of misalignment by itself. It does not mean that the
problem is unsolvable, or that an effort that married legal, political, and
institutional proposals would be doomed to failure. It generally is the
case that law alone cannot remake society. It should be no cause for
gloom that the democratic sphere is not an exception to this rule.
CONCLUSION
Election law doctrine has long been dominated by rights-and-interests balancing: the weighing of the burdens imposed on individual rights
by electoral regulations against the state interests served by the regulations. For the last fifteen years or so, the election law literature has emphasized structural values that relate to the functional realities of the
electoral system, competition chief among them. In this Article, I have
sought to introduce and defend a new structural theory—the alignment
approach—that has the potential to reframe and unify many election law
debates. The crux of the approach is that voters’ and representatives’
preferences ought to be congruent, with respect to both party and policy,
at both the district and legislative levels. Alignment is normatively attractive because it derives from the basic definition of democracy itself.
Alignment also is doctrinally useful because it directs our attention to a
key potential harm, misalignment, in contexts including franchise restriction, party regulation, campaign finance, redistricting, and minority
representation.
The alignment approach walks a fine line between obviousness and
novelty. On the one hand, the notion that voters’ and representatives’
preferences should be congruent hardly is revolutionary. It is a similar
idea to the economists’ proposition that agents (here elected officials)
should obey principals (here the electorate), as well as to the median
voter theorem of political science, which asserts that candidates should
converge on this figure’s position.367 On the other hand, the courts very
rarely have acknowledged the importance of alignment in a democracy,
and legal scholars have been preoccupied to date with structural values
other than preference congruence. The argument that the purpose of
elections is to promote alignment—and that the purpose of election law
should be to facilitate their aligning role—has not previously been advanced in any sort of systematic fashion. Again, I doubt that this thesis
would strike anyone engaged in the field as entirely unexpected. But
there is still value in saying something explicitly that until now has only
been implicit. There is still value in taking a claim that has long been inchoate and making it concrete.

367. See supra notes 13, 117–118 and accompanying text (discussing principal-agent
perspective and median voter theorem).
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